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FRIDAY, 3 OCTOBER 1969 
IN THE CHAIR :Mr. SCELBA 
President of the European Parliament 
The Sitting was opened at 3.30 p.m. 
I.  0 pening of the  Joint  Meeting 
The Chairman(/).-I declare open the 16th Joint Meeting of 
the  members  of  the  Consultative  Assembly  of  the  Council  of 
Europe and the members of the European Parliament. 
May I  remind you that the Rules  of  Procedure in force  are 
those  which  have  been  jointly  adopted  by  the  Bureaux  of  the 
Consultative Assembly of the  Council  of  Europe and the Euro-
pean Parliament. 
Members who  wish  to  speak should add their names  to  the 
list of speakers in Room 70/  A. 10  CONSULTATIVE  ASSEMBLY- EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
2.  Apologies  for  absence 
The Chairman (/). -Mrs. Elsner, MM.  Leemans, Dittrich, 
De Gryse,  Miss  Flesch, MM.  Armengaud, Triboulet, Starke  and 
Van  Offelen  have  apologised  for  not  being  able  to  attend  the 
sittings today and tomorrow. 
3.  Report  by  Mr.  Hougardy 
I.  Minimum conditions for  the  success of European mone-
tary co-operation 
II.  Activities of the European Parliament from  1 May 1968 
to 30 April1969 
The Chairman (l).  - The next  item  on  the  agenda  is  the 
presentation  of the  report by  Mr.  Hougardy,  Rapporteur of the 
European Parliament, on: 
I.  "Minimum conditions for the success of European mone-
tary co-operation"; 
II.  "Activities of the European Parliament from  1 May 1968 
to 30 April 1969". 
I call Mr. Hougardy. 
Mr. Hougardy, Rapporteur of the European Parliament  (F). 
- Mr.  Chairman,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  as  has  long been the 
practice,  the  report  before  you  comprises  two  parts,  a  political 
part and a documentary part. 
The documentary  part consists  of  the  report proper on the 
activities  of  the  European  Parliament  £rom  1  May  1968  to 
30 April 1969. 
In other words, this part which, in accordance with the statu-
tory  provisions,  is  to  be  discussed  at  the  Joint  Meeting  of  the JOINT  MEETING  OF  3-4  OCTOBER  1969  11 
members  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, summadses the activities  of 
the European Parliament; it consequently describes in a particular 
political  light  the  development  and  activities  of  the  European 
Community. 
Every effort has been made to keep the text within reasonable 
proportions, for to  have given  a  detailed account of  the increas-
ingly extensive activities of our Parliament would have meant the 
report's assuming encyclopaedic dimensions-which is  hardly ap-
propriate for a parliamentary document. 
In order to give  you some idea of the volume  of work im-
posed on the European Parliament, let me quote some figures from 
the report. 
The Parliament met for  35  days  in plenary sittings.  Its  12 
committees  held  altogether  24  7  meetings,  that is  25  more  than 
in  the previous  year.  It was  consulted  104 times  in the  course 
of the year, as compared with 78  times during the preceding year 
and  52  times  during  the  year  1966-1967.  Consequently,  the 
number  of  reports  drawn  up  by the  Parliament  also  increased 
-from 105 for the year 1966-1967 to 124 in 1968-1969. 
The  number  of  written  questions  put  by  members  of  the 
Parliament rose from 188 to 359.  In addition, 16 questions were 
publicly debated during the period in question. 
The extent of  this  activity,  which  equals,  where  it  does  not 
exceed, that of the national parliaments, reveals one of the reasons 
why the European Parliament demands with increasing impatience 
that it should be elected by direct suffrage. 
The delegates' dual roles  impose increasingly heavy burdens 
on them, which they find it more and more difficult to bear. 
But the  debate  which  brings  us  together  here  is  concerned 
with  the  first  part of  the  report,  entitled:  "Minimum  conditions 
for  the  success  of  European  monetary  co-operation",  a  theme 12  CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
whose topicality I  am sure I need not explain in advance to this 
Assembly. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, the report on monetary policy which 
I  have the honour to present to you was  drafted,  completed and 
adopted by the European Parliament before the French devalua-
tion, before the violent debate on monetary policy in the Federal 
Republic of Germany and before the German Government's deci-
sion, at the beginning of this week, to allow the Deutsche Mark to 
find its own level on the exchange market. 
Our Assembly,  too,  is  meeting  just  when  the  International 
Monetary Fund is  sitting ,in Washington, and a few  weeks before 
the summit meeting to be held in The Hague on 17  and 18  Nov-
ember next.  However, I do not think that anything in the situa-
tion I described before these events has improved in the meantime. 
On the contrary, what I  said in the report about this  acute cris,is 
and  its  unfortunate  repercussions  has  proved  accurate.  I  refer 
on this point to the remarks in paragraph 7 of the report on the 
repercussions of monetary difficulties on the agricultural common 
market, and in paragraph 6 on the problem of the exchange rate. 
If, since then, your Rapporteur's fears have been confirmed, 
namely that the very existence of the agricultural common market 
would  be menaced by  a  unilateral change  in  the exchange  rates 
of one or more member countr,ies and that disintegration would be 
the only likely  result;  if the  forecasts  and fears  contained in the 
report have been confirmed in these fields,  this is no reason to call 
them prophecies. 
This assessment is  the result of a lucid analysis of the nature 
of  the  crisis  and its  causes; it is  not a piece of wishful  thinking, 
it does  not take  as  its  starting-point the  notion that nothing  can 
happen  that  is  not  logical  and  is  consequently  impossible,  but 
neither  is  it  based  on  the  idea  that  the  elimination  of  certain 
symptoms is synonymous with cure. 
If I  may extend this  metaphor,  just as  an illness  cannot be 
cured without precise and unflinching diagnosis,  in the same way JOINT  MEETING  OF  3-4  OCTOBER  I969  13 
the  present monetary  crisis  cannot  be  combated  effectively  and 
with hope of lasting results  so  long as  its  causes  and  the  extent 
of their effect are left out of account. 
Let us  take an  example.  The symptoms  of  monetary crisis 
are  more  disquieting  than  ever.  In my  country,  Belgium,  the 
banks are proposing an interest rate of  10-12 per cent and even 
more for short-term loans.  Economically, such a situation cannot 
be long maintained without the most dire consequences. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany,  a few  days before the 
elections for  the Bundestag, the influx of currency was  such that 
the federal issuing bank and the government were obliged tempo-
rarily  to  close  the  exchange  market.  The  German Government 
saw  no  other  possible  way  of  solving  the  country's  monetary 
difficulties but to adopt a measure which had seemed inconceivable 
since the conclusion of  the  Bretton Woods  Agreements  in  1945, 
and which creates a new situation in international monetary rela-
tions, namely the abolition of the official margin of fluctuation of 
the Deutsche Mark. 
These events, for all their importance, are only danger signals, 
pathological symptoms, but not the danger, the sickness itself. 
No  responsible  politician  or economist will  be  so  foolish  as 
to  believe that the crisis  is  over as  soon  as  the exchange market 
is re-opened, the flow of currency into Germany returns to normal, 
the  exchange  rate  of  the  Deutsche Mark is  fixed  again  and the 
interest rate reduced to normal proportions. 
Indeed, and I  wish  to insist on this  point in introducing my 
report and the debate which will follow, the monetary crisis which 
is  shaking  Europe  and  the  Western  monetary  system  to  their 
very  foundations  is  not  primarily  of  an  economic  or  technical 
nature but is  essentially,  in its  origin and its character,  political. 
Consequently, there can be no question of seeking a solution pri-
marily in monetary policy or technical measures; the solution  of 
the monetary crisis, if there is one, will be a political solution. 14  CONSULTATIVE  ASSEMBLY- EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
What are the causes of the crisis? 
They are political, not only  in the  sense  that the  difficulties 
appear to flow from the application of faulty or mistaken monetary 
or economic policies by the governments concerned, but also,  and 
principally,  because  these  difficulties  arise  from  the  absence  of 
suitable structures or the weakness of existing structures.  But the 
main cause of the crisis is  the fact that the monetary geography 
of  the  Western  world  no  longer  reflects  its  political  geography. 
Each of  last  year's  crises  was  due  to  the  weakness  of  the  two 
main reserve currences, the dollar and the pound. 
However, the main cause of the dollar's weakness is the world 
role which the United States feels obliged to play and the excessive 
burden this  places on the American budget; as  for  the weakness 
of  the  pound  sterling,  it is  due  principally  to  the  new  place  of 
Great Br,itain in world politics.  Britain's political function is  no 
longer commensurate with her monetary role; the structure of  the 
sterling area, which is  the monetary basis of sterling's world role, 
no longer corresponds to  political and economic reality. 
Similarly,  one of the causes of the crisis of the French franc 
is  the  disproportion  between  the  tasks  which  French policy  has 
assumed  or has  had thrust upon it,  and the  country's  economic 
capacity-in  other  words,  the  disproportion  between  economic 
and political realities. 
The  monetary  policies  of  the  two  European  countries,  as 
revealed  in  the monetary crisis,  seem ·to me to throw particular 
light on the basic problem: a state's currency represents that state, 
it represents the state's guarantee of the whole economic process, 
especially  of  the  fundamental  value  relationships  governing  ex-
change both within the state and outside.  The extension of eco-
nomic  activity  beyond the  state's frontiers  through foreign  trade 
in  no  way  changes  this  role  of  currency  and  consequently  the 
state's guarantee, but it does provide a measure of state's political 
efficiency. 
Great Britain's and France's monetary problems are not es-
sentially  problems  of  monetary  technique,  nor  are  they  mainly JOINT  MEETING  OF  3-4  OCTOBER  1969  15 
economic problems.  They raise the political question of the state's 
guarantee  capabilities,  and  they  do  so. directly  on  the  psycho-
logical plane.  The speculation against the French franc was  trig-
gered not only  by  economic factors  but also,  and  perhaps  even 
more,  by  psychological  factors.  It developed  in  proportion  to 
the disappearance,  whether justified or not,  of  confidence  in the 
French Government's  ability to  act,  and was  thus finally  one  of 
the main causes of the fall of that government. 
The President of the French Republic had indeed attempted, 
last  autumn,  to  check  the  developing  crisis  in  its  early  stages 
by psychological methods in refusing to  devalue because he saw 
no economic or monetary reason to do so.  The European mone-
tary  crisis  will  not,  therefore,  be  resolved  by  having  recourse, 
exclusively  or even  principally,  to  measures  of  monetary policy, 
but by acting in such a way that both the monetary and economic 
instruments  brought  into  operation  are  commensurate  with  the 
new  needs  and  by  re-establishing  in  these  countries,  in  Europe 
and more generally throughout the world, confidence in the state's 
ability to act and to provide guarantees in these fields. 
But will  that be  possible,  and  under  what  conditions?  To 
speak  of  the  state's  ability  to  act  and to  guarantee  its  currency 
is  at  the  same  time  to  ask  whom  we  are  driving  at.  For  in 
Western  Europe,  the  monetary  situation  has  been  made  all  the 
more  critical  by  the  mere  existence  of  the  institution  which  is 
supposed to  create  the  conditions  and instruments  necessary  for 
the appropriate solution of monetary problems, namely the Euro-
pean Community and the Common Market. 
Integration of the  economies  by sectors has revealed  differ-
ences  in  level,  the  negative  side  of  which  is  that they  preclude 
any possibility of influencing the market politically. 
The growing integration of markets is not matched by a grow-
ing integration of  guidance mechanisms,  with the result that the 
ways  in which  governments  can  act in  economic  and  monetary 
policy  matters  are increasingly  modified.  Economic  trends  are 
no  longer  a  purely  "domestic"  pr6blem:  the  six  economies  are 16  CONSULTATIVE  ASSEMBLY  - EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
caught up in a general current, and although this can still,  up to 
a  point,  be  nationally directed,  protection on a  national scale  is 
no longer possible. 
Every government must  expect to  see  its  own  economy  in-
fluenced by its partners' policies, but it can exert no direct influ-
ence on them.  It cannot now even protect itself  against possible 
unfavourable repercussions, except by placing restrictions on inter-
national trade,  in  other words  by  applying  a  policy  contrary to 
the rules agreed by the member states of the Community. 
The  freedom  of  action  of  the  institutions  responsible  for 
economic  policy  is  thus  limited  in  two  ways.  National govern-
ments continue to bear responsibility for the overall development 
of  the  economy.  But they  can  no  longer  act  independently  in 
all  sectors; their freedom  is  restricted by Community machinery. 
As for  the freedom of  action of the Community institutions, 
this in turn is limited by the powers still wielded by national gov-
ernments.  In certain  important economic  sectors,  these  institu-
tions have no power at all, or their power is  only accessory. 
No political body bears direct and full responsibility for the 
entire economic and political weight of the Common Market, for 
no  such  body  exists.  Thus  the  six  economies  are  striving  to 
achieve  a  single  market  without  conforming  to  a  single  overall 
authority.  There is  no  suitable governing machinery to  regulate 
the working of the market as a whole. 
The Common Market can only function under the following 
conditions:  either  a  common  economic  policy  must  be  imple-
mented, that means practising within the Community an economic 
policy  which  is  the same in  its  broad outlines,  or the  system  of 
floating  exchange rates must be adopted; floating  exchange  rates 
would  permit  a  certain  amount  of  diversification  in  economic 
development  within  the  framework  of  free  exchange  within 
the Community, and would help to lessen the present difficulties. 
A  third  solution  would  be  to  maintain  or  to  re-establish JOINT  MEETING  OF  3-4  OCTOBER  I969  17 
national frontiers for certain sectors of the economy; that is what 
happened recently after the devaluation of the French franc. 
That,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  is  the  choice  which  faces  the 
Community.  It  will  be  important  to  know  to  which  of  these 
solutions  we  shall  be  committed by  each  step  we  shall  have  to 
take in the coming months. 
The third  solution,  that is,  the maintenance  or re-establish-
ment of national frontiers,  would  amount to the  achievement in 
Europe of one of man's oldest dreams, in so far as it is practicable 
and people have sufficient patience to put up with it.  The Com-
mon Market would thus become a system of perpetual motion at 
last  achieved.  It would  mean setting  off  an  endless  movement 
which  continually  brough  us  back  to  our  starting-point.  From 
the protection of national markets we  should move to  free  trade, 
which would in turn lead, under the effect of monetary disparities 
and fluctuating exchanges rates, to restrictions in the free circula-
tion of goods, and so on and so forth. 
The second solution, floating  exchange rates,  is  equally sus-
pect.  It would mean allowing rates of exchange to float,  ~s is  so 
often  advocated at present and as  the Federal Republic of  Ger-
many has just done in practice. 
We must be fully  aware, even more than for the other solu-
tions, just what steps in this direction would be bound to cost. 
Widening the band of permiss·ible fluctuation is  in fact a way 
of· dissimulating a de  facto revaluation or devaluation.  It would 
probably not prevent speculation.  Floating rates  seem  almost  a 
direct incitement to speculation.  On the other hand, the increased 
exchange  risk  would  produce  a  reduction  in  intra-Community 
trade and internal investment,  that is,  a reduction in the rate of 
economic growth. 
This solution of slowing down the Common Market to idling 
speed would no doubt be practicable for a transitional period, but 
it would  deprive  the  Community  of  its  principal  raison  d'etre. 18  CONSULTATIVE  ASSEMBLY- EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
In trying  to  camouflage  a  weakness  in  the  monetary  field  and 
succeeding in the  short term,  one would discover  another weak-
ness  on the  plane of international trade.  Variable  rates  of  ex-
change make international trade less attractive. 
The first  reaction among  business  circles,  for  example,  was 
fear of a reduction in the volume of trade with the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, because future transactions would involve exces-
sive and insufficiently predictable risks for importers. 
Intra-Community trade is  even more severely  affected.  The 
main advantage which the Common Market brought the business 
world,  we must remember, was  increased security in its business 
dealings.  Intra-Community trade became less and less like inter-
national transactions, with all their risks as compared with internal 
trade.  Variable rates  of  exchange  may  be  a  palliative  for  the 
monetary world,  but so  far  as  international  trade  is  concerned, 
they put an end to the security which the Bretton Woods Agree-
ments had ensured and which had permitted the tremendous  ex-
pansion  in  international  trade  since  1945,  and  they  have  also 
reduced  to  nought  the  considerable  advantages  brought  by  the 
Common Market. 
There is  no doubt that the first  of the three possibilities, the 
implementation of a common monetary policy, is, with its essential 
pre-condition, the establishment of fixed  parities, the only logical 
solution. 
The situation  of  the  Western  European  economies  will  not 
become  politically  acceptable  again  until  this  has  been  done. 
However, the fact that a solution is logical does not guarantee its 
political implementation, nor does it mean that we  know how to 
apply  it.  Before it  can be  implemented,  we  must be convinced 
of its  necessity.  As for  the  ways  and means,  they  are  not pri-
marily a matter for the experts but will depend above  all  on the 
state of the  economies  concerned and their inter-relationships as 
well as on the prior political situation of the member states. 
These two factors are inseparable.  It must first  be borne in 
mind  that  at present  the  member  states  practise  monetary  and JOINT  MEETING  OF  3-4  OCTOBER  1969  19 
economic policies which are just as independent of one another as 
their general policies,  and consequently there are differences  be-
tween  them  it  economic  development:  the  present  crisis  is  the 
express,ion of those differences. 
In this situation,  is  it not utopian to want fixed  parities and 
automatic monetary support?  Those are in fact both instruments 
of  a  sort  of  internal  compensation  system  which  is  usual  and 
normal between regions  subject to the same political system,  but 
which  is  not well  thought  of  on  an  international  scale.  Fixed 
parities,  in  fact,  imply  support for  the.  weakest  economy by  the 
strongest.  As long as  each country can be responsible for getting 
itself into difficulties,  whilst the countries of  the Community still 
observe the international law of non-interference in internal affairs, 
it is difficult to see how governments can be persuaded of the need 
for such solidarity. 
The paymaster  wants  his  money's  worth.  There  could  be 
no question of pooling only expenses.  The governments and the 
Community institutions  have  therefore  acknowledged,  as  indeed 
they  must,  the  urgent  need  to  ensure  the  co-ordination  of  their 
economic policies, and they have taken steps to that effect. 
That was  certainly  an absolute  necessity  in  the  short term. 
But how  can  and must  that co-ordination  be  ensured?  In this 
context  a  whole  series  of  major  problems  arise  which  must  be 
considered if, in a short time, a general feeling of failure is  not to 
spread and the idea to gain credence that a united Europe cannot 
be achieved anyway. 
Politically,  the  most  important  question  is  this:  who  will 
ensure  that  co-ordination?  It  will  be,  we  are  told  today,  the 
governments, through the 'intermediary of special committees and 
expert committees, but this  reply provokes another question:  will 
these committees really be able to ensure co-ordination and, if so, 
at  what  price?  If co-ordination  is  to  be  ensured by  inter-state 
bodies,  such as  the Committee  of Permanent Representatives  or 
the existing  specialist  committees,  that means  that an important 
aspect of economic policy will  increasingly escape parliamentary 
control. 20  CONSULTATIVE  ASSEMBLY- EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
The  fixing  of  medium-term  objectives  and  decisions  on 
medium-term joint measures  have  already,  from  outside,  limited 
parliaments' freedom  of  choice.  The result  might be the further 
accentuation of  the  already precipitous  weakening  of  the demo-
cratic  element within  the  Community.  If we  interfere  with  the 
legitimate  rights  of  parliaments,  we  must  not  be  surprised  if 
Community  measures  meet  with  resistance.  What  government 
could  insist  on  implementing  agreed  measures  in  the  fact  of 
internal pressure? 
Ladies and Gentlemen, you as par1iamentarians know that the 
ultimate  criterion  by  which  a  government  will  reach  a  decision 
is the effect of that decision in the struggle for  power among the 
political forces  inside  the  country.  To reject  the  claims  of  na-
tional, political or social groups can cost a government its chances 
of re-election.  And re-election is  one of the  essential postulates 
of any government.  Governments tend, if they  are not obliged, 
to bow to the necessities implied by the need to maintain power 
rather than conform to international agreements. 
This being so,  if economic  objectives  jointly agreed to  with 
partner  countries  are  not  to  be  abandoned  when  elections  ap-
proach, if social  anxiety  is  not  to be translated into policy  and 
if the  political forces  in member  states  are  not to  turn against 
the Community idea, we must at last embark upon democratisation 
as a new minimum measure, enlisting the co-operation of political 
,groups  and  economic  and  social  organisations  in  defining  the 
Community's econpmic and monetary objectives. 
To establish such a programme, it is  essential that there be 
a primary obligation to consult the European Parliament. 
Before  concluding,  I  should  like  to  raise  one  point,  which 
also  seems  to  me important,  if the  success  of  a  joint monetary 
and economic policy is  to be ensured. 
The envisaged harmonisation of economic policies brings with 
it new  restrictions  on  member  states'  freedom  of  action,  while 
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In this context, the Community has not produced the desired 
effect,  namely a  rapprochement of  the objectives pursued by the 
countries of the Community in foreign  policy.  On the contrary, 
their  positions  on  several  important  questions  of  international 
foreign policy are more divergent than they have been at any time 
since the end of the second world war. 
The governments thus find  themselves in  a  dilemma:  on the 
one  hand,  they  are  still  nationally  responsible  for  their  foreign 
policy;  on the other hand, they can no longer make unrestricted 
use of instruments  of  economic policy.  However,  monetary and 
financial policy are essential instruments in any country's foreign 
policy.  Expenditure on defence, international loans, development 
aid and the like  are among  the means  a country employs in the 
protection of  its  interests  abroad.  Now  the policies  pursued by 
the states of the Community in these three fields  are still strictly 
national  ones.  There  is  nothing  in  that  to  encourage  them  to 
persevere along the path to integration; on the contrary.  It may 
be feared that great progress in the field  of Community economic 
and monetary policy  is  hardly possible  as  long  as  the  objectives 
of foreign policy have not been brought closer together. 
Success in Community policy can therefore be judged only in 
relation to  how much nearer the decisions  taken bring us  to the 
goal of a common policy in vital sectors of state and society, that 
is  to say the extent to which they reveal the existence of  a com-
mon political will and clear a path for it. 
The harmonisation  of  economic  and  monetary policies  will 
not bring this goal within our grasp.  It will create new technical 
constraints  whose  logical  outcome  is  political  unification;  but 
it will  not be  realised  that such  constraints  cannot be properly 
dealt with by applying a common policy. 
We  must  bow  to  the  facts:  the  advance  towards  political 
unity, and thus towards an independent destiny for Europe, cannot 
be  begun  until  economic  and  monetary  policy  are  conceived, 
understood and desired,  as  the instruments of a  common overall 
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This brings me to my conclusions. 
Monetary co-operation depends on co-operation in economic 
policy-which must gradually become mandatory. 
Economic co-operation can only become mandatory in so far 
as  jointly defined aims  are gradually incorporated in  a  common 
overall policy. 
As long as  the foreign policies of member states continue to 
differ  in  important  ways  on  a  number  of  essential  points,  the 
prospect  of  a  common,  or  even  simply  harmonised,  economic 
and monetary policy remains limited. 
As  long  as  the political  organisations  of  the  peoples  of  the 
Community  are denied  all  chance  of  helping  to shape  decisions 
and determine economic and monetary objectives, common objec-
tives are unlikely to be realised. 
These conclusions indicate the following tasks: 
1.  A common monetary policy can only be arrived at in stages. 
These  stages  must  be  closely  linked  with  the  progress  towards 
economic union.  The essential minimum conditions for  success-
ful  monetary co-operation  is  real  co-ordination  of  the  medium-
term  economic  policy  objectives  of  member  states  and  of  their 
day-to-day economic policies. 
2.  Mandatory co-ordination must be gradually strengthened by: 
(a)  the setting-up  of monetary machinery to provide short-
term and longer-term aid to states that find themselves in economic 
difficulties  in  relation  to  other  countries;  the  conditions  for 
application of this machinery must be such that the obligation to 
co-ordinate is increased; 
(b)  the  establishment of  new machinery,  or the adaptation 
of  existing  machinery,  for  financial  equalisation  on  a  European 
scale. /,''  .. ;·,,, 
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3.  Common guidelines should be sought for the supply of capital 
in  accordance  with  the  major  medium-term  objectives  jointly 
agreed.  It will then be possible to do away with official variations 
in exchange rates. 
4.  A  common monetary policy requires  a  uniform  attitude  on 
the part of member states to the rest of  the world,  especially in 
international  monetary  institutions.  An  approach  common  to 
all European states should be sought. 
5.  Financial equalisation in its various forms will be a,cceptable 
to donor countries only in so far as it is  accompanied by the first 
steps towards common guidelines for overall policy and the neces-
sary procedures are established to that end.  But these two con-
ditions can be met only to the extent that a politically conscious 
Community  public  opinion  can  be  formed  and  made  aware  of 
the  drawbacks  of  lack  of  co-ordination  in  national  economic 
policies  and of the dangers to democracy if  co-ordination is  con-
fined to the state level. 
Everything which urgently demands political unity therefore, 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  has  a  claim  to  priority.  Economic  and 
monetary policy  aims  must be studied in relation to the general 
policy  aims  of  the Community, for  otherwise  what seeks  to de-
velop into European policy-supposing we  ever got so far-will 
in  fact  be nothing  more  than  a  monstrous  tangle  of  extremely 
laborious compromises between the interests  of  different groups. 
The  agricultural  market  should  serve  as  a  warning.  That 
is  why the general aims of Western European policy must 3:t  last 
be defined.  Governments must force themselves-or be forced-
to settle their political differences  directly and in public,  and not 
go on defying the laws of equilibrium in order to escape them. 
Mr.  Chairman,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  the  time  for  costly 
subterfuge is past. (Applause.) 
The Chairman  ([).  -Thank you,  Mr.  Hougardy,  for  your 
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4. Reports on behalf of the Consultative Assembly 
of the Council of Europe by Mr. Petersen, 
Rapporteur of the Committee on Economic Affairs 
and Development, 
and by Mr. Federspiel, 
Rapporteur of the Political Affairs Committee 
The Chairman  (/). - The next  item  on the  agenda  is  the 
presentation of the reports prepared on behalf of the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe by Mr. Petersen, Rapporteur 
of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development, and by 
Mr.  Federspiel,  Rapporteur  of  the  Political  Affairs  Committee. 
I call Mr. Petersen. 
Mr.  Petersen,  Rapporteur of the  Consultative  Assembly  of 
the  Council of Europe.  - I  wish  to  commence  by  offering  my 
felicitations to Mr. Hougardy on his exoellent report. which I have 
had the opportunity to study for some time. and on his extensive 
and penetrating introduction to the problems under discussion this 
afternoon. 
I have the honour, on behalf of the Committee on Economic 
Affairs  and  Development  of  the  Consultative  Assembly  of  the 
Council of Europe, to present to this Joint Meeting the report on 
the minimum requirements for the success of European monetary 
co-operation.  It is a difficult theme on which to report. 
First, what  do  we  mean by monetary co-operation?  If the 
aim  is  to prevent further  foreign  exchange crises  that might  de-
velop  into devaluations,  that in itself would be a very important 
achievement.  Or do we  aim  at co-operation that will  make the 
monetary  systems  of  the  European countries  function  smoothly 
and effectively, that is,  prevent balance-of-payments disturbances, 
guarantee full employment and rapid economic growth and stable 
prices?  That is a much more ambitious task. · Or do we go to the 
limit and envisage  a  system with a common European monetary 
unit?  Then,  indeed,  the  minimum  requirements  would  be  sub-
stantial.  Nothing less  than a  central monetary power would  be 
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To take  quite  another  approach,  if we  had a  real  political 
union in Europe we would have no inter-state monetary problems. 
There would  be no foreign  exchange problems between London 
and Edinburgh, Frankfurt and Hamburg, New York and Chicago. 
If we insist on political union as  a condition for successful mone-
tary co-operation, then we can leave out all the monetary technics. 
What we then have is  a purely political problem. If  political union 
could be established the whole complex of problems under discus-
sion this afternoon would disappear. 
On the other hand, if we had to deal with separate states or 
groups  of states with different monetary units and monetary sys-
tems,  monetary disturbances would  disappear if  all  governments 
acted as if they were part of a great union.  If they did show, with 
no limitation,  this  kind  of self  -discipline,  monetary disturbances, 
and· with them monetary problems, would be reduced to  a mini-
mum.  This  is  a  very  nice  theory,  but-as Mr.  Hougardy  has 
already said-self-discipline in  this  respect may mean restrictive 
measures which might be very unpopular; and there is  a limit to 
how far governments will dare to go in imposing restrictions and 
hardship on their people, even if they are advised by experts. 
Very  often,  therefore,  there will  not be a political basis  for 
the necessary self-discipline that would restore economic balance. 
In the  absence  of political union with  a central monetary power 
and in the absence of the possibility of sufficient self  -discipline, we 
have to fall back on something in between.  The ·question is  how 
can we  improve  the  monetary technic  and  the  way  of  handling 
monetary policy in such a  way  that monetary disturbances  may 
be  reduced.  That is,  of  course,  not  a  strictly  European but  a 
world-wide  problem.  It brings  us  to  the  problems  of monetary 
technicalities, such as  exchange rate fluctuation,  "crawling pegs", 
the consolidation of deficits by long-term borrowing, swap arrange-
ments,  recycling of hot money and surprise devaluations  such as 
that we have seen lately in France, and now, with developments 1!1 
Germany, free floating exchange rates.  I do not intend to go into 
details on such problems because that would take hours, but they 
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they who will have to take the decisions on which reforms should 
be introduced. 
All these measures have some merits as  well  as  some draw-
backs.  There  are  comments  on  them  in  my  report.  If some 
consensus should come out of this debate on one or more of these 
points, it would be useful.  It seems  that a more effective  mone-
tary co-operation, which is  badly needed, will have to be a com-
plex  effort  in  which  quite  a  number  of  approaches  have  to be 
resorted to.  Each of them may contribute a little to improve the 
situation and reduce the problem.  But a panacea which will  in 
one stroke solve the problem is  hardly to be found.  As long as 
Europe  is  divided,  monetary  disturbances  and  problems  of  an 
inter-state  character  will  be  with  us.  What  we  may  hope  to 
achieve is  to reduce them to a tolerable size. 
It seems to me almost unnatural for a Rapporteur not to have 
some  kind  of blueprint to  offer  for  the  debate,  but I  believe  it 
would do no service to  the debate if I were to suggest a series of 
measures which would  have  no  chance  of  being  adopted  in  the 
present climate of political opinion in our national parliaments and 
countries at large. 
It is  easier  to  define  some  of  the  problems  than to  suggest 
early remedies, but that definition is  an essential step towards the 
informed  discussion  necessary  for  the  achievement  of  what  I 
regard as  the first minimum requirement for ensuring the success 
of  European monetary  co-operation.  What  is  required for  that 
is, first and foremost, a better comprehension of the national self-
discipline required to maintain an orderly international monetary 
system, which is an essential requisite for a steady and continuous 
increase  in  our standard of living.  Once that comprehension is 
established, the question of the appropriate machinery for effecting 
the necessary co-operation will  be found,  I  believe,  to pose rela-
tively little difficulty.  Without such better comprehension any new 
machinery is unlikely to take us very far. 
The Chairman  (/).-Thank you, Mr. Petersen. 
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Mr.  Federspiel, Rapporteur of the Consultative  Assembly of 
the Council of Europe. - I express my gratitude to my predeces-
sors in the debate for their reports and presentation of the monetary 
problems.  I have been charged to speak on behalf of the Political 
Committee.  Although  I  could  really  sit  down,  because  I  am 
broadly in agreement with what has been said, I want to put some 
points  of  view  on the political aspects,  particularly the  political 
aspects as seen from countries outside the European Communities 
now seeking membership. 
In this  context,  I  express  my  appreciation  to the  European 
Commission for the document released this morning recommend-
ing  the  Council  of  Ministers  to  proceed  with  negotiations  for 
membership  with  all  the  applicant  countries,  thus  avoiding  the 
pitfall many of us have feared, that negotiations would be limited 
to  only  one  of the applicant countries.  This move  had calmed 
many preoccupations. 
Since  the barriers to trade began to  be broken down in the 
1950s,  and  more  particularly  since  the  major  world  currencies 
became convertible in  1958, we  in the industrialised world have 
experienced a  greater expansion  of  world  trade  and production, 
and hence the greatest increase in prosperity and the overall stand-
ard of living that the world has seen.  Throughout this period we 
have not, as we did in earlier times, seen periods of boom followed 
by serious symptoms of recession in the style of the classical trade 
cycles. 
Politically this serves to emphasise the interdependence of our 
economies  and  warns  us  that  national  egotism  in  the  form  of 
restrictive and protective measures or the free  flow  of goods  and 
services  will  invariably backfire  and punish the  offender  against 
the  international code  of  co-operation as  much as  it will  punish 
those against whom the measures are directed. 
Nevertheless the world is not perfect and from time to time the 
machinery necessary for  this  development,  the monetary system, 
has been showing signs  of strain.  Logically,  it may not be sur-
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with production and trade and the enormous investments required 
for full utilisation of modern technology.  Although a great deal 
of ingenuity has been applied to creating the liquidity essential to 
keep this movement going,  we  have in the last few  years experi-
enced  several  monetary  crises.  Only  this  week  we  are  in  the 
middle  of  one,  to  which  I  shall  return,  a  crisis  hardly  likely 
to  find  a  solution  until  the  new  German  Government  is 
installed  in  office.  Even  then,  it  is  by  no  means  certain 
that whichever solution is found for the isolated German problem 
the effects will not spread to other currencies. 
These  crises  arising  from  disparities  between  the  national 
economies  are probably inevitable  as  long  as  we  fail  to achieve 
some  kind  of  international monetary union,  of  which  Professor 
Petersen spoke, a union capable of straightening out the disparities 
by  amalgamating  the  national  economies.  With  our  present 
methods  of  political  thinking,  and  as  long  as  we  are  jealously 
maintaining  absolute  national  sovereignty  in  our  financial  and 
monetary policies, we  can only hope that some future generation 
will reach this obviously desirable goal.  In the meantime we have 
realistically  to  concentrate  on  the  most  appropriate  measures 
which do not offend the sacred cows of national sovereignty. 
Long before the last war we were forced to abandon the classi-
cal gold standard which for so long had served a gently developing 
economy effectively and without giving much trouble.  I need not 
here go into the reasons why we had to abandon the gold standard 
and look for other means of creating money and credit.  First, the 
gold  exchange  standard  came  to  be  accepted,  giving  foreign 
currency balances roughly the same standing as  gold,  thus easing 
international liquidity up  to  a point.  But even foreign  currency 
balances  are limited in supply in the same way  as  gold,  and the 
new  system  of international drawing rights  had to be  devised  as 
a kind of paper gold. 
There  is  a  fundamental  difference  between  gold  and  these 
other reserves.  Gold has  a stable price and relative immobility, 
and  currency  balances  have  proved  to be  a  nervous  species  of 
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fact  that  confidence  in  them  is  susceptible  to  the  ever-varying 
appreciation of the strength of the national economies supporting 
the currency in question,  this  currency in itself having for many 
years been released from its  absolute dependence upon gold  and 
basing itsef  on other normally sound assets  such  as  commercial 
bills. 
It is clear therefore that there is a strong connection between 
the  monetary  situation  and  the  economic  and  financial  policies 
adopted by our countries.  The more we can harmonise our eco-
nomic policies,  or perhaps rather adapt our economic policies to 
the greatest possible harmonisation of our economic activity aim-
ing  at  balancing  our  foreign  payments  on  current  account,  the 
more we shall be able to limit the risk of currency crises for other 
reasons  than  an  overall  lack  of  liquidity.  It has  at least  been 
made  abundantly  clear  that  the  monetary  difficulties  which  we 
have met and which I  believe  we  are likely  to meet at intervals 
in the future are not problems concerned merely with the mecha-
nism  of  the international monetary system  but are of  a  political 
nature and call for political action. 
The mechanism  has  worked  remarkably well.  Apart from 
the  operations  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund,  \Yhich  has 
proved to be an invaluable safeguard up to a point, but no further 
than the credit of the countries concerned can justify at any given 
time,  the  actions  of  the  Group  of Ten and the  heads  of  central 
banks meeting regularly at the Bank for International Settlements 
at Basle have demonstrated a remarkable degree of flexibility  and 
imagination.  It is probably not too much to say that by the inter-
vention of these groups which can work with exceptional rapidity 
-sometimes just a few telephone calls between the leading central 
banks-critical situations which may not even have been noticed 
by the general public have  been  averted.  But these  improvisa-
tions,  however salutary they may be, can hardly be described  as 
a system  and can in any case produce only  temporary remedies. 
Settlement of a short-term debt must necessarily follow long before 
the basic disequilibrium which has been at the root of the trouble 
can be straightened out by political action in the country or coun-
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As long as we have not been able to agree on common eco-
nomic  policies  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  stability  in  our 
economies, and hence currencies employed, there will always be a 
temptation  which  governments  will  find  it  difficult  to  resist  to 
resort to immediate protectionist measures such as  import restric-
tions,  currency  control  and  the  other  inequities  which  were  so 
rampant in the 1930s.  These measures have the further unhealthy 
effect  of  being  infectious,  in  the  sense  that  they  call  for  other 
measures  by those who  are hurt by  them and may then become 
trading enemies instead of trading partners. 
It may  well  be  that  the  situation  could  be  stabilised  by 
regional action within groups which are otherwise closely associat-
ed, such as the Communities or even within the Communities, the 
Benelux Group or the Nordic Group or the Sterling Area or any 
other natural grouping.  But such regional action will suffer from 
the  obvious  defect  that it  does  not  take  the  evergrowing  inter-
dependence  of  the  greater  part  of  the  industrialised  world  into 
account. 
The proposals drawn up by the Commission of the European 
Communities  in  February  1968,  generally  known  as  the  Barre 
Plan, to which I referred in my original report, are in themselves 
valuable  and  realistic  in  the  sense  that they  do  not  go  beyond 
what should be politically possible.  But they do not call for simi-
lar action by other European countries which are almost as  much 
dependent on the economic developments within the Six as if they 
were  themselves  already  Members  of  the  Community.  Most 
important of course is  that Britain and the pound sterling should 
be submitted to the same discipline  as  that proposed for the eco-
nomies of the Community countries.  If policies  on the basis  of 
the Barre Plan are adopted by the Community,  it is  essential  at 
least for the applicant countries that they follow the same pattern 
and  the  same  timing  in  the  development  of  their  internal  eco-
nomic policies. 
Mr. Hougardy made this  point very clearly in paragraph 18 
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"We must  bow  to  the  facts:  the  advance  towards  political 
unity,  and thus  towards  an independent destiny for Europe, 
cannot  begin  until  economic  and  monetary  policy  are 
conceived,  understood  and  desired  as  the  instruments  of  a 
common overall policy." 
The Barre Plan assumes  that the co-ordination of  economic 
policies must rest on monetary and financial support which must 
be permanent and flexible.  This naturally leads on to the interest-
ing observations by Professor Triffin on the monetary aspects  of 
the accession of Britain to the Common Market and hence to the 
idea of creating some form of European Monetary Fund or reserve 
which  could  work  quite  independent  of  negotiations  for  British 
membership,  but  which  would  form  an  excellent  foundation  to 
facilitate the early enlargement of the Communities. 
Another point made by Professor Triffin is  of equal interest, 
namely, that a European currency reserve fund could as  one of its 
assets  include  some  major  portion  of  Britain's  indebtedness  to 
other European countries.  This is an ingenious and simple device. 
Someone's  debt must  of  course  always  be  someone  else's  asset. 
And the  asset  in  question is  a  perfectly  good  one provided you 
do not have to convert it into liquid cash immediately.  And that 
of course is not the purpose of a reserve intended to form a perma-
nent backing  of  the  economy.  In any  case  the  overall liquidity 
is not likely to be affected by a transaction of this nature. 
The mere  harmonisation  of  economic  policies  leading  to  a 
better balance between  the  currencies  within  the  Community or 
even  within  Western  Europe  will  undoubtedly  be  an  important 
step forward, but it is not likely to solve the whole problem of the 
recurring imbalances.  It has been pointed out so  often that this 
can be achieved only if the Western European countries combine 
into a regular monetary union where imbalances between France 
and  Germany  would  have  as  little  effect  as,  for  instance,  im-
balances between Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein would have on 
the German monetary situation today.  But the establishment of 
a real monetary reserve available to the Western European coun-
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further and enable the co-ordinating organ, whether the Commis-
sion  or a banking institution,  not merely to avoid  the  effects  of 
disequilibria in the national balances. of payment, but also keep the 
liquidity under control and thus stop inflation from getting out of 
hand.  In other words, to prevent the general economy from being 
overheated. 
It goes  without saying that a system of  this kind would also 
require constant co-ordination of economic policy,  a point which 
Mr.  Hougardy  clearly  made,  and  harmonisation  of  the  various 
branches  of  legislation  which  have  direct  effect  on  economic 
trends; for instance, taxation, incentives to trading, housing policy, 
pensions and social policy generally.  The recent shocks we  have 
experienced-and I  am  not  referring  only  to  the  action  of  the 
German  Government in  letting  the  mark find  its  own  price  for 
the  purpose  of  avoiding  speculative movement of  capital-have, 
I believe, further underlined the necessity of combining the mone-
tary  policy  with  the  general  economic  policy. 
The sudden increase by  5 1/2 per cent of  export duties  on 
agricultural products  into  Germany is  not,  of  course,  a  remedy. 
It is  a stopgap, a kind of first-aid bandage to be removed as  soon 
as  possible. It seems  to me also that the reactions  to the freeing 
of the German exchange rate should put an end to  the proposals 
ventilated in certain  quarters,  within  the International Monetary 
Fund and elsewhere,  to  introduce  a  system  of  flexible  exchange 
rates or possibly a crawling peg system. 
The economies of modern industry and the necessity for long-
term planning,  both in  production and marketing,  and the  com-
petition  which,  of  course,  becomes  keener  the  more  restrictions 
are lifted from the market, will  certainly not leave  much elbow-
room for  the  uncertainty which  such  flexible  systems  invariably 
would entail.  It would force exporting industries to operate with 
a  very  cnnsiderable  risk  market,  with  consequent  higher  price, 
to the detriment of  consumers  and probably to  trade  generally. 
This does not exclude the remedy of adjustment from time to time 
when the economy of a country has evidently got out of tune with 
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How  much  this  general  cons,ideration  would  apply  to  the 
present  situation  of  the ·German  mark  is  a  matter  on  which· I 
hesitate to express an opinion. Evidently, the situation is  intended 
to be of short duration, presumably not beyond 20 October.  It 
may  well  be ·that the  unilateral  measures  taken,  even  with  the 
obvious breaches of the Bretton Woods Agreements and the Rome 
Treaty,  may  have  a  salutary  effect  in  the  sense  of  letting  the 
German mark find its true level, which would put an end to much 
speculation and uncertainty.  It seems,  as Le Monde put it in an 
editorial on 1 October, that this might be preferable to a further 
rush on the German mark. 
It is  evident,  however,  that the  present monetary  situation 
has constituted a serious threat to the working of the agricultural 
Common Market,  and the effects  of  this  should certainly not be 
underestimated.  Everything therefore seems to point in the direc-
tion of early  action  to  set up a limited monetary salvage system 
based  on  a  European reserve  and with  the  greatest  measure  of 
political undertaking by  the countries taking  part in such a  sys-
tem  to  follow  an  agreed  code  of  behaviour  in  economic  policy 
aiming at the creation of monetary stability. 
I see no reason why this system should be limited to the Com-
mon  Market countries.  It might  prepare  the  way  for  an  early 
extension of the Communities,  not least because none of us  can 
deny that the  pound sterling plays  a  very  important part in the 
monetary build-up in Europe. 
Could we  achieve  this-and it  is  certainly  not  beyond  the 
possibilities of practical politics-it would be a demonstration of 
political will  which  in  itself  might  have  sufficient  momentum to 
penetrate the  political  inertia which  so  far  has  been  one  of the 
major obstacles to progressing to greater European unity. 
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5.  Exchange of views 
The Chairman  (1).  - The next  item  on  the  agenda  is  an 
exchange of views between the members of the European Parlia-
ment and the members of the Consultative Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe. 
I  call  Mr.  Boersma,  on  behalf  of  the  Christian  Democrat 
Group. 
Mr. Boersma (N). - Mr. Chairman, unfortunately I received 
the reports of Mr. Petersen and Mr. Federspiel only this morning. 
I  have not yet  been able  to  study them,  and  in  my  remarks  on 
behalf  of  the  Christian Democrats  I  shall  be  obliged  to  restrict 
myself to what I have read in Mr. Hougardy's report. 
I  should like to draw attention to  the fact that the report is 
in two  parts.  The second part gives  an account of the activities 
of  the  European  Parliament.  This  is  no  small  matter:  a  great 
mass of activities is  referred to.  Numerous political questions  of 
great complexity are discussed  as  they have been today and will 
be tomorrow.  The second part of the report is also a reflection of 
human shortcomings.  No doubt some will say that over the years 
in  which  efforts  at  United  Europe  have  been  pursued,  more 
has  been  achieved  than many  had thought.  But to  set  against 
that,  there  are  many  others  who  take  the  view  than  less  been 
achieved than a great many people has expected and hoped.  And 
it  is  lack of will  rather than inability which  is  the  cause.  That 
is  clear from the report.  At a time when the laws  of gravity can 
be  overcome  and  men  can  actually  walk  on  the  moon,  quite 
clearly we  cannot plead our inability to solve  problems  that are 
of  significance for  the whole  world:  what is  lacking must be the 
will.  The basic factor in all the problems dealt with in this As-
sembly is the absence of concertation and co-operation.  And this 
is true not only of the European Economic Community.  The lack 
of such co-operation is  in fact  illustrated particularly clearly  by 
the question now before us.  It is  an extremely topical question; 
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days  in this  Chamber,  and will  probably  arise  again  next  week 
when the European Parliament meets. 
And yet the whole monetary situation in which we find  our-
selves today is an unmistakable symptom of what I have called the 
lack of real concertation and co-operation.  The whole course of 
recent developments,  characterised as  they have been by a series 
of monetary crises,  shows  that when  solutions  are  being  sought 
there  is  certainly  co-operation,  but  that  this  subsequently  gives 
way  to  nervous  national attitudes  which  cannot really  offer  any 
lasting solution, either for a country which adopts special measures 
or for other countries bound to it by economic and monetary ties. 
And on this very question there is  a conspicuous absence of what 
one might  call  a  clear,  deliberate,  co-ordinated  approach.  Fur-
thermore, monetary affairs are not the only field affected: the same 
holds  true  of  other elements  of government.  It would  be quite 
wrong to isolate monetary policy from social policy, from financial 
policy in .  general  and from  economic  policy,  and to  study  it  as 
a  separate phenomenon.  It must be integrated with these other 
important elements of government. 
If there is  one  thing that has  become clear from  all  this,  it 
is  that  it  must  be  regarded  as  intolerable  for  the  international 
monetary  system  to  be  dependent  on  the  balance-of-payments 
position of the country with the most important reserve currency. 
For years that country-the United States-has had to cope with 
a permanent balance-of-payment deficit.  The result is  a constant-
ly  increasing  shortage  of  capital,  and  it is  becoming  more  and 
more acute almost every month.  As a result, we  are faced  with 
higher and higher interest rates, and all  th~  deplorable medium-
term consequences, socially and otherwise.  This is  the untenable 
aspect  of  the  situation;  any  solutions  proposed  must  be  related 
to  the fact that the United States balance of payments ultimately 
.determines  how  effectively  the  international  monetary  system 
works.  As long as  this imbalance continues to exist, and nothing 
is  done  about it,  then a  solution must be  a  choice  between two 
evils.  The United States  can  try  to  reduce  the  running  deficit 
on  their  balance  of  payments,  with  shortage  of  liquidity  as  the 
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Alternatively,  we  can  leave  matters  as  they  are.  In that case, 
there is  ultimately only one solution, namely freeing  the price of 
gold  and devaluing  the  American  dollar.  Then of  course,  the 
game  could  begin  all  over  again-though  at  a  different  parity 
level.  And in a few  years' time we  should be exactly where we 
are now. 
I have already spoken of the succession of crises with which 
we  are confronted.  Of course,  attempts have been made to find 
solutions.  An attempt was  made in Rio de  Janeiro-as another 
speaker  has  mentioned-to  create  special  means  of  liquidity 
through  special  drawing  rights,  but  nothing  was  done  to  solve 
the real problems.  For no one could say what the position of gold, 
the pound sterling and the American dollar should be.  Further-
more,  the Rio  de  Janeiro  agreements have still  to  be ratified  by 
a large  number of  national parliaments.  In itself,  the contribu-
tion  can  be  regarded  as  a  positive  one.  In practice,  however, 
it has not laid many important sandbags on the dike. 
Large-scale speculation led  to  a free  price for gold.  One of 
the consequences had been speculation in other strong currencies 
notably  the  German mark.  Then came  the  devaluation  of  the 
French franc.  We are now faced with a situation in which there 
is  talk of  a floating  exchange rate,  and that can only  lead even-
tually to a 5 to 10 per cent revaluation of the German mark. 
To that may be added that, in Dutch newspapers at least, it 
is  being suggested  that the Italian lira is  in  difficulties  and  may 
possibly forced to devalue in the near future.  This, together with 
the  devaluation  of  the  French  franc  and  the  disservice  to  the 
European cause which the floating exchange rate for the German 
mark is doing, suggests that we  are not in the process of integrat-
ing· and  growing  towards  a  united  Europe,  but rather  that  dis-
integration  is  all  around  us-and not  only  in  the  agricultural 
market.  In brief, the general picture is not a very heartening one. 
The Rapporteurs have  rightly  pointed out in their  speeches 
this  afternoon that we  are concerned not only  with highly com-
plex technical problems, but also with the political aspects of the 
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The Rapporteurs have also observed quite rightly that there 
is  only  one,  unavoidable,  conclusion  to  be  drawn,  namely  the 
need  for  fuller  collaboration  in  monetary  and  other  fields,  and 
that this must not be limited to the Europe of the Six. 
The task which faces the European Commission in the sphere 
we  are now discussing is  of course a specific  and clearly defined 
one.  In the light  of hindsight,  the Treaty of  Rome has  proved 
to  have  sizeable  flaws.  No  doubt  this  is  a  matter  for  general 
regret.  But precisely  as  a  result  of  the  Treaty's  imperfections, 
the  European Commission-and I  mean  this  in no  derogatory 
sense, but merely as  a statement of fact~can only be regarded as 
a  pedestrian  in  the  supersonic  world  of  international  monetary 
affairs.  And it is a pedestrian with one leg in plaster. 
Nevertheless,  we,  for  our part, enormously  appreciate  what 
the  European  Commission  has  produced  in  recent  times-the 
Barre Memorandum, among other things-because an attempt is 
being made to correct the fundamental imbalances in the growth 
of Western Europe by all  manner of  assistance measures.  Ulti-
mately, however, we shall have to try not only to find cures-how-
ever  important that may be when the  patient is  ill-but also  to 
prevent such illrtesses.  And so,  today  again,  we  are justified in 
inquiring:  what is  the  thinking  of  the  European Commission  on 
the problems being discussed here this  afternoon and tomorrow? 
Before  concluding,  I  should  like  to  draw  attention  to  one 
further  aspect.  All the reports we  have received,  containing an 
analysis  of  monetary  problems,  reveal  very  clearly  the  specific 
effects of speculation on monetary developments and the fact that 
the  actions  of  a  relatively  small  number  of  speculators  in  our 
various  countries  can  have  unfortunate  consequences  for  many 
hundreds of thousands. 
Speculation on the currency markets, to my  mind,  is  one of 
the  fundamental  faults  in  the  capitalist  system,  and  the  under-
lying  cause  of  the  phenomena which  are  now  under discussion. 
If  an attempt is to be made to overhaul the international monetary 
system,  that. aspect  of  the  problem  cannot be  overlooked,  par-
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I  now come to my general conclusion.  The disease we  are 
talking  about  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge.  And I  think 
we  can fairly  assume that there is  no mystery as  to the medicine 
needed  to  cure  it.  Unfortunately,  the  real  question  is  whether 
there is  sufficient political will to  administer that medicine. 
More  specifically,  I  would  say  that  the  monetary  problem 
of today, and that of yesterday too, of course, is  a world problem. 
That  means,  first  and  foremost,  that  at  this  level  no  national 
monetary policy measures are of any real significance. 
Even if they provide short-term solutions, the most they can 
do  is  to  stimulate  different  reactions.  The  result  is  a  chain 
reaction which is  of no help  to  anyone,  least of all socially.  At 
the same time, harking back to my remark that we  are concerned 
with a world problem, such measures can in no way help Europe 
to  isolate  herself from  that general problem or even  to  tackle it 
in part-though it is  clear that she  is  expected  to  make a  con-
tribution towards solving it.  Here I  agree with the various con-
clusions drawn, particularly those in Mr.  Hougardy's report.  He 
says  quite  rightly in  paragraph  21  that  as  long  as  the  political 
organisations  of  the  peoples  of  the  Community  are  denied  all 
chance of helping to shape decisions and determine economic and 
monetary objectives,  common  objectives  are unlikely to  be real-
ised.  I  hope the European Commission will  give its  attention to 
this  matter, for that would also  be an  approach to the solution. 
I also fully  agree with Mr.  Hougardy when he says in para-
graph 22 that the most important minimum condition-we are not 
even talking yet about the whole range of conceivable solutions-
for the success  of monetary co-operation is  real co-ordination of 
medium-term economic policy  objectives  and  of  day-to-day eco-
nomic  policies.  Mr.  Federspiel  emphasised  this  point  a  little 
while ago. 
If we agree with that-a question we must answer-and if at 
the end of  this  debate we  try  to formulate  concrete conclusions, 
then, in my view,  one of those conclusions must be:  what are we 
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a  mainly  political  question-this  must  mean  that  each  of  us 
should  bring  these  questions  up  for  discussion  in  his  own  na-
tional  parliament  and  we  should  try  to  exert  pressure  on  our 
governments, particularly the Finance Ministers, since they appear 
to have very little understanding of the European idea. 
Another conclusion  must surely be that the  whole  problem 
points  to  general  interdependence.  And by  interdependence,  I 
mean  that when  something  happens  in  country  A,  its  effect  is 
felt  in country B.  Various examples could be taken to illustrate 
this.  I  spoke  a  moment  ago  about  chain  reactions.  For this 
reason alone and also in view  of  other elements of policy, it can-
not be enough simply  to state that monetary policy will  have to 
be the coping-stone of integration.  If the European Commission 
is  called  upon  to  pronounce on this  again  in  the  near future,  I 
shall be most interested to know its views.  It is  my opinion that 
monetary policy must be an integral part and must be developed 
at the same time. 
In  this  brief  suming-up,  I  should  also  like  to  refer-as 
Mr.  Federspiel did a  short while  ago-to the remarks  made by 
Professor Triffin on behalf of the Action Committee for  a United 
States  of  Europe.  He argued,  amongst  other  things,  in  favour 
of  a  European monetary  zone.  He regarded  this  as  inevitable 
and increasingly necessary.  A European reserve fund,  with clear 
rules  and clear guarantees, would necessarily lead to harmonisa-
tion  in  the  monetary  policies  of  the  states  of  Western  Europe. 
In  his  opinion,  it  might  also  contribute-thought  it  certainly 
complicates  the  issue  technically-to  a  solution  of  the  British 
problem.  I  shall  be most  interested  to  hear  what others think 
of the various comments that have been made.  I  am curious to 
know  the  views  of  the  European  Commission  on  the  idea  of 
creating a European reserve currency. 
I come to my final  conclusion.  It is  undeniable that in the 
narrower context-and for the time  being I  shall limit myself to 
the  present  member  states  of  EEC-a solution  in  the  sphere 
of  monetary policy,  as  a  contribution to  international reform  of 
the  monetary  system,  would necessarily  be  accompanied  by  the 
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Recent  developments  have  clearly  illustrated  how  vitally 
necessary that is. 
Finally,  let me say that I  do  not expect  any  miracles  from 
this  debate,  in the sense  that when we  depart tomorrow  all  the 
problems will be solved.  The question is whether we can together 
make a new contribution which will steer us in the right direction. 
In this  connection I  would  mention  the  Hague Summit Confer-
ence,  for  the  staging  of  which  Mr.  Hougardy  has  been  partly 
responsible.  It may be that our discussion will  contribute to the 
eventual  success  of  the  Summit  Conference.  I  do  not  wish 
to go into greater detail about the Conference, but I am convinced 
that it is  important.  The question  is  whether  we  can  summon 
up  a  new burst of  enthusiasm  as  a  result of which further  steps 
towards  unification  might  be  possible-and  I  am  thinking  not 
only of the Europe of the Six,  but also  of all the other countries 
who  have  expressed  the  wish  to  join.  In view  of  the  present 
situation  after  the  French  devaluation,  in  view  of  the  probable 
German revaluation and the possibility of  more drastic  devalua-
tions, I take the view that we  are not on the way towards integra-
tion but towards  disastrous disintegration.  I  hope  that this  dis-
cussion will  a least help to prevent our moving towards the fatal 
disintegration of a united Europe. 
The Chairman(/).- Thank you, Mr. Boersma. 
I call Mr. Chapman. 
Mr. Chapman.- I  was  impressed by and interested to read 
Part II of Mr. Hougardy's Memorandum.  His summary there of 
the  work  done  in  the  European  Parliament  cannot  but  deeply 
impress an Englishman like myself who is  not a member of that 
Parliament.  It only  makes  me  express  my  anxiety  to  be  there 
and to  be a member, to join as  soon as  possible,  in  order to  be 
able to share in this very important work.  It is  deeply impressive, 
and I was grateful for his summary.  I hope that it will not be long 
before we are able to join in as well. 
It is  not fashionable  and  perhaps  it is  a  little  foolhardy  to 
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so  far  every  speaker  in  the  debate  has  been  pessimistic.  As 
Economic Rapporteur  of the Council of  Europe until last May, 
I  had  the  difficult  and unpleasant  task  of  bringing  forward  re-
peated, pessimistic reports  about the monetary situation.  How-
ever,  having  read  the  three  documents  before  us  and  having 
reflected  on them,  I  want  to  be  a  little  foolhardy  and  express 
some guarded optimism about the months  and perhaps even the 
years ahead. 
First-and although this  is  not really in my list of factors  I 
want to begin with it-we tend to underestimate the success of the 
Bretton  Woods  system.  It is  a  very  successful  system.  In  his 
report,  Mr.  Petersen rightly  says  that we  must recognise  that it 
has facilitated an unprecedented advance and expansion in world 
trade in the last twenty years.  Do not let us start by saying that 
we  have some rickety world structure which is  not going to sur  .. 
vive.  Quite the  contrary  is  the  case.  It is  going  well.  It has 
flaws  and  difficulties  in  it which  have  newly  emerged,  but  my 
optimism springs from  the  fact  that I  think we  are now tackling 
those flaws one by one and are moving into a new situation. 
But let me  come  now  to  the more  positive  reasons  for  my 
optimism.  Of course, first,  as  a  Britisher I  must express  to this 
gathering  a  much  more  favourable  view  of  the  present  British 
balance-of  -payments  situation  than  is  contained  in  any  of  the 
documents before us  which were written before the recent trends 
had emerged and before the figures revealed this week.  I see that 
Mr. Hougardy is  nodding his  head to  confirm what I  am saying. 
Let me  outline  what  that improvement  is.  It is  no  longer 
the  case  on  present  trends  that sterling  is  going  to  be  a  weak 
currency.  Indeed,  on the latest figures  available to us  and given 
this  week  by  the  British  Government,  from  an  annual  rate  of 
deficit  in  November  1967,  before  British  devaluation-then an 
average annual rate of deficit of  1,000 million dollars per year-
we  have  now  moved  into  a  position  where  it  seems  likely  that 
we  shall have a surplus this year of 1,000 million dollars.  That 
is  an  exact  switch-round  in  the  British  situation,  which  we  are 
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are far from feeling secure.  The trend is  only just clearly emerg-
ing  and is,  we  hope, unable to be diverted.  But it  is  something 
new in the world's monetary situation. 
We in Britain hope that this is not a temporary change in the 
British situation.  If we had deflated in Britain, if  we  had caused 
unemployment, if we  had stopped economic growth and obtained 
a  balance-of-payments  surplus  that way,  that  is  something  that 
anybody  can  do.  But as  soon  as  we  had  reflated  and  allowed 
growth  to  start  again,  we  would  have  had  another  balance-of-
payments  crisis.  We  have  done  the  exact  contrary.  What  we 
have done in Britain over the past four years of unpleasant work, 
high  taxation and difficult  days  is  to restructure the British eco-
nomy  at  a  time  of  rising  production,  so  that  we  have  held  a 
constant  zero  increase  in  British home  consumption.  We  have 
held  at zero  increase in  real terms  British Government expendi-
ture, and we have cut it in some parts of the world.  The whole 
of  our increase  in  productivity  in  the  past  two  years  has  gone 
into exports. 
The  result  is  the  great  turn-round  in  the  British  situation. 
That means that there is  no reason why this situation should not 
continue.  It is  not one which,  as  soon as  the period is  over and 
the brake is let off, is bound to reverse itself and result in another 
balance-of-payments crisis.  This we hope from the measures we 
have taken, from disciplining wages and productivity, from moder-
nisation  of  our industry, from  one  effort  after  another.  We  are 
in the course of restructuring the British economy.  That should 
be a permanent gain to us,  and we hope that it will mean a steady 
surplus  for  some  years  ahead,  at  least  at  the  present  rate  of 
approaching-!  do  not  want  to  be  too  optimistic  today-
1,000 million dollars a year. 
We shall not relax.  There is  no chance that Britain, by some 
foolhardy  pre-election  measure,  will  run  into  another  balance-
of-payments crisis.  We  have had enough.  We  are only grateful 
to our friends  in the Council of  Europe and in Europe generally 
for their patience with Britain during these recent years when we 
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economy.  I hope that in a year's time when we perhaps look at 
these  measures  again  we  shall  all  be  able  to  heave  a  sigh  of 
relief and say that my optimism was not unjustified. 
That, then, is  the first  reason why I  am optimistic about the 
future  of monetary co-operation in Europe.  One of the greatest 
difficulties-the weakness  of  sterling-is in  the  course  of  being 
removed. 
But let  us  look  at the  other  reasons  for  optimism.  There 
have been so  many advances in the past year in patching up the 
difficulties  in  the  Bretton  Woods  system.  As  is  mentioned  by 
Professor Petersen in his report, there have been the Basle Agree-
ments on the sterling balances, under which those balances, which 
are  a  permanent  reason  for  monetary  insecurity  as  soon  as 
British sterling is under pressure, will not in future be a cause for 
disturbance  and disequilibrium.  The credits  made available  not 
only  guarantee  them  but  also  guarantee  them  against  further 
devaluation.  So another cause of insecurity and instability in the 
European  and  world  monetary  situation  has  been  removed, 
thanks to our understanding colleagues in Europe and the world. 
Thirdly, we  have had the agreement mentioned by Professor 
Petersen  and Mr.  Hougardy  on  the  recycling  of  the  hot-money 
flow.  When  speculation  starts  now,  the  bankers  are  ready  to 
recycle  the  hot-money as  it flows  back to the country of  origin, 
thus defeating the speculator in his  attack on the currency.  This 
is  a  great  advance  taken  in  a  time  of  crisis  and  danger,  but 
nevertheless  it  is  a  great advance to have cured this  flaw  which 
was  never  seen  when  the Bretton Woods  system  was  originally 
developed. 
Fourthly,  newly  passed  this  week,  there  is  the  system  of 
special drawing rights which is adding $3,500 million to the world 
supply of liquid assets  and thus lubricating world trade,  in addi-
tion to the $4,000 million of credit already agreedin recent years 
which,  in  effect,  increased  world  liquidity  as  described  by  Pro-
fessor  Petersen in  paragraph 51  of  his  report.  There again  we 
have reason to be pleased that we have found a flaw in the Bretton 
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Fifthly, let us be honest about it, one great plus factor to give 
us  cause  for  optimism  today  is  the  return  of  our colleagues  in 
France to co-operation in the monetary sphere under the leader-
ship  of  Mr.  Giscard  1 d'Estaing-whether  or not  we  agree  with 
him politically-which means we have a good European in charge 
of French monetary matters,  one who is  anxious whole-heartedly 
to  co-operate  in  world  monetary  problems.  Those five  factors 
should relieve our pessimism. 
Let me  come  now  to  one  factor  where  the  contrary  was. 
thought to be the case but which I believe is a cause for optimism 
-the French devaluation and the imminent German revaluation. 
What does it mean?  It is  a minus factor that all  that took place 
without  consultation  by  those  countries  with  their  colleagues. 
France devalued without consultation and Germany will  revalue 
without  consultation;  but  in  essence  it means  that  one  of  the 
biggest  causes  of  insecurity  in  the  European system  in  the  last 
twelve  months,  fear  over  these  changes  in  parity,  have  been 
removed.  We should have a stable period ahead in which there 
is no reason to fear any further changes in the parity of European 
currency.  In France following that devaluation we have a meas-
ure of  self  -discipline which is  being imposed on the French eco-
nomy.  I  hope  that it will  succeed.  All  strength  to  their  arm. 
We have had some.  We have had to suffer a lot of this discipline 
in Great Britain and it is not very pleasant medicine.  I hope that 
it will  succeed in France, too.  It is  good that France is  feeling, 
as we have had to feel,  that these things have to be gone through 
from time to time. 
Looking at these changes in parity, however, is it not the case 
that their very  unilateral nature and  the  danger that is  thus  ex-
posed in Europe of doing such things unilaterally has brought us 
face to face with the danger of  our disunity in this respect?  The 
very fact that neither France nor Germany has consulted anybody 
has  suddenly brought us face  to face with the danger.  Even our 
own colleagues are saying that if this goes on there will be mount-
ing chaos.  Surely the warning is  now so  clear that this should be 
the last time that changes in parity of this kind occur without real 
consultation,  because  we  know  the  danger  that  is  ahead  if  this 
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I  am very optimistic today and have still three or four more 
suggestions.  As  number  seven  I  would  put  the  Memorandum 
prepared by Vice-President Barre of the European Commission.  I 
welcomed it here in the Assembly of the Council of Europe within 
weeks of publication.  I would again say what an important docu-
ment I  feel  it is.  It remedies  a flaw  in  the Treaty of  Rome  and 
has led· to wide discussion,  as  Mr. Hougardy has reported, in the 
European Parliament, which is  all to the good.  It means that we 
are all  alerted to  the way  ahead as  well  as  to the dangers  if  we 
do  not take that way.  The suggestions  made  by  Vice-President 
Barre in his  Memorandum are excellent,  practical,  and on pres-
ent  trends  are  bound  to  come  about  within  twelve  months  or 
two years. 
Coming to my last two points,  surely we  must take account 
of  the fact  that we  need political decisions.  Professor Petersen, 
Mr. Federspiel and others are saying that we are looking to polit-
ical decisions for solutions to monetary matters.  There is  at least 
one  we  can  record  which  is  of  great  importance.  France  has 
decided  to  return  to  full  participation  in  Western  European 
Union.  This is  a great day.  It is something we  are very pleased 
to  have  and  I  hope  it  means  a  new  era  of  real  political  co-
operation in Western Europe. 
Lastly,  we  come  to  the  most  important point  of  all  which 
gives  me  cause  for  optimism.  It seems  possible  at  last  that 
negotiations are to open for an extension of the European Com-
munity.  If this comes about, it is  surely going to be a time when 
consideration  will  be  given  to  what  economic  union  must  take 
place  in Europe.  I  would  put it in  this  way : is  it really  likely 
that the  six  nations  of  the  European  Community  will  want  to 
accept  and  offer  membership  to  further  countries  into  a  Com~ 
munity which,  in the  words  of  some  of my colleagues  here this 
afternoon,  is  going  through unresolved crises  and even  breaking 
apart?  Those words  have  been used  about the economic  situa-
tion.  I feel it  is unlikely that the Six will want to invite new Mem-
bers into a Community which is  in these difficulties.  It will want 
to  resolve  those  difficulties,  and  to  use  the  catalyst  of  the  new 
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problem of enlargement but the problem of real economic union 
all in one go  at the time these applications are considered. 
I  believe,  therefore,  that it  is  a  cause  for  optimism  in the 
monetary and economic  spheres  that negotiations  seem  likely  to 
open and can only take place in the context of trying to put right 
many of the things which have caused my collleagues  this  after-
noon  to be  distressed  and pessimistic  about  the  economic  and 
monetary spheres.  It will be  a big negotiation of  a big solution, 
a big  step  forward  in  Europe when  the  negotiations  really  take 
place.  I hope it will mean that there will be an agreement on the 
lines  of  the  Barre  Memorandum  in  a  period  which,  as  I  have 
tried to indicate,  seems likely to be fairly  calm.  Bretton Woods 
has  been  patched  up.  There  will  be  no  more  devaluation  in 
isolation,  and a  period of  relative  economic calm will  give  us  a 
chance not only to broaden membership  of the Community,  but 
at the same time to solve  problems  in  the  move  onwards in  the 
Communities, from  customs  union to  the  beginning  of  real eco-
nomic union and integration of national economic planning in the 
way proposed by Mr. Barre. 
There is  one other way in future which seems likely to bring 
a  solution  and  amelioration  of  the  monetary  situation.  I  have 
said that the main way will  be the negotiations for  enlarging the 
Communities, but there are also  now  the new proposals put this 
week to the IMF which I think are of supreme importance.  The 
British Chancellor of  the  Exchequer has  suggested  to the  Fund 
that a study be undertaken of the possibility of allowing a 2 per 
cent variation in parity each side of the fixed  rate instead of the 
present  1 per cent.  This  would give  a 4  per cent possibility of 
variation over all.  In my view, this should go a long way to meet 
the  pressure  there  has  been  for  greater  flexibility,  and-this is 
the important point-should be a bigger weapon in the hands of 
the central banks in figthing  speculators.  That is  the purpose of 
the proposition.  I  do  not believe  in  "crawling pegs".  Nor do 
Mr. Hougardy and Mr. Petersen, and Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, who 
has called it-rightly-"crawling uncertainty".  The possibility of 
a 2 per cent variation on each side should go  a long way to meet 
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The Chancellor of the Exchequer has put another proposition 
for study to the IMF.  It is  a rather novel suggestion.  It is  that 
there should be an extension of the Basle  arrangements for gua-
ranteeing the value of sterling balances in such a way as  to apply 
to other currencies and reduce not only the capital loss, as in the 
guarantees for sterling balances, but also capital profits.  This all 
sounds very technical,  but the point is  that if we  could evolve  a 
scheme  rather  like  the  Basle  agreement  guaranteeing  sterling 
to  counter the  speculator by devaluing  his  possible  gain  after  a 
successful speculation against the currency, we  should have gone 
a  long  way  towards  healing  one  of  the  final  difficulties  in  the 
present working  of the Bretton Woods  system,  and the  one dif-
ficulty which is  causing so much trouble in recent weeks with the 
flow  of funds  into Germany.  This suggestion has  been put as  a 
possible way of further improving the operation of Bretton Woods 
and making for monetary stability. 
Practical  steps  have  been  taken  in  the  last  twelve  months. 
There has been practical improvement in the British position and 
in  a lot of  other positions  in monetary affairs  in  recent months. 
New measures have been taken by the IMF with further ones to 
come, which may improve the situation.  There are political and 
economic  possibilities  ahead  for  negotiations  for  entry  into 
Europe,  by  the  application  of  the  Barre  Memorandum,  which 
could lead to a more widely based Europe, with wider possibilities 
for  monetary  co-operation  in  the  world  and  in  Europe  in 
particular. 
I  hope that this  is  not an  unjustified list  that I  have  given. 
But sometimes  we  should  throw  off  our  pessimism  and  try  to 
realise  that there  are  some  good  features  in  the  situation facing 
us.  I hope that in a year's time I shall have proved to have been 
justified in being guardedly optimistic  about the future  of Euro-
pean monetary co-operation in the months ahead. 
The Chairman (1). -Thank you, Mr. Chapman. 
May I inform the Assembly that there are still fifteen  speak-
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mind when he speaks, so that all those on the list may have their 
turn. 
I call Mr. Glinne, on behalf of the Socialist Group. 
Mr. Glinne (F). - Mr. Chairman. Ladies and Gentlemen. the 
Socialist Group is certainly in agreement with the proposals made 
by  our  colleague,  Mr.  Hougardy,  but there  is  no  denying  that 
their implementation is  still remote. 
We  share  his  opinion,  in  fact,  with  regard  to  the  need  to 
establish a common European currency as  soon as  possible.  We 
agree with the essence of what he said about a common economic 
policy and even a common foreign policy.  And we go along with 
him  even  in  his  proposal to  accelerate  as  much  as  possible  the 
institution of direct election of the European Parliament. 
While we  agree  with  him,  on· this  last point it seems  to me 
more important to provide for  considerable reinforcement of the 
European Parliament's powers, in view of the fact that the Com-
munity  will  have  its  own  resources  as  from  1974.  It seems  to 
me inadvisable to provide for the election of the European Parlia-
ment by direct suffrage without closely  associating with this  new 
method the reinforcement of the powers of our institution. 
We  also  agree  with  Mr.  Hougardy  when  he  says  that  the 
solution to the monetary problem cannot be essentially a technical 
one.  It is  quite clear that in such a field  as  this the political and 
the technical must go hand in hand. 
Having said this,  we  should like  to make a few  remarks on 
Mr.  Hougardy's  report,  and  then  something  like  a  motion  for 
an amendment.  The remarks  are the following,  and  I  feel  that 
Mr.  Hougardy  will  not  object  to  them.  It is  quite  clear  that 
the text of  Mr.  Hougardy's report was  drafted before a  number 
of very important political and economic events.  I may even say, 
as  far  as  politics  is  concerned,  that  it  was  written  before  the 
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This  is  bound to  have  consequences  for  our  assessment  of 
this  extremely  interesting report, which was  nonetheless  drafted, 
politically  speaking,  in  a  context  which  has  been  overtaken  by 
events  in  France and  in  several  other European countries,  both 
by  the series  of monetary crises  and by a number of not incon-
siderable  political  events.  So  much  so  that today  the  position 
of  several  governments  of  member  states  of  EEC may,  in  our 
view,  be characterised as  follows  : these  governments  are  aware 
of  the  reasons  for  accepting  monetary  integration,  but  at  the 
same  time  they  still  wish  to  adopt essentially national  solutions. 
There  is  a  contradiction between  the  two  poles  of  this  attitude, 
and  the  speculative  crisis  of  recent  months  and  weeks  cannot 
but reinforce this  observation.  Indeed, while  some  governments 
deplore  the  sickness  of  their  currency  resulting  from  weakness 
and other  deplore  the  fact  that  their  money  is  sick  because  it 
is  too  healthy,  some  authorities  are heard  to  propose  a  sort  of 
falling  back  on  national  sovereignty-a policy  which  at  Euro-
pean  level  is  unacceptable-whilst  others  are  at  a  loss  as  to 
how  to  rescue  Europe from  speculation  and from  a  number  of 
other ills. 
This  situation  moves  us  to  the  following  reflection :  we 
believe it is  not possible, if we  are to act effectively  and without 
blind optimism,  to wait until the political situation is  favourable 
for  the  creation  of  a  single  European  currency.  This  would 
mean  waiting  and  hoping  for  the  best  rather  than  acting  im-
mediately, 
For the  second  stage,  which  we  shall  soon  have  to  think 
about,  we  feel  that it  is  impossible  either  to  wait  for or to  be 
content  with  Mr.  Barre's  proposals.  The  defect  of  these  pro-
posals, interesting in the pre-April-May 1969 context, is  that they 
do  not sufficiently  ensure the automatic solidarity which  the Six 
must show in their policies. 
This being so, if we reject the perfection which would be too 
long  in  becoming  reality,  and  are  not satisfied  with  the  present 
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In  this  connection  I  heard  Mr.  Petersen  use  an  excellent 
British phrase : "We have to fall back on something in between." 
It is  perhaps  a  coincidence  that  I,  a  spokesman  for  the 
Socialist Group, am also Belgian, and you know the Belgian vice 
of middelmaatisme and the medium-term solution.  It is  therefore 
a medium-term solution which I commend to  your consideration. 
We  should  like,  in fact,  to  make  a  proposal  which  indeed 
depends upon the affirmation of sufficient political will  but which 
would  not immediately  require  a  total  change  of  heart  and  at-
titude.  This  solution  would  of  course  involve  a  number  of 
institutional reforms,  but it is  not essential  to review  the whole 
legal  situation  before  beginning  to  implement  such  a  reform. 
What we wish to avoid, I repeat, is  a return to idealistic dreaming 
and resignation in the meantime to doing nothing.  We  propose 
a  step  forward  which,  it  seems  to  me,  would  be  most  useful, 
drawing  our  inspiration  from  a  phrase  often  used  in  politics 
in  my  country:  "We must  avoid  both disastrous  haste  and  ill-
considered  procrastination"  ("II  faut  eviter  a la  fois  les  pre-
cipitations funestes,  mais  aussi les  atermoiements  inconsideres"). 
What  we  should  like  to  put  you  is  a  sort  of  first  draft, 
which  would  of  course  require  further  consideration.  All  this 
of course runs parallel to what technicians,  specialists  and  pub-
licists recently threw into the forum for discussion; I am thinking 
of  the  proposals  made by Mr.  Triffin  and by  Mr.  Guido  Cari. 
Moreover, European monetary problems cannot be tackled with-
out  having  at the back  of  our minds,  with  some  apprehension, 
the extraordinarily complicated, dangerous and threatening prob-
lem of Eurodollars and Euro-currency. 
Our proposal-to stop beating about the bush-is precisely 
the following : we  should like  the member states to consider the 
possibility  of  agreeing  on the  creation of  a  European Monetary 
Fund  of  the  type  which  was  set  up  on  an  international  scale 
by the Bretton Woods Agreements,  a  European Monetary Fund 
to which the  central banks of the Six  would contribute,  with or 
without gold,  all  or at least a  substantial part of their exchange 
reserves. JOINT  MEETING  OF  3-4  OCTOBER  1969  51 
Once  this  had been  done,  a  currency  of  account  with  un-
limited convertibility and at a fixed  parity with the currencies of 
the  Six  would  be  established,  along  with  common  exchange 
regulations,  by  virtue  of  which  only  the  European  currency  of 
account could be held by banks in countries outside the Six. 
The internal equilibrium of EEC itself would be guaranteed 
in the most traditional way,  since  the  central banks would have 
to  respect  a  cover  coefficient  between  their  circulation  of  notes 
and their reserves, including in these both gold and their accounts 
with the European Monetary Fund in cases of surplus or deficit. 
If such  a  system  were  instituted,  a  national  government  would 
have  no  alternative,  apart from  deflation-which would  be very 
difficult and delicate for a host of reasons which I  have no need 
the explain here-but to borrow from the Monetary Fund, since 
it would no longer be able to borrow from the central banks, and 
the  loan  could  be  made  very  expensive-in  political  terms  of 
course- if the government refused to take the measures suggest-
ed by the Community. 
However, such a loan could not be refused since changes of 
parity would be prohibited and the convertibility of the currencies 
of the Six guaranteed. 
Clearly  this  type  of proposal goes  much further  than what 
was  suggested in Mr. Barre's report. 
I  should also  like  to emphasise that such a  proposal would 
have major political consequences.  Indeed, the rule  of decisions 
by a qualified majority, which still exists in the treaties, but which, 
as we  know, has been replaced in practice since the Luxembourg 
crisis by the rule of unanimity, would at last come into effect. 
This would  amount of  a real relinquishment of sovereignty, 
without doubt less  spectacular in  the short term,  or in  the  very 
near future,  than the direct election of  the European Parliament 
or  a  federal  constitution.  But  it is  my  personal  feeling  that 
this  system  would  have  the  advantage  of  bringing  considerable 
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I  am  well  aware  that  objections  or  reservations  may  im-
mediately be made to this proposal. 
I  shall first be asked what would happen to this fine  scheme 
if negotiations  were  opened  with  Great Britain  and  other  non-
member states for their entry to the Common Market. 
This question may be answered quite clearly.  It seems to me 
that in negotiations with Great Britain, one of the conditions for 
its  entry to  the Common Market would  automatically be  that it 
renounce,  to the  benefit  of  the  European  currency  of  account, 
the  privilege  of  the  pound  sterling  to serve  as  an  international 
reserve currency. 
Like  each of the  currencies  of  the  Six,  the  pound  sterling 
would be practically reduced to  being  an internal currency,  and 
the role of reserve currency would fall  to  the European currency 
of account. 
I  would  also  point  out  that the  European  capital  market 
could  also  be  realised  as  soon  as  the  agreement  setting  up  the 
European Monetary  Fund could  ensure  transfer  at fixed  parity 
between all the accounts  of  all  the banks of the Six  without any 
limit on amounts and without any exchange commission,  so  that 
the national currencies would no longer  be  quotable  on  the  ex-
change markets. 
I shall also be told that considerable technical obstacles may 
be foreseen, particularly the possible conflicting opinions of tech-
nicians  on  such  important  aspects  of  the  monetary  problem  as 
whether or not help for a currency in difficulties  should be auto-
matic,  or the  famous  problem  of  flexible  exchange  rates  versus 
the system of fixed parities. 
On the  subject of  automatic help,  I  shall confine  myself  to 
saying that the important thing is  to fix  an automatic maximum 
for  such  help,  since  this  would  constitute  the  main  remedy  in 
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On the subject of the quarrel between schools of thought and 
between specialists on the problem of flexibility of exchange rates, 
I  should like here,  too,  to refer to a fact in recent Belgian poli-
tical  history,  from  which  a  number  of  historical  lessons  may 
perhaps be drawn. 
When the independence  of  the  Congo  was  being  discussed, 
there were two rival schools of thought in the Belgian Parliament. 
The one  was  formed  by  the  partisans of decentralised  unitaria-
nism,  the other by the  supporters  of  centralist  federalism.  And 
between some of the partisans of the one or other of these alter-
natives, there were only tiny and very secondary differences. 
I  believe  that  between  some  partisans  of  fixed  parity  and 
some  partisans  of  controlled  flexibility  the  only  differences  are 
matters  of· nuance,  and  agreement  may  be noted between  tech-
nicians who  are otherwise fundamentally  opposed to each other. 
I refer particularly to the publications of the authors I mentioned 
a  moment ago,  MM.  Triffin  and Cari. 
Here  you  have  some  suggestions  which  are  perhaps  dis-
proportionate in relation  to  the  immediate  possibilities  of  Euro-
pean economic and political integration, but which I believe were 
nonetheless  worth  making  immediately,  provided  they  respect, 
like  any  other  suggestion,  fundamental  balances  in  the  field  of 
budgetary policy.  We  also  hope  that additional  considerations, 
corrections, amendments or other proposals may be raised on this 
subject. 
It was  our  concern,  as  I  indicated  at the  beginning  of  my 
speech, to propose possible action over the medium term without 
awaiting  a  political  situation  favourable  to  the  establishment  of 
a common European currency, which, I repeat, is  a desirable, but 
for the time being, necessarily remote objective. 
Let me add in conclusion that in the view of most, if not all 
of  public  opinion  in  our  states,  what  broke  down  recently  in 
European  policy  was  not  agricultural  policy,  it  was  not  other 
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Parliament ;  what  broke  down  in  recent  months,  what  struck 
a  public  committed  to  the  European idea,  was  what  happened 
in the monetary sphere, in France, in Germany and consequently 
in  other countries. 
Since  the  monetary  aspect  has  assumed  such  importance, 
there are many of  us  who believe  that it is  on the  basis  of  this 
monetary  crisis  that  political  proposals  must  be  reformulated, 
aimed  both  at European public  opinion  and  at national  parlia-
ments and executives, which might have the virtue of announcing 
the total and very necessary relaunching of European integration. 
In making this  proposal, we  may say,  with the last speaker, 
that the problems we have to face must be looked at in a spirit of 
optimism.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (I). -Thank you, Mr. Glinne. 
I call Mr. Blumenfeld. 
Mr. Blumenfeld (G).- Mr. Chairman, I am speaking in this 
debate as the spokesman of the Political Affairs Committee of the 
Consultative Assembly.  Consequently,  apart from  a  number of 
political  remarks  and  comments  on  foreign  policy,  I  shall  in 
essence  be  concerning  myself  with  the  same  theme;  and  so,  if 
the  experts  on  financial  and  foreign  exchange  policy  do  not 
agree  with  this  or  that point  of  my  argument,  then  I  ask  their 
indulgence. 
As  I  see  it,  the  reports  before  us  by  MM.  Hougardy  and 
Federspiel hit the nail right on the head where the present situa-
tion  is  concerned.  Their  analyses  are  excellent  and  their  con-
clusions are to be welcomed and supported.  As the two reports 
have quite  rightly  emphasised,  there is  no doubt that the causes 
of the foreign  exchange problems in Europe and the rest  of  the 
world are political and are connected with the radical change in 
· the  political  structure  of  the  major  geographical  areas  of  the 
world.  Great Britain, as-if I  may be allowed to call it such-
a great power in decline, is  affected just as  much by the develop-
ments and upheavals which place too great a strain on its financial 
resources,  as  the present Western world power, America,  whose 
financial resources are not unlimited either. JOINT  MEETING  OF  3-4  OCTOBER  1969  55 
The United States'  world-wide political  and economic  com-
mitments  have  led  over  the  last  twenty  years  to  an  abundant 
supply  of dollars  which  can no longer  be absorbed  by America 
itself and therefore exerts constant pressure on the exchange rate 
of the dollar. 
Efforts so far made to achieve  a dollar balance of payments 
have  just  not  been  sufficient.  An  effective  measure  might 
perhaps  be the  cutting  back  of  American  overseas  investment; 
but  the  American  Government  has  little  influence  over  such 
investment.  In  recent  years,  these  surplus  dollars  have  very 
largely  led  in  Europe  to  an  artificial  inflation  of  international 
liquidity>  whose  effects  in  the  individual  European  rece,iving 
countries  has  been  to  provoke  a  boom  on  the  one  hand  and 
inflation  on  the  other.  Of  course,  no-one  would  advocate  the 
sudden withdrawal of  this  international liquidity,  because  of  the 
serious  effects  this  would have and because  a  serious  restriction 
of liquidity would be bound to conjure up the even greater danger 
of  a  world  economic  crisis.  This  brings  me  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  problem  of  the  dollar-and the  same  applies  to  the 
pound sterling-can only be solved by stages. 
I  listened  with  interest  to  our  colleague  Mr.  Chapman's 
optimistic-though  his  optimism  was· not  unqualified-account 
of the English  balance-of-payments,  the  development of exports 
and the stability  of the pound.  If I  may be allowed  to  say  so, 
I  am not so sure whether this  newly  observed  trend will  neces-
sarily continue, much though that is  to be wished.  I believe that 
many  more  difficulties  remain  which  have  not  been  mentioned 
_by  our friend Mr. Chapman. 
Turning now to Europe, I  am in complete and wholehearted 
agreement with Mr. Hougardy; the crucial problem is  indeed the 
fact  that the EEC institutions  are  still  limited  in many respects 
and all our efforts towards integration have been able to achieve 
no  more  than the  abolition  of  internal  customs  duties  and  the 
creation  of  the  agricultural  Common  Market.  The latter-the 
agricultural market-since the French devaluation and the float-
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back  to  this  point  briefly  later.  The  national  European  gov-
ernments-and this  seems  to me a crucial problem-continue to 
bear responsibility for the welfare of their own countries and their 
economies,  although  they  no  longer  have  the  authority  to  act 
independently  in  all  fields  of  the  economy,  their  freedom  of 
action being limited by the existing  institutions  of  EEC and the 
Rome Treaty. 
But the Commission in  Brussels,  too,  has  only limited free-
dom of  action-because of the  action taken on  all  sides  by na-
tional  governments.  In  the  long  run,  this  means  that  nobody 
bears real responsibility.  And in  a  market of  over  190 million 
people that is  a very disturbing state of affairs. 
I  believe,  therefore,  that  the  following  must  now  be urged 
on  the  Council  of  Ministers,  the  Commission  and  the  national 
parliaments :  harmonisation  of  economic  and  budgetary  policy 
and  the  freest  possible  movement  of  capital.  This  would  also 
lead-as has  already been said in this debate-to more uniform 
social,  incomes  and taxation  policy.  This  would  in  turn  result 
in  more uniform price levels  in  the countries of the Community 
and  thence  to  satisfactory  balances-of-payments  and  realistic 
exchange  rates  which  would  no  longer  have  to  be  brought  in 
line  with  each  other,  as  they  do  now,  through  devaluation  or 
revaluation. 
Unfortunately,  we  already once  again  have  in  Europe,  and 
within  EEC,  countries  with  low  and  countries  with  high  price 
levels;  if  this  situation  is  allowed  to  continue  within  the  Eco-
nomic Community, then it is doubtful whether the present absence 
of  internal  customs  duties  can  be  maintained.  The  total 
abolition  of  customs  duties  within EEC has brought foreign  ex-
change problems more  and more to the forefront,  because what 
was  formerly  regulated  through  customs  duties  now  has  to  be 
regulated through exchange rates. 
Of course I  am well  aware  that a· uniform economic policy 
would  provide  no  protection  against  inflationary  developments 
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at  least  be  synchronised,  however,  and  would  thus  have  no 
effects  on  currencies  and  exchange  rates  within  EEC.  This 
would,  however,  give  rise to  another problem in relation to our 
trading  partners  outside  the  Community,  because  our  products 
would then become too expensive. 
I  conclude,  therefore,  that if  we  do  not settle  in  EEC the 
great crucial problems  of which I  have  just spoken,  then I  fear 
the work of the last ten years will have been almost in vain. 
With regard to  Mr.  Federspiel's suggestion  for  a  European 
reserve currency, let me say this: Of course such a  system must 
be set up on as  broad a basis as possible.  The difficult problems 
of  sterling,  however,  cannot be conducive  to  solving  the  foreign 
exchange  problems  in  EEC.  An  independent  EEC  currency 
system would therefore hardly be practicable unless  preceded by 
integration. 
In  discussions  in  recent  days  and  weeks,  the  question  of 
flexible  exchange  rates  has  once  again  been  thrown  into  the 
limelight.  Let me  say,  in my  view,  flexible  exchange  rates  are 
a dangerous method; they open the flood-gates to inflation, create 
enormous difficulties for industrial exports and would, I consider, 
threaten the very existence of  the Community; they are therefore 
out of the  question.  Speaking  as  a  German member  of  parlia-
ment,  I  believe  I  may  say  the  same  on  behalf  of  the  German 
Government. 
A  quite  different  question,  Mr.  Chairman,  already  touched 
upon by Mr.  Chapman, is  that of  widening the acceptable limits 
of variation in exchange parities; I would suggest doubling them, 
without  however  allowing  changes  in  parity  to  occur  automati-
cally;  such changes-and I  emphasise this-must always  be the 
result of government decisions. 
Let me now- as  a German member of  parliament make a 
few  personal remarks  on the  most  recent  developments  in  Ger-
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As  soon  as  a  new  government  has  been  elected  in  Bonn, 
the  floating  rate  of  the mark will  have to be fixed.  That may, 
I  repeat  may,  be  equivalent  to  a  ·revaluation.  But only,  and I 
emphasise this, if at the same time the present 4 per cent import 
subsidies and corresponding export surcharges are abolished. 
Mr.  Chairman, the German Federal Bank-and I  think this 
must be pointed out here-has acted in  recent  weeks  with  care 
and circumspection and has the development of the exchange rate 
of  the  mark  under  control.  No  speculative  development  will 
therefore  unduly  affect  a  new  government's  decision.  Allowing 
the mark to float has-and this too is  a personal opinion-led to 
new difficulties in the agricultural market. 
The  Federal  Government's  request,  on  the  basis  of  Ar-
ticle 115-and I  admit that this Article does not fully  lend itself 
to this-to levy frontier charges, was rejected by the Commission. 
The Commission suggested completely closing the  German fron-
tiers  to  agricultural  imports.  This  suggestion  was  quite  rightly 
resisted  by  the  German  Government.  In  order  to  settle  this 
difference  in  the  spirit  of  the  Rome  Treaties,  however,  Bonn 
has appealed, or will appeal, to the Court. 
I  believe  it should also  be said here that we  Germans wish 
our measures to create as  little disturbance as  possible in a diffi-
cult transitional situation until  the  question  of  the  parity of  the 
mark  is  finally  settled.  We  shall  know  in  November  whether 
all  the  European  governments,  including  the  Commission  in 
Brussels,  have already directed their attention to  the  basic  ques-
tions raised here or whether they are only just about to do so. 
Mr.  Chairman,  time  is  short!  As  Mr.  Hougardy  has  said, 
we  must  tackle  the  basic  problems  of political  decisions  in  our 
member states and member governments.  These problems do not 
exist  only  in individual sectors  of foreign,  armaments or defence 
policy,  but embrace the whole  field.  If these  problems  are  not 
tackled,  Mr.  Chairman,  then  there  are  difficult  times  ahead 
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The Chairman (I).- Thank you, Mr. Blumenfeld. 
I  call  Mr.  Dequae,  on  behalf  of  the  Christian  Democrat 
Group. 
Mr.  Dequae (N). -Mr. Chairman, I  should like first  of all 
to stress the world-wide nature of present-day monetary problems. 
At the  same  time,  though,  I  should like  to  demonstrate  to  the 
Assembly  that  the  monetary  provisions  of the  Treaty of  Rome 
are quite inadequate.  It is  certainly impossible to find  a solution 
to European monetary  problems  except  in  a  global  framework. 
We  cannot isolate  ourselves  in  this  matter.  There is  no  doubt 
that the  monetary problem  must  be  solved  in  a  world  context. 
But that does not alter the fact that better arrangements at Euro-
pean level  could make a  considerable contribution to  a  solution 
at world  level.  H  is  consequently  a  matter  for  regret  that  the 
Treaty  of  Rome  says  little  about  monetary  matters,  exc·ept  for 
a  few  clauses  on  the  balance  of  payments,  the  procedure  for 
mutual assistance and the institution of the Monetary Committee. 
Fortunately,  however,  actual  developments  have  gone  further, 
thanks to the quarterly meetings  of  the Finance Ministers which 
were  instituted in  1966 on the  initiative of the German Finance 
Minister, Mr. Etzel. 
Steps  were  then taken not  only  to  give  more  power  to  the 
Common  Market's  Monetary  Committee  but  also  to  make  it 
responsible  for  preparing  international  monetary  contacts.  It 
has achieved much in that respeet.  The governors  of  the central 
banks  have  also  been invited  to  attend the  three-monthly meet-
ings,  and this  too has  yielded fruit. 
In addition,  the Committee of  Governors  of  Central Banks 
was officially set up in 1965.  I can testify that the three-monthly 
meetings of the Finance Ministers contributed in a large measure 
to the  creation  by  the  industrial  countries  of  the  Club  of  Ten, 
which  has  worked  towards  the  solution  of  monetary  problems 
since  1964-1965. 
And yet  all  this  has  proved inadequate.  Of this,  everyone 
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has  grown  not  only  the  proposal  from  Mr.  Werner,  Prime 
Minister  of  Luxembourg,  but  also  the  suggestions  of  the  Com-
mission  as  formulated  by  Mr.  Barre.  In any  event,  these  have 
come  too late  to  weather  the  present monetary  storm.  And in 
my  opinion the proposals do not go  far enough-not far enough 
even  to  cope  with  Europe's  internal difficulties.  I  remain  con-
vinced  of  the  need for  a  planned transition  to  a  European cur-
rency  unit  through  the  medium  of  complete  economic  integra-
tion.  This  is  the  only  possible  way  of  eliminating  future 
balance-of  -payments  difficulties.  It  would  certainly  simplify 
monetary problems at world level, too.  At all events, the intricate 
mosaic  would  be  somewhat  simplified  by  the  introduction  of  a 
European currency. 
I  should  ne~t like  to  illustrate  a  number  of  fundamental 
monetary problems at world level.  The real monetary problem is 
the  settlement  of  international  transactions :  money  is  only  a 
means  to  this  end.  International  trade  has  risen  very  steeply 
in the last fifteen  years and,  thank heavens,  is  continuing to rise. 
It can  only  be transacted by  means  of  internationally  accepted 
liquidities.  Trends  in  international  liquidity  are  a  source  of 
anxiety, not so much from  the point of view  of  quantity, though 
that is  a problem too,  but perhaps ,even  more from the point of 
view  of structure.  The first  element in international liquidity is 
undoubtedly  gold;  and  whatever  may  be  said  about  it,  it  has 
proved  to  be  the  best.  But  monetary  gold  supplies  have  been 
falling  in  the  last three years.  Even in Europe,  after  a  certain 
increase, we  have fallen back to the  1961  level. 
The  second  element  in  international  liquidity,  the  reserve 
cunencies  represented  by  the  pound  sterling  and the  American 
dollar,  suffer  from  a  lack  of  flexibility.  Past  rises  have  con-
siderably weakened these  reserve currencies; this  applies most to 
the pound sterling, but it also holds true for the dollar.  A further 
increase  is  certainly  not  desirable.  The  regularly  recurring  at-
tacks  of  international  anxiety  over  reserve  currencies  would 
certainly become more acute if there were a quantitative increase. 
This  means  that  credit  facilities  may  well  be  the  only  way  of 
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come.  We are familiar with the IMP drawing rights.  These have 
already been used  on two  occasions.  The views  of  the  Group 
of Ten are the deciding factor here.  In addition,  s,wap  arrange-
ments have existed for some years not between the central banks. 
Tomorrow  we  may  have  special  drawing  righ~s.  But  nobody 
will  dispute  that the  extension  of  credit  facilities-even  on  the 
conditions  attached  to  the  various  facilities-is  not  without  its 
dangers.  In theory,  there  is  no  danger  on the face  of  it,  since 
the total world picture is  always  one of the  balance-of  -payments 
equilibrium.  Deficits on one hand inevitably cancel out surpluses 
on the other.  But if the game is  to be played properly, the first 
essential  is  complete  solidarity  between  states  on this  question. 
Recent developments have not proved too reassuring.  Above all, 
there  must  be  sufficient  willingness-political will,  as  Mr.  Blu-
menfeld  has said-to accept  the  necessary  degree  of  discipline. 
This  means  not only  that  countries  which  are  running  a  defidt 
must  apply  themselves  to  making  it  good  within  a  given  time-
limit,  but also-and  this  is  all  too  easily  forgotten-it  means 
that countries which have excessive surpluses must in turn make 
the  effort  to  achieve  equilibrium.  And  all  this,  as  has  been 
repeatedly  emphasised,  can only  be  done  by  the  harmonisation 
not merely  of  the  economic  policies  but  also  of  the  budgetary 
policies of the various states. 
Finally, I  should like to draw the attention of this Assembly 
to  a  number of incidental  aspects  that  have  evolved  in recent 
times.  Their  effect  is  to  render  much  more  difficult  still  an 
already  highly  complicated  monetary  problem.  It must  surely 
be obvious to everyone that the monetary problem stems only to 
a  limited  degree  from  unsatisfactory  trade  balances.  Lately,  it 
has  been  financial  transfers  that  have  been  most  significant, 
and at the same time most dangerous. 
The  principle  of  "transferability"  has  enabled  a  mass  of 
Euro-currencies-sometimes called Eurodollars or by some other 
name-to detach themselves from the national economies.  They 
circulate  freely  as  floating  capital  and  settle  wherever  interest 
rates  are  most  attractive,  and  especially  where  the  least  risk 
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Germany.  And  there  is  a  huge  sum  involved.  This  floating 
capital  is  estimated  at  between  15  and  20  thousand  mil-
lion dollars. 
No single country and no currency in the world is capable of 
withstanding  a  sudden  transfer  of  monetary  resources  of  that 
order. 
There is  another phenomenon which  complicates  the issue : 
the  fact  that  the  public  at  large  is  nowadays  more  aware  of 
monetary problems than it ever used to be.  These problems were 
once the preserve of  a  few  specialists.  Now  they  are  a  subject 
of general interest.  They are discussed in the press,  which after 
all has a duty to inform, and in other media too. 
It is probably the first time in history that the most important 
slogan  in  an  election  campaign  has  had  to  do  with  monetary 
problems.  That is a thing which has never happened in the past. 
All  this  of  course  makes  the  problem  no  simpler.  And 
furthermore,  the  factors  are  not easy  to  counteract.  The  only 
direct  way  of  checking  transfers  of  floating  capital  is  what  is 
called "recyclage".  That is  a resolute answer, certainly, but then 
care must be taken that speculative movements derive  no benefit 
from  it,  nor,  when  the  "recyclage"  process  is  completed,  must 
they be allowed to start all over again. 
This is  a technique which calls for closer investigation. 
I  know  that a  great many  countries  try  to  neutralise  these 
transfers,  at least  in  part, by  exerting  pressure  on their internal 
credits or on consumer credit in their own country. 
But that approach does not yield satisfactory results; what is 
more,  it  involves  the  risk  of  damping  economic  activity  and 
economic  growth in the  various  countries  without removing  the 
cause of the evil, namely monetary transfers and speculation.  In 
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We have not yet,  I  think,  reached the end of the tightrope. 
We are at present in a very tricky and perilous situation. 
The decision  of  the Federal Republic  of Germany to  allow 
the German mark to float is very worrying.  H is to be hoped that 
the mark will  again  be  tied to  a  fixed  exchange rate as  soon  as 
possible. 
Unlike  what some  people  here  appear to  believe,  I  do  not 
think that floating  exchange  rates,  or exchange  rates with  wider 
margins  within  which they then proceed to  slide  gradually,  can 
offer  a  solution.  On  the  contrary,  they  make  for  permanent 
uncertainty, limited though it may be. 
The  most  dangerous  aspect  of  floating  exchange  rates  or 
wider  margins,  however,  is  that  they  provide  no  incentive  to 
efforts  at recovery.  There  is  a  temptation  simply  to  let  things 
slide.  A  gradual slide is  always  less  dangerous  and less  painful 
than falling  over  a  cliff.  Psychologically,  I  think,  such  a  solu-
tion would mean a very heavy burden. 
Clearly-this has been emphasised by various speakers-the 
core  of this  problem is  the need for  every  country to  adopt an 
economic  policy  and  a  budgetary  policy  capable  of  preventing 
such balance-of-payments  slides.  This  is  undoubtedly  the  deci-
sive factor, but a good monetary policy at national level is neces-
sarily hard, and it involves restrictions on credit facilities.  Every 
country is finding it increasingly difficult nowadays to pursue such 
a  policy,  because  the  political  pressure  of  the  population  is 
always exerted in another direction, namely towards easier credit. 
Let  us  hope  that  economic  harmonisation  and  integration  of 
important  par·~s  of  Europe and  the  world  will  be achieved  and 
that the political will needed throughout the world manifests itself. 
If not, then in all probability we  shall be called upon very often 
to discuss monetary problems.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (I). - Thank you, Mr. Dequae. 
I  call  Mr.  Couste,  on  behalf  of the  European Democratic 
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Mr.  Couste  (F).  - Mr.  Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,  I 
should  like  to  concentrate  my  remarks  and  suggestions  on  the 
theme set for debate and not on a number of  other subjects con-
cerned with the monetary problem. 
I shall therefore concern myself essentially with the minimum 
conditions  for  the  success  of  European  monetary  co-operation, 
deliberately leaving on one side the examination of the activities 
of the European Parliament from  1 May 1968 to 30 April 1969, 
which  constitutes  the  second  part  of  Mr.  Hougardy's  report, 
although  it shows  the  importance  of  these  activities,  linked  as 
they  are  to  the  activities  of  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Community and of the Council of  Ministers, which are the envy 
of those here today who belong not to the European Parliament 
but to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
I can see their point of view, but I  should like to concentrate 
my explanations and my suggestions on the minimum conditions. 
They are many, Mr. Hougardy; I have counted fourteen of them 
of varying degrees of importance, sometimes linked the one to the 
other  as  cause  and effect.  These  minimum  conditions  are  pre-
ceded in your report by  an  analysis,  which  on the whole  meets 
with our agreement,  of the situation of  our Community,  and by 
a  remark which  is  accurate  at  the  world  level,  namely  that the 
monetary geography of  the Western world  no  longer  reflects  its 
political geography. 
We  could  comment  at  length  on  the  consequences  of  this 
most perspicacious and far-reaching judgment, but we  shall con-
fine  ourselves  to  observing  that  once  this  judgment  was  pro-
nounced,  one question naturally came to Mr.  Hougardy's mind, 
which has not been  disputed ·by  our other colleagues  and Rap-
porteurs,  MM.  Federspiel  and  Petersen:  what,  in  this  situation, 
is  the role of Europe? 
The question of its  readiness and ability,  to use your terms, 
is  indeed  raised,  and  it  is  raised  in  terms  which,  in  my  view, 
inevitably reflect  the difficulty  of  our position  and our future  in 
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Indeed,  it  is  sufficient  to  have  heard  what  we  have  heard, 
to read what you have written, Mr.  Hougardy, to realise that we 
all use words  and expressions in  different  senses  when we  speak 
about European currency,  European monetary union,  European 
monetary zones and finally  European reserve currencies. 
These are not all the same thing.  If we  had the time-but 
we know that we  are pressed for time, Mr. Chairman-we could 
examine the importance of words in a field where mere words are 
not enough. 
You did well,  before turning to the minimum conditions,  to 
recall  in  your  oral  report  that since  4  July  last  we  have  lived 
through  events  which  for  an  observer,  an  economist,  are  truly 
unique experiences, since we have seen the apparent contradiction 
in  these  few  months  of  an  affirmation  of  the  Six's  solidarity  in 
the adoption of what Mr.  Chapman called the Barre Plan.  But 
there is  no longer any such thing  as  the "Barre Plan"; there is  a 
decision  by  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  the  Community  which 
has made  it the monetary policy of  this  Community.  Over  and 
above the event which tightened that solidarity, two other events 
have  occurred which  contradict it or  at least  appear to  do  so: 
first,  the  August  devaluation  of  the  franc  which,  for  obvious 
reasons of secrecy, had to be effected in conditions whose sudden-
ness  was  welcomed,  but also the German Government's decision 
of 30 September to allow the Deutsche Mark to find  its  own ex-
change rate. 
I  shall say presently what I  think  on this  point.  What the 
Commission thinks is not so very far removed from my own idea. 
Then  we  have  the  meeting  of  the  International  Monetary 
Fund at  which,  on  a  far  wider  scale  than  Europe,  it is  being 
envisaged,  nay  decided,  to  increase  international  monetary  re-
sources in order to promote the expansion of world trade-a good 
thing-through the creation of special drawing rights. 
There. is  finally  a  promise the  importance  of  which  I  must 
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meeting on 16 and 17 November next of the Conference of Heads 
of  State  and Heads  of  Government.  There  is  no  need  for  me 
to  say here what hopes, but also what difficulties,  this  news  may 
produce  after  all  these  events  and  in  face  of  all the  problems 
which are raised both within  and outside the Community. 
After  having  examined  this  internal  structure  of  the  Com-
munity,  what are then the minimum conditions?  We,  Mr.  Hou-
gardy,  share  your  own  views  on this.  We  are  too  much  com-
mitted,  all  of  us,  to  the  construction  of  Europe  not  to  realise 
that either we  must move  towards  economic  union  on  the  basis 
of a customs union, or we shall not even have an economic union 
and we shall perhaps be no more than an enlarged free trade area, 
and everybody  knows  what a  free  trade  area,  even  an  enlarged 
one,  represents  in  the  way of diminution  of  cohesion  and  what 
it will mean in the future for the well-being of our peoples. 
For a  long time,  as  you  said,  there has been general agree-
ment  in  recognizing  the  accuracy  of  the  analysis  of  a  situation 
which must develop  towards  economic union and not stop  short 
at  a  customs  union.  You  add,  quite  rightly,  that  these  diffi-
culties  are due  to  the contradiction between that greater mutual 
dependence between the economies of the Six, as a result of which 
some countries export more than 50 per cent of their production 
and  the  fact  their  foreign  trade  represents  more  than  one-third 
of  their national income.  When  one  weighs  up  the percentages 
which I quote one realises just how necessary it is  that the result 
of  this  interpenetration,  in  a  word  of  this  success  of  the  Com-
munity  on  a  commercial level,  should  be echoed  in  the  organi-
sation of a true economic union, really following common policies 
in all fields  and not only in that of agriculture. 
That is  my analysis, but it also reflects the preoccupations of 
the  French Government.  That is  why  the  French Government 
rightly  says-and I  believe  we  shall  be understood  in Europe, 
as  we  have been quite recently-that we  must complete a three-
phase programme in succesive stages. 
We must complete the transitional phase in which the Euro-
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so before 1 January 1970; we must develop the Community, that 
is  we must turn it from a customs union into an economic union; 
finally  we  must  examine  reasonable  conditions  for  its  enlarge-
ment.  Such  are  the  three  steps  which  we  have  to  carry  out 
successfully. 
Having  said  that,  we  are  not  so  very  far  away  from  an 
examination of the minimum conditions.  If  we group them under 
one  main  point of  view,  they  are  of three  types,  and  they  also 
pose,  as  you  have  quite  rightly said,  a  problem  of  democratisa-
tion,  that  is,  of  the  participation  of  the  peoples  of  Europe  in 
European common policy.  They also pose the problem, which I 
shall approach with some reserve, of the prior political conditions 
for monetary and economic action. 
The three main conditions are : fixed rates of exchange within 
the Six,  the  co-ordination  of  short  and  medium-term  economic 
policies  and,  finally,  the  operation  of  automatic  solidarity 
machinery. 
First, fixed  rates of exchange : until recently we  had known 
real fixed rates of exchange since the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Rome and we had not realised that ,they were just as important 
to  our economies  as  the  air we  breathe  is  to  us  as  individuals. 
That went without saying.  What went without saying was  chal-
lenged first  by the devaluation of the French franc  and then by 
the  measures taken by the German Government tending,  as  you 
know, towards a floating rate or exchange for the Deutsche Mark. 
However,  I  subscribe  to  Mr.  Hougardy's  little phrase-but 
little  phrases  are  very  important  in  politics-when  the  rightly 
says that the effects of a flexible  system of exchange rates would 
run counter to the aims  of the Community treaties. 
It is  just because you are right that nothing is  worse-and it 
is  not  an example  to  be  followed-not than  changing  a  parity 
even  in  difficult  circumstances,  but  than  allowing  an  exchange 
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The Commission's reaction, was, for me at least, quite under-
standable.  Having  once  noted  a  step  backward  in  relation  to 
1958 and the Treaty of Rome,  I  think we  must first  re-establish 
-and that is  not merely a minimum condition but, as  Mr. Hou-
gardy  has  said,  an  essential  pre-condition-fixed  rates  of  ex-
change between the Six. 
Mr. Chapman, referring just now to the proposal to increase 
the International Monetary Fund's variation figure from 0. 7 5 to 2, 
said that this  measure  would  permit a  variation of  the  order  of 
4 per cent.  He is  mistaken.  It would mean a variation of 8 per 
cent.  All of us  who  are familiar  with  the problem of  exchange 
rates know that, for example, if we take the International Mone-
tary Fund's figure of 0.75, that means that the figure  of 0.75 may 
be pushed to 1.5  on either side  of the rate, giving  a variation of 
3 per cent.  That is  what it means. 
Consequently,  one is  either for  fixed  rates  or one is  against 
them,  but if  one  is  for  fixed  rates,  despite  the  discussions  that 
are taking place at this very moment in the International Mone-
tary Fund, one knows very well  that one is  sticking to  a funda-
mental  rule  of  the  Bretton  Woods  Agreements,  of  the  Inter-
national Monetary Fund, and that until we  find  something better, 
this  way  of  conducting  business  has  produced  results  in  world 
trade, for it provides certainty and security in trade and invisible 
operations. 
That is  of  prime  importance if  we  really wish to  serve  not 
only  the  union  of  a  continent  but the  needs-and God  knows 
they are important-of the whole world, not forgetting the needs 
in this respect of the developing countries. 
Flexibility  must  therefore  be  rejected,  fixed  rates  are  in-
dispensable. 
I feel,  Mr. Hougardy; that your attempt to define fixed parity 
-which you  attempt  in  my  view  very  successfully  at page  14 
of your report-must be retained. 
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"What (fixed  parity) boils  down  to  is  that  the relative 
value of the Deutsche Mark must be identical to that of the 
lira,  the  guilder  and  the  franc,  i.e.,  the  value  of  national 
currencies relative to those of outside countries must remain 
the same." 
That is  the fundamental point.  And you add,  because you 
are  concerned,  as  we  all  are,  not only  with  monetary  but  also 
with economic problems : 
"But  this  also  means  that  increased  efficiency  in  one 
part of  the  Community"  -efficiency here  meaning  prosper-
ity-"will benefit the Community as  a whole", 
that is,  you recall that fundamental law of Community solidarity. 
I  think that on this  point we  might  pose one  last  question. 
And I  put it to you with all the gravity and the  consequences  it 
represents. 
Is  it  reasonable  for  Europe  to  continue  to  conduct  all  its 
economic operations, and more particularly those of farmers  and 
stockbreeders, on the basis of a unit of account which is  after all 
not European? 
In putting this  question I  am of course aware of the magni-
tude of the problem raised.  But when I  assess,  as  assess I  must, 
the situation of farmers in each of our countries-! am thinking 
of course especially of the French but also at the moment of the 
Germans  and  tomorrow  perhaps  others-it is  my  duty  to  ask 
this  question on their behalf,  because they may wonder whether 
their future does  lie  in a  Europe which  they were told was  their 
hope for the future. 
I  must add that in  this  situation we  must  be  very  careful. 
And since we  have the opportunity in this debate to put a funda-
mental question, I shall not be so  cruel as  to ask the Commission 
for  an immediate  reply,  but I  serve  notice  that I  shall  want  to 
know  whether  we  shall  tomorrow  have  the  political  strength  to 
answer it. 
The  second  condition  concerns  harmonised  economic  poli-
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made,  contrary  to  all  expectations,  when  the  Commission's 
Memorandum,  presented  by  ~1r.  Barre,  was  accepted  by  the 
Council of Ministers and became a Community decision. 
I  for  my  part welcome  this  decision  because  it is  linked in 
time to a speed corresponding to our needs.  The Memorandum 
was tabled on 12 February and adopted on 17 July.  And I know 
how many texts have been discussed by this Parliament, present-
ed by the Commission and still remain unanswered by the Coun-
cil of Ministers. 
That  is  a  step  forward,  and  it  must  be  noted,  for  three 
fundamental pvinciples have thereby been adopted. 
First, we  have  adopted the principle of ensuring convergent 
trends  in  national  guidelines  for  medium-term  economic  policy. 
When we know that to achieve a union and then unity, a real 
effort must be made,  and that the responsibility lies  first  of  all, 
as  Mr.  Petersen quite rightly  said, with governments,  these must 
endeavour to make their  national  policy  fit  the  requirements  of 
their own Community decisions. 
This  short-term  economic  policy-and  this  is  the  second 
principle-must also  fit  in  with  the  medium-term  policy  guide-
lines that have been adopted. 
This being so,  the Council must be congratulated on having 
decided  in  the  autumn  of  this  year  to  institute  a  fundamental 
debate  between  its  members  on  the  methods  of  medium-term 
policy on the basis of a study by the Commission. 
So  far  as  I  know,  this  study has not yet been submitted.  I 
hope that it soon will be' and that the debate may open shortly. 
But what is  no doubt even more interesting is  the third and 
last  principle,  namely  that  of  the  machinery  for  monetary  co-
operation. 
I am not a maximalist, unlike my colleague Mr. GLinne,  who 
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I  believe that by  trying to  do  too  much all  at once  we  are 
likely to  place ourselves  in  an untenable position in the matters 
we  are concerned with. 
·Once  the  principle  has  been  eStaJblished,  and  once  the 
experiment  promises  to  turn  out  well,  we  shall  then  have  the 
opportunity to  advance further  in the  direction  of  monetary  co-
operation machinery. 
I  believe that then we  shall  have  demonstrated the  solidity 
of our Community in a very difficult field. 
In a word, we feel that the Council's decision,  the monetary 
principles which have just been adopted at the instigation of the 
Commission,  are the way  of  the future. 
The other conditions are very numerous and very interesting; 
they  would  each  deserve  long  examination  and  I  should  very 
much like  to see  a full  debate in the European Parliament on a 
report of such quality as  the one now before us. 
We are told there should be movement towards the creation 
of a  common capital market-my colleague Mr. Bousquet, who 
will  speak on Thursday when Mr. Dichgan's report is  presented, 
will  show  how  positive  our spirit  is-towards the  co-ordination 
and harmonisation  of  social  charges  and  taxation,  towards  the 
harmonisation  of  monetary  reserves  policy,  towards  common 
guidelines for the supply of capital in the Community, towards a 
uniform  attitude  in  the  international  monetary  institutions  and, 
you rightly add,  towards greater solidarity between the Six with-
in the Group of Ten. 
All  that  is  true,  those  are  necessary  additional  conditions. 
You  then  add  a  final  very  interesting  condition,  which  I  think 
should  be  accepted :  the  harmonisation  and  co-ordination  of 
budgetary policy.  How right you are in view  of the size  of the 
budgets in each of our countries, in view of the inflationary effect 
of public expenditure within one economy! 
But  there  is  a  budgetary  committee.  These  institutions 
-and we  are coming to one  of your great concerns-should be 
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run,  that means  fulfilling  your twelfth  condition,  the  democrati-
sation of  economic life. 
On this  point, I  must tell you  quite frankly  that we  should 
be  very  satified  if,  as  you say-and this  little  adverb  is  impor-
tant-we, the  European Parliament, were  obligatorily  consulted. 
It seems to us that, without speaking now, too early, of European 
lists  of  candidates,  of  elections  to  which  we  are  by  no  means 
disinclined,  it seems  to us that if there were  such  an obligation, 
we  should be in a far better position to control the action of the 
European institutions  and consequently to be better informed of 
what goes  on in  those  numerous  committees  of  whose  existence 
you remind us, whether it be the Monetary Committee, the Com-
mittee on Business Cycle Policy,  the Committee of Governors of 
Central  Banks,  the  Budgetary  Policy  Committee,  the  informal 
mee'tings  of Finance Ministers and finally  the Medium-term Eco-
nomic Policy Committee. 
We  know full  well that the Council of Ministers was  aware 
of  the difficulties  which would have to  be overcome  and that it 
has made a number of excellent moves. 
I  feel  there  are  indeed  interesting  points  in  your  political 
observations  in  this  field.  One  may  in  fact  wonder,  as  I 
do,  whether  the  monetary  problems  did  not  play-this  should 
certainly be for  a future  analyst to determine-a very important 
part in recent political events,  both in France-! am thinking of 
the referendum  of  27  April-and in  Germany,  in  the  elections 
of  28  September. 
I have a feeling that if an analysis in depth were made of the 
psychology of the electorate, motives would  be found  explaining 
a  number  of  changes,  a  number  of  attitudes,  a  number  of  new 
percentages  by  a  sort  of  monetary  concern,  so  true  is  it that 
monetary  transactions  form  an  intimate  part  of  each  citizen's 
daily life. 
But I shall say no more on this point; I merely ask the ques-
tion  and  go  to  another  aspect  raised  by  Mr.  Hougardy,  when 
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"any  progress  achieved  towards  a  common  economic  and 
monetary policy depends on the progress made in establishing 
a  common  foreign  policy  and  on  the  possibilities  which 
exist in this  regard". 
I must say that on this point I am not in complete agreement 
with you.  You say in fact,  that defence,  international credit and 
development aid are fields  in which the policy of the countries of 
the Community is  still strictly national. 
That is  not quite  accurate~fortunately!  When you think of 
international credit,  particularly of  development  aid,  you  cannot 
but think  at  this  very  moment of  the  association  between  EEC 
and  the  African  and Malagasy  States,  an  association  which  we 
have  renewed  by  the  Yaounde  Convention;  surely  you  can  see 
that we  are committed to  a  path which  is  not  merely  national? 
On  this  point,  therefore,  I  have  some  reservations  on  your 
observations. 
I  now  come,  finally,  to  your  last  condition,  which  clearly 
interests you a great deal and which you call "the political thresh-
old of the Community process".  You say,  and I  quote: 
"We must bow to the facts:  the advance towards politi-
cal  unity,  and  thus  towards  an  independent  destiny  for 
Europe,  cannot  be  begun  until  economic  and  monetary 
policy  are conceived,  understood and  desired  as  the  instru-
ments of a common overall policy." 
And you  repeated  this  sentence word for  just now  in  your 
oral report. 
If by this  you  really  imply hope in  the  Summit Conference 
in November, then I agree with you; but if,  as might be supposed 
from  certain contexts  in which you say  that the European Eco-
nomic  Community was  and  is  necessary,  but politically  it  is  an 
attempt  to  evade  the  issue,  your  intention  was  merely  to  affirm 
that the problem of co-operation pure and simple does not neces-
sarily provide the impetus for  a common policy, then I  must say 
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For it  is  by no means certain in the long run whether joint 
concerted  action  in  an  economic  union  will  lead  to  a  political 
union;  there,  too,  political will  is  necessary,  and I  hope  that  at 
The Hague, when Heads of State and of Government meet,  they 
will express a political will to unite Europe in all the fields which 
we know to be crucial and especially, first of all, to complete this 
European Economic Community  and perhaps  to  strengthen  and 
enlarge it. 
Those, Mr. Hougardy, are the essential points I wish to raise, 
and the  contribution I  wish  to make to this  debate which,  I  re-
peat, is  very important for us,  for we  are well  aware that behind 
the  franc,  the  Deutsche  Mark,  the pound sterling,  the  dollar  it 
is  the destiny and happiness of men, the daily lives  of us all,  our 
material welfare  which  is  at stake.  In a  word,  what matters  is 
that we  as  politicians  should  always  be  concerned  with  finding 
ways  and means to  achieve greater solidarity between men.  For 
us,  in any event, one of the best ways  is  the building of Europe. 
(Applause.) 
The Chairman (1).- Thank you, Mr. Couste. 
I call Mr. Aiken. 
Mr. Aiken. - I was glad to have the privilege of hearing the 
three  Rapporteurs,  Mr.  Federspiel,  Mr.  Petersen  and  Mr.  Hou-
gardy,  expounding  on  their  very  valua:ble  papers.  There  are 
undoubtedly some hopeful signs that the world is  moving towards 
a better appreciation of the fundamentals of international finance, 
and all of us  welcomed the action of the International Monetary 
Fund  in  taking  steps  to  increase  international  reserves  as  and 
when required. 
In dealing with our European situation, we must realise that, 
as  Mr. Federspiel said, 
"the decisive factor remains the extent to which governments 
are prepared to  co-ordinate and integrate their national eco-
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In his report to us, Mr. Hougardy said that 
"one of  the minimum  conditions for  monetary co-operation 
was  co-operation in economic policy,  which  must gradually 
become mandatory." 
That idea  was  expressed  in  other  words  by  Mr.  Petersen, 
when he said that 
"what  is  required  for  successful  monetary  co-operation  is 
first  and foremost  a  better appreciation of the national self-
discipline required to maintain an orderly international mone-
tary system." 
Some  of  the  crises  that have  occurred  in recent  years  and 
have  needed very strong and unprecedented action in the mone-
tary field by financial authorities have highlighted what Mr. Peter-
sen said on page 18  of this report. He said: 
". . .  it has to  be recognised that  the  international monetary 
structure is  already so  wormeaten that no one  dare let folly 
reap  its  'just'  deserts  for  fear  that the  whole  structure will 
come tumbling about our ears." 
There is  little  doubt that we  want,  if  we  can,  to co-operate 
and  find  a  means  of  bringing  our  combined  influence  here  in 
Europe  on  all  the  governments  of  Europe,  whether  they  are in 
the Community or are other Members of the Council of Europe, 
not  only  to  act as  good Members  searching for  European unity 
but  also-those  of  them  that  are  creditors-to  act  as  good 
creditors. 
As Mr. Petersen pointed out, any balance-of-payments deficit 
by  one  of  country  is  necessarily  reflected  by  a  balance-of-
payments surplus or surpluses elsewhere.  We must try, if we can, 
to  level  out,  so  that there will  be  neither dangerous  deficits  nor 
dangerous surpluses. 
The  Community  must  be  careful  that it does  not  get  too 
inward-looking and think only  of the interests  of the six present 
Members.  It must also have regard to the fact that some  of the 
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tions  on  imports-are causing  a  great  deficit  in  the  balance  of 
trade  between  the  Six  and  other  Members  of  the  Council  of 
Europe who  hope  some  day  to  become  Members  of  the  Com-
munity.  For example,  in  1968,  Ireland  imported  goods  worth 
$192  million  from  the  Six  but  only  succeeded  in  exporting  to 
the Six $73 million worth, leaving a deficit for our small country 
of  $120 million.  We  have done our utmost over  the  years,  by 
trade  negotiations  and  diplomatic  representations,  to  get  that 
deficit reduced. 
I  agree that the Members of the Six  and the other Members 
of the Council of Europe should in financial and economic matters 
try to  act as  good  Members,  conscious  not only  of  the  need  to 
promote  the  welfare  of  their  own  peoples,  but  also  of  the  fact 
that it behoves them not to act in a way which will harm the rest 
of  their European partners. 
Back  in  1958,  when  things  were  different,  the  European 
economy had a lot of difficulties.  It was bedevilled by the height 
of  the  tariffs  and  by  the  extent  to  which  European  trade  was 
covered  by  quota  systems.  The European  countries  then  com-
bined to  establish OEEC-it is  now OECD-and it was  deter-
mined  to  found  the  European  Payments  Union.  One  of  the 
factors that made a success of the EPU, and which helped to build 
up European trade· to the extent of 40 per cent within about two 
years, was that there was a certain amount of compulsion backing 
the self-discipline which Mr. Petersen has asked for. 
As a former Minister of  Finance, I  always like  to feel  there 
is  a little bit of pressure behind the se1f -discipline of taX!payers  in 
paying  what is  due  to  the  government.  In this  case,  whatever 
system  we  evolve  here  in  Europe,  and  whatever  monetary 
system  is  eventually  evolved  in  the  world,  I  hope  that  that 
element will be in it and that not only will it be a cause of satis-
faction  to  each Member to  act  as  a good  creditor when  he  has 
a surplus,  but it will also be to  his  advantage. 
I  am glad that the Economic Committee is  to co-operate in 
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field,  so  that  we  here  in  Europe,  whether  we  are  Members  of 
the  Six  or  whether,  within  a  couple  of  years,  the  Community 
becomes  Ten or Eleven,  will  do  our  utmost  to  see  that  all  the 
European countries that are Members of this  Council of Europe 
will co-operate and discipline themselves,  and help  discipline the 
other Members,  in seeing  that there are  in  future  no  great  sur-
pluses  and no  great deficits,  at least in the  area over  which  we 
can hope  to  have some  effective  influence,  over  the  area  of  the 
combined membership of the Council of Europe. 
The Chairman (/). -Thank you, Mr. Aiken. 
I call Mr. Martino. 
Mr.  Martino,  Member  of the Commission  of the  European 
Communities(/). -Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Commission 
I  should ·like to  associate myself with Mr.  Hougardy's  other col-
leagues  in  congratulating  him  on  his  report.  It has  certainly 
produced  what  has  so  far  proved  a  full,  lively  and  interesting 
debate on the vital subject of the political necessity for European 
co-operation in the monetary field. 
In his speech today, after describing the Community's present 
situation  and the  difficulty  it  was  experiencing  in  passing  from 
economic to political union, the Rapporteur touched on the ques-
tion of its  enlargement as  seen from the monetary aspects.  One 
might have supposed, if he was going to refer to the matter at all, 
that he would have  done  so  in a  wider  context than that of  its 
monetary implications-that he would also have mentioned other 
aspects  such  as  the  opening  of  negotiations  which  could  in  a 
sense be described as  the most immediate problem, the extent of 
the  enlargement and the problems  bound up with  it.  It is  true 
that some allusion has been made to these questions by Mr. Chap-
man, Mr. Federspiel and the last speaker, Mr. Aiken. 
Coming at the end of this part of the debate, I shall content 
myself with replying to those who have dealt with the question of 
enlargement.  I  shall  also  take  the  opportunity  of  telling  the 
Joint Meeting about some of the ideas which prompted the Com-78  CONSULTATIVE  ASSEMBLY- EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
mission to prepare the document which it sent to the Council of 
Ministers yesterday. 
In reply to Mr. Federspiel, let me point out that the truth is 
that  the  United  Kingdom,  Ireland,  Denmark  and  Norway  have 
never  withdrawn  their  applications  for  admission  to  the  Com-
munity.  Those  applications  come  from  European countries,  all 
of which have e:x:pressed their readiness to accept without reserva-
tion every one of the Community's objectives with regard to eco-
nomic integration and political union.  For that reason, it is  our 
view  that their applications  ought to  be considered together  and 
none of them given priority. 
The admission  of  new Members  to  the Community  ~mplies, 
moreover, that they,  on their side,  accept not only all the provi-
sions  of  the  treaties  but  also  the  decisions  adopted  since  the 
treaties came into force.  Those decisions have become an essen-
tial element of the de facto solidarity which binds the Six together 
and so  also  fundamental  element  of  the  Community's  existence. 
That is  why,  in our view,  specific  problems should in general be 
solved by the adoption of interim measures rather than by amend-
ing the existing rules. 
It remains to be seen whether the  obligations assumed under 
the treaties-and to  which  the  EEC member  states  are  already 
giving  practical  effect-will be  enough  to  ensure  the  successful 
functioning  of an enlarged  Community,  or whether  some  mor~ 
precise  undertakings  may  not  be  required  from  old  and  new 
Members alike.  There is  one point, however,  on which we  must 
insist and that is  that it would not be sufficient for the countries 
applying for admission merely to give their assent to some general 
objectives.  They must accept the priorities, at both internal and 
international  level,  that have  emerged  from  the  progressive  co-
ordination within the Community. 
The point has  acquired additional importance following  the 
results achieved by the Community at the international monetary 
negotiations  that  led  to  the  amendment  of  the  International 
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drawing  rights  system.  It  has  acquired  more  importance  still 
-Mr. Couste is right about this-since last July's decisions by the 
Community's Council of Ministers regarding better harmonisation 
of the member states' medium-term economic policies, as well  as 
more  efficient  co-ordination  of  their  current  policies,  and  the 
implementation  by  appropriate  methods,  of  monetary  co-
operation within the Community. 
This,  in our view,  would  make  it possible-and here  I  am 
replying to Mr. Boersma-to prevent, rather than cure, excessive 
imbalance between the EEC Members, besides being more likely 
to produce the necessary conditions for maintaining the stable ex-
change rates required not only for the common agricultural prices 
system but also, and chiefly, as  a secure basis for business devel-
opment inside the Common Market. 
Their progress in  this  direction has  brought its  Members  to 
the opening of a new stage in the Community's evolution involv-
ing the creation of  a  common monetary system.  Acceptance of 
this  target,  and of the means of achieving  it,  by  the  states  now 
applying  for  admission  would  contribute  greatly  towards  the 
unity and dynamic character of an enlarged Community. 
There are two problems-how to strengthen the Community 
and how to expand it-but they can both be solved simultaneous-
··ly.  As  regards  the first,  the  Community  cannot  stand  still.  If 
it  did,  the  pressure  of  the  disruptive  forces  already  apparent 
would,  paradoxically enough, lead to its  disappearance just as  it 
had achieved  a  customs  union  and  just  as  improved  techniques 
were enabling it to reap ever larger benefits from the existence of 
a  vast  common  market.  The  Community  must  not stand  still. 
It must consolidate and develop its achievements and their results, 
within the framework of the Community institutions. 
All this  means  further  essential progress  being made  in the 
social,  agricultural,  economic,  technological and institutional sec-
tors  and,  as  I  have already  said,  the  Commission has  presented 
a  number  of  proposals  to  the  Council  with  that in  view.  The 
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lowed  up  and  intensified,  and  it need  hardly  be  added  that  its 
enlargement  to  take  in  the United  Kingdom,  Denmark,  Ireland 
and Norway  cannot be allowed to  slow  down  that action.  The 
only  type  of  structure  capable  of  providing  a  place  for  these 
candidates is  that  of  a  strong  Community.  It has  been  in that 
context,  as  Mr.  Chapman very  rightly  says,  that those countries 
have  presented  and,  for  over  two  years,  maintained  their 
application. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  negotiations,  therefore,  it  will  be 
advisable for  the countries concerned to  state,  in full  knowledge 
of the facts-of the action,  that is  to  say,  that has been decided 
or  already taken-that they  accept  the  principle  that the  Com-
munity  must  be  strengthened;  and  it  will  be  necessary,  further, 
that they introduce policies similar to those followed by the Com-
munity itself to that end. 
I  have  spoken  of  the beginning  of  the  negotiations  because 
the  Commission is  convinced that they should be begun as  soon 
as  possible.  That is  the conclusion reached in  the  report it has 
just sent  to  the Council of  Ministers.  The same  document also 
suggests a plan and a number of principles designed to facilitate the 
examination,  together  with  the  applicant  countries,  of  the  prob-
lems  raised by the enlargement of  the  Community, and hence to 
contribute towards finding  a means  of  ensuring that an  enlarged 
Community will possess the two essential qualities of cohesion and ' 
dynamism. 
The Chairman(/).-Thank you, Mr. Martino. 
The  remainder  of  the  debate  is  adjourned  until  tomorrow 
morning, Saturday 4  October, at 10 o'clock. 
The Sitting is  closed. 
The Sitting was closed at 7.15 p.m. SECOND SITTING 
SATURDAY, 4 OCTOBER 1969 
IN THE CHAIR  :  Mr.  REVERDIN 
President of the Consultative Assembly 
The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. 
The Chairman (F). - The Sitting is open. 
I.  Continuation of the exchange of views 
The Chairman (F). -The agenda calls for the continuation 
of the exchange of views  between the members of the European 
Parliament and the members of the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. 
I call Mr. Vredeling. 
Mr. Vredeling (N). - Mr. Chairman, if I may be allowed at 
this inspiring hour to make a few  remarks on the subject before 
us, I should like to start by saying that the question whether it is 
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to  collaborate more  closely  in  monetary  affairs,  and  to  achieve 
closer monetary unity, is  answered differently by different people. 
By that I  mean that when the Ministers  of Economic Affairs  on 
the one hand and the Ministers of Finance on the other are faced 
with this question, they have a marked tendency to play hide-and-
seek and to shelter behind each other's backs. 
The argument  of  the Ministers  of  Economic Affairs  is  that 
we  must first have monetary unity because otherwise it is  impos-
sible to  conduct sound monetary policies. 
The  Minister  of  Finance,  on  the  other  hand,  say  that  we 
cannot  have  monetary  unity  until  economic  policies  have  been 
integrated. 
We  have  been  gyrating  inside  this  vicious  circle  for  some 
considerable  time  now,  and we  can see  the  consequences.  Ac-
cording  to  the  textbook,  it is  practically  certain  that  monetary 
unity-monetary union-is the  keystone  in  the  process  of  eco-
nomic  integration.  To my  mind,  however,  day-to-day  political 
practice reveals a slightly different situation, and no doubt because 
economic policy, in a society based, like ours, on a free enterprise 
production system, is hardly an operational reality. 
Of course every country, including the member states, applies 
an  economic  policy.  But when  all  is  said  and  done,  it comes 
down to little more ·than a  set  of guidelines  for  commercial  and 
industrial enterpr.ise.  Facilities are provided, regional policies are 
put into effect here and there and backward industries are stimu-
lated.  Individually, these measures are not highly operational, at 
least seen from  a central standpoint. 
Monetary  policy,  by  contrast,  is  operational.  Devaluation 
and  revaluation  clearly  have  an  operational  character.  They 
are the subjects of one major decision.  Credit policy, budgetary 
policy,  and central banks all  play operational roles  in daily gov-
ernment.  The part played by Ministers  of  Economic Affairs  is 
different.  In practical  politics  it is  very  probably  necessary  to 
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which  are  intended  to  stimulate  the  economy  and  are  more  a 
matter  of  co-operation  with  commerce  and industry,  cannot  be 
taken until the operational measures in the monetary sphere have 
been applied.  If simultaneity is  dictated by monetary policy,  the 
process which is set in motion has very far-reaching consequences. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  parallel  can  be  drawn  with  agricultural 
policy.  This too,  has proved to be an operational policy in the 
Community.  By its  means the Community should have  set cer-
tain processes in motion,  although in this it has not always  been 
successful.  Here again use has been made of an advanced sector 
because it was  able to function operationally.  Yet it should not 
have needed to occupy this leading position. 
The whole pr,ocess  of operations of this  kind which have to 
be  carried  out  simultaneously-and I  would  emphasise  this  to 
avoid  any  possibility  of  misunderstanding-is  certainly  not  ac-
ceptable if it is  done inside the Community without the European 
Parliament's  exercising  any  form  of  parliamentary  control.  I 
shall  return to  this  point in  a  moment.  As  regards  the  simul-
taneity of the process, I should like to say the following. 
To my mind, the question cannot properly be tackled before 
the  central  position  which  an  internal  parliamentary  institution 
such as  the European Parliament must  occupy is  clearly  under-
stood. 
I  should like to say a few  words about the recent difficulties 
over  the devaluation of the French franc and-for this  is  really 
the  crux  of  the  matter-the revaluation  of  the  German  mark. 
For this  purpose  I  would  refer  you  to  an  interesting  article  by 
Professor  Mundell  of  Chicago  University  in  The  Times  on 
Wednesday  1  October.  Professor  Mundell  discusses  this  very 
subject.  His  thesis  is  that  if  there  had  been  no  revaluation  or 
adjustment of  the German mark, wages  in West Germany would 
have had to rise by 10 to 15  per cent.  Acoording to him, there-
fore,  the choice  lay  between  revaluation  and  a  wage  rise  of  10 
to  15  per cent.  There  was  no  other  alternative.  Now  as  we 
know the German Government opted for revaluation.  A measure 
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unions.  The  German trade  unions  are  now  in  the  position  of 
being unable to formulate  their wage  demands in the same way. 
In this  connection Professor Mundell  makes  the interesting  sug-
gestion  that the trade unions  might  consider including  exchange 
rate clauses in their collective agreements in order to arm them-
selves  against  such  eventualities,  against  which  they  are  other-
wise  quite powerless. 
This strikes me as  a highly interesting idea.  We are familiar 
with collective labour agreements which provides for the adapta-
tion  of  wage  rates  to  price  increases.  But wage  rates  tied  to 
exchange  rates  are  something  new.  If  the  politicians  allow 
monetary co-operation to go by default and fail to reach the unity 
we  desire,  then  the  trade  unions  will  in  turn  have  to  resort  to 
such  a  remedy,  more  or  less  for  the  sake  of  self-preservation. 
This  presupposes  a  high  degree  of  collaboration  between  trade 
union movements in the various member states.  It also calls for 
a different kind of consultation between both sides of industry in 
the various countries of the Community.  We shall have to work 
together more. 
If I may, I should like to say a word in this connection about 
the position of the small countries,  and I  shall take the Nether-
lands as  an exemple.  The Netherlands  are tied to  an important 
degree  to  the  German mark.  Half of  all  Dutch exports  to the 
EEC  countries  go  to  Germany.  More  than  one  third  of  the 
national income of the Netherlands  is  earned in West Germany. 
Although the process  of inflation is  at work in  the Netherlands, 
it is  not certain that revaluation will be necessary.  In any event 
the  revaluation  of  the  German  mark  restricts  the  options  of  a 
Dutch  incomes  policy.  These  options  in  the  Netherlands  are 
limited, in connection with the export and similar factors,  by the 
fact that the German trade union movement,  the DGB, has not 
experienced  the  same  wage  rises  as  have  taken  place  in  other 
member states; this is  a very interesting point in view  of Profes-
sor Mundell's  hypothesis.  In fact,  the DGB in  Germany deter-
mines the wages policies of small countries like the Netherlands. 
The same applies to Belgium.  This dependence upon each other 
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economic  and social  policy before we  can arrive  at a  monetary 
policy  is  really  an illusory  argument,  because  the  absence  of  a 
common monetary policy  already  in  fact  largely  determines  the 
economic and social policies of the various states.  In my opinion 
therefore it is high time that the monetary authorities took action. 
As  a  result of the  absence  of  a  Community monetary policy,  a 
number of  states will  be forced  to align themselves  with the  ex-
change rate of  the  German mark.  Other ·countries will  need  to 
align more closely with the dollar rate.  H is  a remarkable thing 
that the trial of strength which threatens to take place in EEC be-
tween  the  French  franc  and  the  American  dollar  has  become 
essentially a struggle between the German mark and the American 
dollar.  As the saying has it, you never can tell. 
I turn now to Mr. Hougardy's report, where in paragraph 15 
a  number of  important things  are  said which  have  been  said in 
previous European Parliament reports.  Mr.  Hougardy tackles  a 
highly  important  question  in that paragraph when  he  says  that 
the interests which are so  mutually contradictory 
"will  be  regarded  as  national as  long  as  nation states  form 
the framework and the foundation of politics, and as  long as 
there is  no possibility  of  considering them in the  context of 
the  Community,  for  want  of  communication  at  that  level 
between public opinion in the different member states or even 
between  the  various  parties,  trade  unions  or  professional 
organisations." 
This is a highly important statement and, I feel, quite correct. 
We in the Community lack the process of integration of the politi-
cal forces which are generally present in our member states in the 
form  of political parties.  We are sorely in need of that process. 
As  everyone  knows,  the  trade union movement has  set  the  ball 
rolling,  but  the  political  parties  have  so  far  lagged  a  long  way 
behind. 
Mr.  Hougardy says  in his  report that there must necessarily 
be a struggle for power between the political forces.  He means, 
of course, political power and not power in the conventional sense 86  CONSULTATIVE  ASSEMBLY- EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
of  the  word.  He  says  that  political  power  is  a  reflection  of 
interests. 
He further  points  out that as  a  minimum  condition,  a  start 
must at length be made on democratisation-the participation of 
political  groups  and  economic  and  social  organisations  in  the 
determination of common economic and monetary objectives.  To 
establish such a programme, there must be a primary obligation to 
consult the European Parliament and possibly also the Economic 
and Social Committee. 
On the  question  what  form  this  process  should  eventually 
take,  he  says  that the  political parties will  have  to  be  organised 
on  a  European  scale  within  the  foreseeable  future.  He  then 
argues-and here  I  cannot help  but hesitate  a  little-that gov-
ernments  might  lend  a  helping  hand  by  exerting  some  gentle 
pressure.  I  hesitate here  some,what  because  governments  them-
selves  are  the  expression  of  particular  political  leanings.  So  if 
they themselves were to lend a helping hand I am not sure wheth-
er  this  would  be  done  in  a  way  that could  be  called  objective. 
This is a point intrinsically worthy of discussion and consideration 
because so far no progress whatever has been made towards the 
integration of the political forces  in the  Community.  The  con-
s·equences  of this  are many and varied. 
Mr.  Hougardy has  pointed  out,  for  example,  that progress 
towards a common monetary and economic policy is  inextricable 
from,  and dependent on, the  requirements  and possibilities  of  a 
common  foreign  policy.  This  is  true;  but  the  converse  also 
applies.  As a result of the fact that they have no common views 
on foreign  policy,  the  member  states  are  extremely  hesitant  to 
pool their economic and monetary policies.  These things go very 
deep.  And so I feel that the Rapporteur has hit the nail on the 
head: the important point is the lack of integration of the political 
forces inside the Community. 
This  is  all  the more  significant  because  the failure  to  move 
towards  integration of political forces  reveals  in an even  clearer 
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For these forces are pushing ahead with integration.  Ever greater 
concentrations of economic power are a reality.  Amalgamations 
of large concerns across international frontiers are the order of the 
day.  The leeway in the political integration process gives  rise to 
enormous  problems,  notably for  the future  of  democracy in the 
Community. 
Some  highly  interesting  data  have  been  compiled  by 
Mr.  Charles  Levinson,  Secretary  General  of  the  International 
Federation of Chemical and General Workers' Unions.  I  found 
them in the Guardian of 3 September last. 
In· a  study  on  this  question  of  the  build-up  of  economic 
power, this international federation has shown that 35  per cent of 
the  gross  national product  of  the  Western  world,  excluding  the 
United States-i.e. broadly speaking, Europe and Japan-is pro-
duced by United States companies and affiliated subsidiaries.  A 
revealing figure indeed. 
This  is  also  to  some  extent reflected  in  the  Bulletin  of  the 
European  Communities  entitled  Research  and  Technology  of 
16 September last, in which it is stated that one sixth of all Euro-
pean production  in  the  electronics  field  is  in  the  hands  of  sub-
sidiaries  of  American  companies. 
My reference to  these  facts  must not be  taken  as  a  sign  of 
anti-American  sentiment.  That  is  by  no  means  my  intention. 
Yet it is  worth pointing out that this process of concentration of 
economic power,  with the merging  of  large  concerns, is  covered 
by federal  anti-trust legislation in the  United States.  We in  the 
Communities  have,  it is  true,  begun  to  tackle  this  problem  by 
regulations  on  competition,  but  not,  I  think,  in  a  ·sufficiently 
effective way. 
Generally speaking then, we lack the concerted policy which 
is  a  fact  of life  in  the  United  States.  Nonetheless,  perhaps  for 
that  very  reason,  the  process  of  economic  integration  between 
large concerns is  taking on gigantic proportions and leaving us in 
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before  except  in  the  19th century,  and  which  is  now  far  more 
dangerous because of the significantly greater scale on which it is 
taking place. 
It is  my opinion that if  the politicians are consdous of  their 
responsibility-and I  am thinking of the party politicians in our 
various  countries-they must  surely  learn  something  from  this 
situation. 
I need hardly tell you that a recent statement by the British 
Foreign Secretary on this point pleased me greatly. 
In  a  speech  in  Brighton  this  week,  he  made  the  following 
highly  significant  declaration: 
"We fully  support  our  friends  in  the  Community  who 
wish to see more democratic control by the European Parlia-
ment of activities covered by the Treaty.  We do not believe 
that in this process Britain will  be swamped and submerged; 
we  have  greater  faith  in  the  political  genius  of  our people 
than that.  We believe that if Britain has much to gain from 
membership she has also very much to give." 
Mr. Chairman, I  believe that to  be true and that we  on the 
continent must agree that Britain has much to gain from member-
ship but also a great deal to  give. 
This point is  especially relevant in connection with the pro-
cess  of democratisation and the need to provide a counterweight 
to the economic forces arising on the continent, since this process 
will  be  accelerated  if  Britain  becomes  a  Member  of  the  Com-
munity. 
I wish to say how particularly glad I  am to hear the British 
Foreign Secretary,  even  before  England  becomes  a  Member  of 
the Community, giving evidence of his solidarity with those in our 
Community  who  in  fact  want  to  see  the  European  Parliament 
playing a greater part. 
I believe that British membership of the European Economic 
Community  will  mean  a  great  stimulus  for  the  European  Par-
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The Chairman (F).-I call Mr. Ohlin. 
Mr.  Ohlin.  - I  must  begin  by  complementing  the  Rap-
porteurs  on  their  excellent  reports.  Mr.  Hougardy  gives  more 
than he promises,  as  he discusses not only problems in the short 
and medium run but some  very  interesting  long-term  questions. 
I shall confine myself to two points.  First, there are consider-
able  advantages  in  a  limited  flexibility  of  the  foreign  exchange 
rates instead of the present system of, on the whole, fixed parities. 
When we discuss future monetary reform, the possibility of build-
ing on a greater flexibility  should not be excluded. 
Mr. Petersen, in his excellent and useful report, mentions the 
system  of  a  "crawling  peg".  By  this  I  mean  a  system  of  the 
following type:  the par value of  a currency can· be modified step 
by step, but with a certain total maximum-such as  2 per cent-
in the course of a 12-month period.  One can maintain the normal 
margin for fluctuations of plus or minus three-quarters of one per 
cent which we have at present, or a little more.  These figures are 
chiefly used as  an illustration. 
It is  easy to see that speculators will not be able to profit as 
much, if we have such a system, as they do now, when a devalua-
tion of 5, 10 or 20 per cent offers  great chances of profits.  The 
foreign  exchange  market  in  future  deljveries  makes  it  possible 
for importers and exporters to find insurance against losses caused 
by these limited variations in the exchange rates. 
Secondly,  if  we  are to avoid  monetary crises  like  the  many 
we  have  had  since  the  war  and  escape  from  very  large 
foreign  exchange  variations,  then  a  very  uneven  develop-
ment  of  cost  of  production  levels  must  be  avoided.  Average 
costs per unit, not wage rates,  are what determine the conditions 
of competition,  as  productivity  may  vary.  But  as  productivity 
rises only slowly, variations in the wage rates are, of course, very 
important.  If  wage rates should rise about 10 per cent per annum 
in one country and 3 per cent per annum in another, and there is 
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ensue.  Balances-of-payments  will  get  out of  order,  and  in  due 
time-or perhaps one  should say  much later than would be  due 
time-we have a devaluation. 
The external value  of  a  currency has  a fairly  close  relation 
to its internal value, and if we disregard that we shall never create 
a  monetary system  that will  function welL  However,  the policy 
of governments cannot guarantee a parallel development of costs 
in  different  countries.  It is  not a  question  of  equal wage  rates. 
Both nominal and real wages  are higher in countries where pro-
ductivity is  high.  This is  a condition of natural competition and 
equilib11ium.  The problem is  that the variations in costs per unit 
of  output cannot be widely  different  year  after year  if  fixed,  or 
almost fixed,  foreign exchange rates are to be maintained.  If we 
try  to  keep  the  exchange  rates  fixed  nevertheless,  then  we  are 
sure  to  have  balance-of-payments  crises,  import  restrictions, 
import taxes  and unemployment. 
This influence of different  developments  in  the costs  of pro-
duction  in  different  countries  is  well  known.  The  problem  is 
seldom  taken  up  for  serious  debate  when  we  discuss  monetary 
reform  in  international  gatherings.  But  unless  we  solve  this 
problem of  cost developments  to  a  considerable  extent  the  only 
means of avoiding serious monetary crises will be a more flexible 
foreign exchange rate-more flexible than most of us really desire. 
But if we solve the problem, the real earnings of the workers and 
all  other groups in the population will  be higher,  because condi-
tions for production and trade will be more favourable. 
I  offer  no  solution  of  the  problem  of  how  we  are  to  avoid 
wide  discrepancies  in  the  developments  of  cost  levels.  I  only 
suggest  that  the  freedom  of  the  labour  market,  the  freedom  of 
action of trade unions and employer's organisations, is  considered 
so  important  in  most  Western  European  countries,  as  it  is  my 
own, that a natural method to be tried is  a voluntary co-ordination 
of  certain  aspects  of  wage  policy.  It will  take  time  to gain  an 
understanding  of  this  point  of  view.  But  in  the  realm  of  the 
International Labour Office  many things  have  been  discussed  in 
the past few  years which  were  considered much too  delicate be-
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If you  answer  that at present there is  no  chance of  solving 
this problem of limiting discrepancies in the development of cost 
levels,  then my answer is  twofold.  It is  possible that we  cannot 
do  much now, but we  must try,  and we  must at least begin with 
a discussion of this problem, for it is  important.  Secondly, if we 
cannot solve the problem of cost levels we must have considerable 
flexibility in the foreign exchange rates as  a useful reform of our 
monetary system.  It must be made in  such a way that the con-
ditions  of trade are as  favourable  as  possible  and the risks  of a 
damaging international speculation are as  small as possible. 
Unless  we  solve  problems  like  these-let  us  call  them 
medium-term monetary problems-there will be very serious set-
backs also in the solution of long-term problems, and setbacks in 
the whole work for Western European integration. 
The Chairman (F). - I call Mr. Oele. 
Mr. Oele (N).- Mr. Chairman, I must resist the temptation 
to speak at length  about the  most topical problem in  the  Com-
munity,  namely  how  the  current  disruptive  monetary  develop-
ments,  can be  prevented from  escalating as  they  threaten to do, 
before it is too late.  Quite clearly, a floating exchange rate for the 
foremost currency in the Community has shaken the foundations 
of economic collaboration.  It is  up to the competent EEC bodies 
-the Court of Justice which will discuss this question on Sunday, 
and the European Commission which will  deal  with it on Mon-
day-to halt this development before it is  too late.  As is  always 
the case in politics,  a choice will  have to be made between  two 
evils.  On the one hand, it is  important to prevent further specu-
lation  and  speculative  movements-and not only  in  the  French 
franc  and German mark.  On the other hand,  an  attempt must 
be made to keep the way open for continued and closer economic 
and  political  collaboration.  These  goals  are  not  easily  recon-
cilable;  the  outcome  will  have  to  be  a  compromise.  I  cannot 
say  a  great  deal  about  this.  It is  a  matter  which  is  of  prime 
concern to the European Parliament.  But I  should like .  to make 
one remark,  and I  think that in doing so  I  speak on behalf of a 
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It  is  that  floating  exchange  rates-this  can  be  proved  theo-
retically-are disastrous for  economic  collaboration  of  any  kind 
and  consequently  for  economic  collaboration  inside  the  Com-
munity.  Only a  somewhat wider margin of permitted variations 
in  exchange  rates  inside  the  Community  appears  to  us  to  be 
acceptable,  and then only  as  a  temporary  solution  for  a  transi-
tional  period  in  which  new  and  further-reaching  objectives  for 
economic  policy  collaboration  are  determined  and  agreed  upon. 
I know that these objectives have already been discussed and 
that certain proposals of a general nature have been made in the 
Barre Plan.  Agreement has been reached, but at a time when it 
was not yet possible to give concrete form to these proposals; and 
thereupon the monetary  crisis  escalated further  still.  I  think it 
will be seen in the weeks  and months ahead whether that agree-
ment in  principle,  achieved  last  July,  is  capable  of  turning  this 
particularly  dangerous  tide.  Our  experience  since  last  July 
scarcely leaves us in an optimistic frame of mind at this time.  It 
will require a vast amount of political courage, particularly on the 
part of  the  European Commission-perhaps even  more  courage 
than has been called for to date-to end this unfortunate course 
of  events.  I  wish  the  Commission  every  success.  But  I  am 
anxious to say this now because next week it may be too late. 
Much emphasis been laid on the need for national monetary 
self  -discipline.  The point is  men  Honed in the main conclusion of 
Mr.  Petersen,  Rapporteur  for  the  Council  of  Europe  on  the 
monetary situation.  I  must say  that the analysis he has  given  is 
extremely sound and interesting.  And I  should be  quite  happy 
with his  conclusion were  it not for  the fact  that,  though it may 
give  all  kinds  of facts  to  support it,  in my opinion it  takes  too 
little  account of  the  rapid  changes  that  are  taking  place  inside 
the  Community.  I  think Mr.  Petersen's  view  is  too  static  and 
takes  too  little  account  of  what  is  happening  in  monetary  and 
economic co-operation.  It is,  after all,  a fluid  situation. 
The  Rapporteur  states  that  given  national  self  -discipline, 
appropriate  machinery  for  monetary  co-operation will  not raise 
many problems.  I should like to know from Mr. Petersen wheth-
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co-operation  has  been  created,  then  this  very  fact  of  monetary 
co-operation,  together with existing  economic  co-operation,  gen-
erates  impulses  which  have  consequences  for  the  balance-of-
payments positions  and monetary situation in the member states 
and  in  states  participating  in  that  monetary  co-operation  and 
related economic co-operation. 
The truth is  that, precisely because this is  a  changing situa-
tion,  small  states  may fall  into  extra-monetary  difficulties  as  a 
result of  once  having  accepted  a  particular  procedure  for  eco-
nomic co-operation.  I  could give  examples to illustrate this,  but 
time  is  too  short.  But the fact  is  that whenever  a  country gets 
into difficulties  and is  tied to  a  particular form  of  economic  co-
operation,  then in  certain circumstances  this  can lead to trouble 
for  another  state's  balance-of-payments-trouble  maybe  in  the 
opposite direction  and maybe not.  The process  here is  one  in-
volving  common responsibility  and it is  therefore not enough to 
say that national self-discipline is  required. 
What is  required, indeed, is  interaction, and if states embark 
on economic and political co-operation, they must also be willing 
to adopt an attitude of solidarity and take a common share in the 
consequences. 
That is  the position in which the European Economic Com-
munity finds itself at the present time.  I think it is very important 
for this to be understood from a broader viewpoint. 
Mr.  Chairman,  that was  by way  of  a  theoretical  comment. 
To conclude, I should like to make an observation which is rather 
less  theoretical and relates to the conclusions of Mr. Hougardy's 
report.  It is  an  outstanding  report  which  gives  a  particularly 
admirable  analysis  and a  number  of  very  general conclusion  to 
which I  willingly  subscribe.  The third conclusion  strikes  me  as 
particularly apt. 
At the end of the report, where this  conclusion is  discussed, 
a parallel is  drawn between the creation of a  common economic 
policy and that of a common monetary policy. 
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that monetary policy  cannot  stand  alone,  can never  be  used  to 
exert pressure for further integration; rather must it be preceded, 
carried along as  it were,  by  joint medium-term economic  objec-
tives.  We  also  find  this  in the Barre Plan which I  mentioned  a 
moment  ago.  In  particular,  member  states  must  co-ordinate 
their action in the field of prices, incomes, employment, budgetary 
policy  and fiscal  policy;  these  must then be formulated  as  com-
mon economic objectives and adhered to. 
As you know,  the Barre Plan speaks only of consultation in 
these matters.  Nothing concrete is  proposed as  yet.  Agreement 
must first be reached in these fields;  only then can monetary co-
operation start to work.  This is  a small step in the right direction, 
but it is  no more than that. 
Now I have been wondering-and this is  a very fundamental 
and  also  a  political  problem:  if  that is  in  fact  so,  and it  is  so, 
because  everyone  here  has  argued  that monetary policy,  unlike 
the removal  of  trade barriers,  cannot be used as  a lever to pro-
mote  integration-what  is  there  that  could  serve  in  the  next 
phase as  a new instrument, a new outboard motor, as  it were, for 
the further integration of Europe?  Must it be the unification  of 
social  and  political  objectives?  Since  we  cannot do  everything 
at once,  must this  be the  ne~w propeller,  as  it were,  to  drive. the 
Community forward? 
I  think  I  speak for  my  friend  and colleague  Mr.  V  redeling 
and many people who are concerned for democracy, and also for 
my predecessor Mr.  Ohlin,  who  spoke of the  need for  clear co-
ordination in the field  of  wages  and  ~incomes policy,  when I  say 
that we  are pulling  the wool  over our own  eyes  if  we  think we 
can  achieve  further  integration  simply  by  the  joint  formulation 
of incomes-policy objectives. 
There  is  a  natural  law  at  work  here  which  suggests  an 
analogy with Liebig's law in agriculture: ,in  the growth of a plant 
or  any  living  organism,  the  growth  rate  is  determined  by  the 
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If we  compare all  the factors,  then I  am sure we  shall find 
that it  is  not the  willingness  to  combine  and  merge  social  and 
political objectives in themselves that has that lowest value.  The 
limiting factor is  the possibility of organisation at European level 
in accordance with a democratic procedure such that the peoples 
of the member states  do not lose  sight  of  their  own interests  in 
the  process.  As  for  the  need  for  further  integration  and  the 
requisite political will,  there  is  not so  much a  shortage  of theo-
retical  ins~ight  into  the  possibilities  of  co-ordinating  social  and 
political objectives,  as  a  shortage of  the means  of doing so  in  a 
democratic  and  acceptable  manner,  being  fair  to  the  different 
interests, evaluating them correctly and enabling them to express 
themselves  through  the  acquisition  of  politkal power.  And so 
I  come  to  the  main point,  which  Mr.  Vredeling  also  discussed. 
It is  also implicit in Mr. Ohlin's argument, when he says that we 
simply must try to give  the European Parliament,  the  European 
trade  union  movement  and  the  European  social  organisations 
greater opportunities to  express  themselves  at European level on 
incomes-policy objectives.  If we fail  to  do  that, then we  may as 
well forget the rest.  What is at issue above all is the strengthening 
of European democracy  and the  strengthening  of  the  powers  of 
the  European Parliament  and  the  European  trade  union  move-
ment, the aim being to arrive at an incomes, policy which the latter 
can  implement  and  sell  to  its  members  both  within  states  and 
across their frontiers.  No amount of theorising can be a substitute 
for  that.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (F). - I call Mr. Coe. 
Mr. Coe.- I welcome this opportunity of intervening briefly. 
At this Joint Meeting it is  appropriate to discuss monetary policy, 
which  is  highly  topical  and  very  important.  The  debate  has 
ranged from  qualified  pe,ssimism  to  qualified  optimism from  my 
friend and colleague Mr. Chapman.  He is  by nature an optimist 
but,  judging from  my  knowledge  of  him,  when  he  is  optimistic 
he is  usually right.  Yesterday he gave the meeting a great num-
ber of reasons giving rise to his qualified optim,ism. 
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lived  with  this  problem  since  the  end of  the  war,  and  we  have 
good reason to agree with the point made by Mr.  Petersen in his 
report  that confidence  is  such  an  important  factor  in  having  a 
stable monetary policy.  It depends above all on an understanding 
of the strength and weaknesses of individual economic policies in 
different countries.  This is particularly so in relation to a country 
like the United Kingdom which has a reserve currency. 
It  is  inevitable  that  Mr.  Hougardy's  report  dealing  with 
monetary policy and the other two reports before us  should have 
given  a  considerable  amount  of  attention  to  the  UK  position. 
Since Mr. Hougardy's report was published there has been a great 
deal  of  encouraging  news  about  the  UK  balance-of-payments, 
instead  of  the  s~ituation getting worse  as  the report was  inclined 
to  suggest.  This week  the British Chancellor of  the Exchequer, 
both  at  the  International  Monetary  Fund  and  at  the  Labour 
Party  Conference,  has  pointed  out  that  Britain  is  on  the  way 
to  a  surplus  of  £450  million.  This  excellent  result  has  been 
achieved by following  some  of  the  suggestions  which  Mr.  Hou-
gardy  included  in  his  report.  In  particular,  he  mentioned  the 
need  for  improved  competitiveness  of  British  industry.  The 
8.5 per cent improvement in industrial productivity since devalua-
tion, the changes in industry taking place through regional policies 
are all in line with the very points he made in his report. 
Secondly,  Mr.  Hougardy  suggested  the  need  for  cuts  in 
defence expenditure.  From the long-term estimates of five  years 
ago,  about £2,000 million has been lopped.  We  in Britain now 
spend more on social secudty and education than on defence. 
I make these points to underline the fact  that this economic 
improvement  gives  point  to  Britain's  application  to  join  EEC 
and  emphasises  the  important  role  she  can  play  in  the  future 
economic strength of Europe.  I was glad to hear Mr.  Vredeling 
this  morning  drawing  attention  to  the  important  speech  by  the 
British Foreign Secretary this  week  at Brighton.  I  believe  this 
adds up to stability in monetary policy. 
I  believe  that Mr.  Hougardy. was  rather  too  pessimistic  in 
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weaknesses  in the Western world's  economic  and monetary sys-
tems,  but  he  might  have  made  some  mention  of  the  fact  that 
such actions as  the introduction of the two-tier gold  market,  the 
Basle arrangements for the support of sterling and the agreements 
in  principle  for  supplementary  drawing  rights  suggest  definite 
improvements,  and I  am glad that Mr.  Petersen pointed  out in 
his  report that as  a  result  of  these  improvements,  provided  the 
central banks keep their nerve,  short-term speculators are bound 
to be defeated. 
Finally,  I  am glad that both Mr.  Petersen  and Mr.  Feder-
spiel pointed out that the measure of success with which govern-
ments  can tackle  the economic and monetary problems  depends 
on how far their measures can be "sold" to their parliament and 
people;  and as  politicians we  must always  have this  r~ight at the 
front of  our minds in  talking  about monetary policy.  I  am not 
a practising economist, but I recognise the problems facing inter-
national monetary institutions and above  all  I  plead that we  do 
not talk ourselves into a monetary crisis.  I believe, as Mr. Chap-
man  said  yesterday,' that we  are  in  for  a  period  of  continuous 
search for  greater monetary co-operation within  the more stable 
atmosphere which,  I  believe,  now exists.  Therefore,  I  welcome 
this debate and these three reports as contributions to the search 
for the best possible solution to these important problems. 
The Chairman (F). - I call Mr. Bertoli. 
Mr. Bertoli (1).- Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, we 
are discussing  European co-operation in the monetary field  at a 
time of international crisis whose most obvious and urgent aspects 
are the monetary ones: first the official devaluation of sterling and 
then  that of  the  franc;  Federal Germany's  decision  to  abandon 
the parity of the mark; pressure from some powers for  the reval-
uation  of  certain  currencies,  including  the  Italian  lira  and  the 
mark,  which  is  being  exerted  at  present  in  Washington  at the 
meetings  of  the  International Monetary Fund; spiralling interest 
rates;  movements  of  enormous  amounts  of  capital,  sometimes 
away from countries which, like my own, need to make the fullest 
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the adoption of  deflationary measures  in  various  countries,  par-
ticularly  in  the United States,  the  United Kingdom,  France and 
Germany. 
These facts  are interconnected,  and together  they represent 
the  monetary  aspect  of  a  situation  which  has  its  roots  in  the 
economy  of  the  various  countries,  in  their machinery for  devel-
opment,  in  their  economic  policies  and  indeed  in  their  general 
domestic and foreign policies. 
I  therefore  agree  with  the  comment  in  Mr.  Hougardy's 
report that 
"by their very  nature,  these  problems  have  political  causes 
and  effects", 
if,  as  seems  to  me  possible,  the  adjective  "political"  can  be ex-
tended to include also  economic policy. 
However,  if we  wish  to  find  ~the reasons for  the continually 
increasing  difficulties  of  the  world  economic  system,  we  must 
start from the notion that there is  in the world today a contradic-
tion  between  the  hegemony  of  the  United  States  over  all  the 
countries  of  the  non-communist  world  and the  requirements  of 
the  economic,  social  and  civil  development  of  these  count1;ies. 
This hegemony is apparent in the economic, political and military 
fields  as  well  as  in the  monetary field.  I  include  the  monetary 
field  inasmuch  as  the  dollar,  being now  the  single  key  currency 
for  the  international  monetary  system,  is  one  of  the  rimpor-
tant  instruments  by  which  this  hegemony  is  extended  and 
strengthened. 
I think perhaps we can interpret thus the phrase in Mr. Hou-
gardy's report which suggests  that the main cause of the· dollar's 
weakness is the world role which the United States feels obliged to 
play.  Naturally,  within  this  relationship  of hegemony  is  also  a 
whole range of dialectics:  differentiations, varying strength ratios, 
community and conflicts of interests.  All of this is  not static but 
dynamic, and therefore its quality changes as time goes by. 
The historical explanation of the  hegemony of  the dollar in 
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post-war  conditions.  American  productive  machinery  had  re-
mained intact and indeed had been considerably strengthened by 
the  enormous  war  effort,  while  the  European  nations  suffered 
almost complete destruction of their productive machinery.  The 
demands of reconstruction in the European countries resulted in 
large-scale imports from the United States of Amerka; hence the 
shortage  of  dollars  and  the  improvement  in  the  balance-of-
payments in the United States, which found its reserves increasing 
until they amounted to three quarters of the total available world 
gold  currency and half of the gold  and  currency reserves  of the 
whole world. 
This  was  the  situation  at Bretton  Woods  twenty-five  years 
ago.  Subsequently the  European countries,  continuing  the~ir re-
construction,  became  increasingly  independent  of  American  ex-
port; but, as  a result of the cold war, the war in Korea,  and the 
. continuing war in Vietnam, with the consequent tremendous mili-
tary  expenditure  abroad,  as  well  as  of  investments  in  Europe, 
which increased alarmingly (for example, they rose from  $2 mil-
liard in  1952 to  $15.5  milliard in  1965),  and finally  of the  aid 
given,  on political terms, to under-developed countries, the Ame-
rican balance-of-payments, although its  trade component remain-
ed  favourable,  became  more  and  more  unsatisfactory:  reserves 
diminished considerably, and the world was flooded with dollars, 
in  the  reserves  of  the  countries  that  had  a  surplus  and in  the 
possession of non-residents.  These are the so-called Eurodollars. 
With a monetary system based essentially on the dollar,  the 
United States  of America, unlike  any  other state, was for years, 
from  19 58 up to the present day-and there still is  a surplus-
able  to  support  ~the  decline  in  the  balance-of  -payments  without 
feeling any adverse effects; indeed, it reaped a certain advantage 
from the  point of view  of its  own expansion policy because  this 
was  partly  financed  by  the  credit  which  the  rest  of  the  world, 
particularly  the  European  countries,  extended  to  America  to 
balance their dollar and Eurodollar reserves. 
But this  credit,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  is  for  an  indefinite 
period,  or rather its date of expiry is  linked with the survival of 
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Increasing realisation of ,this  fact  throughout the world, rea-
lisation that the present monetary system enables the United States 
to  finance  its  own  development  and  extend  its  own  hegemony 
by making use of the actual resources of other countries, is  lead-
ing to a crisis in the international monetary system. 
It seems to me that, apart from any judgment on the motives 
that inspired its policy and on many aspects  of its political acti-
vities,  and  apart from  any judgment  on  the  solutions  proposed, 
France  should  be  given  the  credit  for  being  the  first  Western 
European  nation  to  take  action  to  remedy  this  situation.  It 
seems  to me indeed that this  action reveals  an  awareness of the 
existence  of  a  direct  link  between  monetary  facts  and  political 
and economic facts.  In fact,  France did not content itself with 
trying to convert its own dollar reserves into gold, but dissociated 
itself  to  some  extent  from  NATO  and  then-I  am  not  sure 
whether it would  do  the  same  today-stipulated as  an  essential 
pre-condition for  the renewal  of  the  international monetary sys-
tem, the restoration of the American balance-of  -payments. 
To escape fromthe present cr,isis it is necessary to take action 
to  free  our  countries  from  the  American  hegemony.  We  must 
therefore  practise  an  economic  policy  which  will  affect  all  the 
sectors of the life of our countries: first of all a policy for peace, 
where immediate action must consist in reviewing the position of 
our various countries in NATO and in recognising certain coun-
tries, such as  China and Vietnam; an economic and social devel-
opment policy which will  cover schools,  scientific research,  tech-
nology,  the  development  of  social  assets,  the  home,  health  and 
town-planning;  the  devlopment  of  internal  demand;  recovery 
from  the  sectoral  and  territorial  imbalances  in  our  countries; 
reform and decentralisation of  the state; democratic participation 
in authority and,  therefore, democratic planning. 
I shall not go into all these points.  It seems to me that if we 
are to solve  the monetary problems it is  essential for  control of 
liquidity to be in the hands of a  collective  supranational organi-
sation  that  would  be  free  from  the  supremacy  of  the  United 
States  and  of  groups  of  stronger  countries  such  as  the  Group 
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It seems  to me that the institution of special drawing rights, 
at present being discussed  at Washington,  would not be a  move 
in  this  direction,  because  special  drawing  rights  would  form  a 
part of the present system of so-called normal multilateral credits, 
that is  to say normal drawing rights,  stand-by credits, swaps and 
the  general  loan  agreements  of  1962;  and  also  because  special 
drawing  rights  would  be  allocated  according  to  percentage  con-
tributions  to the Fund, so  that, for  example,  in the first  year of 
allocation, out of $3.5 thousand million of special drawing rights 
$900  million  would  go  to  the  United  States,  $400  million  to 
Great Britain and only  $160 million to all the African countries 
and $325 million to  Latin America.  Finally, too, because draw-
ing  rights  would  be  administered  by  a  body  which,  even  with 
the change in the majority from 80 per cent to 85 per cent of the 
necessary quorum, would still be dominated by the United States 
system of alliances. 
Recent history seems to me to have provided an ironic com-
ment on some of the proposals in Mr.  Hougardy's report (this is 
nearly  all  I  have  to  say);  for  example  the  proposal that a  fixed 
exchange  rate  should  be  accepted  by  the  Community  as  a  first 
step towards a European currency, coming just when the Federal 
Republic of  Germany was  allowing the mark to float. 
Others, however,  which draw attention to  the links  between 
the foreign policies of member states, their econom:ic policies and 
monetary  problems,  may  be  regarded  as  a  positive  basis  for 
further exploration. 
Still  other proposals  of  Mr.  Hougardy's report,  such  as  the 
suggestion that the political organisations must be given a part in 
the decisions regarding the lines of economic and monetary policy, 
might have  immediate  consequences,  such  as,  for  example,  par-
ticipation  in  the  European  Parliament  of  political  forces  of  the 
left  which  are  not yet  represented,  and recognition  of  the  right 
of Italian left-wing parliamentarians sitting there to form a group. 
While  Mr.  Hougardy's report deserves  special credit for the 
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possible remedies for the present crisis of the monetary system, it 
seems to me  that its  general trend is  not entirely centred on the 
problem we  regard as  fundamental:  that is  to say, how we  are to 
overcome  the  contradiction between  United States  hegemony  in 
the monetary field  and the need for  the democratic and peaceful 
development of all our countries. 
For  that  reason,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  we  feel  that  we 
cannot vote in support of Mr. Hougardy's report. 
The Chairman (F). - I call Mr. Schulz. 
Mr. Schulz (G). -Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, for 
many years now the annual Joint Meeting of the European Parlia-
ment  and the  Consultative  Assembly  of the  Council  of  Europe 
in  this  Chamber  has  provided  an  opportunity  to  debate  the 
regrettable halt in the process  of European unification,  and par-
ticularly in the development of the European Community. 
This time it is  not just a halt but a serious  step  backwards. 
The  effects  of  the  French  devaluation  and  the  floating  of  the 
Deutsche  Mark  have  shaken  the  structure  of  the  agricultural 
Common Market and largely brought progress towards integration 
to a standstill.  I hope it will not be taken as an expression of the 
prejudice  of  a  member  of  the  German  delegation  to  the  Con-
sultative Assembly when I emphasise the pointlessness of trying to 
apportion blame  in  this  unhappy  process.  It is  often  said,  not 
least in politics,  that events  make the rules.  I  believe  that here 
the reverse has occurred.  In this instance, non-events have played 
a great part.  In recent days we have all been confronted with the 
fact  that  there  has  not  yet  been  sufficient  concrete  progress 
towards  European unity  to  withstand  disintegratory factors,  be-
cause  circumstances  have  proved  stronger  than  any  amount  of 
goodwill. 
But it is  not only this example which must give  us  pause for 
thought; we  must also  register,  partly in parallel with  the events 
of the recent weeks  and months,  a certain unmistakeable falling-
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Community  and  of the  Consultative  Assembly.  I  never  could 
understand the rather facile optimism of those who spoke in 1969 
of a "European Spring".  On the contrary, it seems to me that the 
erroneous  conception  is  gaining  ground  that  even  seriously  in-
tended  economic  integration  must  exclusively  benefit  the  par-
ticipating nation-states, if not the selfish interests of the respective 
countries.  Political  experiments,  especially  those  of  a  supra-
na:tional nature, are to be avoided. 
I  have no need to explain before this  gathering,  at least for 
the  overwhelming  majority,  how  wrong  this  attitude  is.  All  of 
us  here know that the  interests  of the  oitizens  of our countries, 
though not the interests of our countries' bureaucracies, would be 
best served by the  creation of the most  tightly-knit  Community 
possible,  which  sets  itself  political  aims  which  go  beyond  the 
economic field. 
And yet the opposite view-let me emphasise it once again-
which  wants  to  use  the  factors  of  economic  integration  pre-
dominantly to the benefit of existing nation-states on the basis of 
unrestricted  sovereignty,  is  currently  widespread.  That  was  at 
least the view taken by France while de  Gaulle was in office,  and 
'there has as  yet been no indication of any radical change in this 
attitude. 
I  frankly  admit,  Mr.  Chairman,  that,  as  a  European,  I  am 
also uneasy about the signs of what is happening in Great Britain. 
The proceedings of the last Labour Party Congress and a number 
of  utterances by leading politicians  and  statesmen show the way 
things  are going.  There are  a number of psychological' reasons 
for the fact that, in Great Britain, too-if I may put it this way-
the supranational tide has turned. 
These retrogressive  trends  should be seriously  considered at 
the forthcoming Summit Conference of the Six in November.  In 
my view,  they should be its main theme.  I hope you, in par,ticu-
lar, Mr.  Chairman, will forgive  me for  transposing a well-known 
dictum into what is  no  doubt very bad Latin.  I  hope you will 
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this  should be the  motto  of  our Summit Conference-ne malus 
detrimenti communitas capiat!  I  think it really will  be  a matter 
of  making serious joint efforts  to maintain and consolidate what 
we  have  already  achieved  and to  preserve  it from  falling  back 
still further. 
For  all  that,  I  believe  we  may  indulge  in  a  little  modest 
optimism.  We  should  e~press that optimism  here,  if only,  un-
fortunately,  in  a  merely  consultative  capacity  and  not  yet  as 
legislators  in  European policy,  and  address  it to  those  whom it 
concerns, especially the Council of Minis'ters  of  the Six. 
As  I  see  it,  this  relapse  can  be  remedied,  this  misfortune 
turned  to  advantage,  this  necessity  made  a  virtue,  if the  right 
conclusions are drawn from the recent upheavals. 
The partial integration of  agr<iculture  in the European Com-
munity-! do not wish to go  into greater detail here on the con-
flicting  interests  which  existed  in  the  late  fifties  and  early  six-
ties-has, in my  view,  proved to have been a  matter of putting 
the proverbial cart before the horse.  But even without the recent 
crises  it  would  inevitably  soon  have  been  subjected  to  serious 
strain. 
Through integration in this sphere, we  have built up an agri-
cultural market which was primarily a producer's market and did 
not  serve  the  consumer.  We  have  built  up  a  fund  which  has 
grown to DMlO,OOO million and over which there is as yet not the 
slightest  parliamentary  control,  or  at least  no  effective  control. 
These are in themselves two great public nuisances, even without 
the monetary upheavals which we  have recently witnessed.  The 
only conclusion which can be drawn, as  I  see it,  is  that we  must 
resolutely declare the fourth, fifth or sixth act of integration, which 
has until now been postponed because of reservations and existing 
circumstances,  as  the first  act  and  start afresh with  a  true har-
monisation of economic, cyclical and monetary po1icy. 
Even  then,  harmonisation  and  unification  of  the  various 
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cultural policy, harmonisation of  social and fiscal  policy will not 
in  future  be  achieved  automatically,  but  we  shall  have  a  firm 
foundation, a specific geometrical pattern on which to build them, 
in contrast to the present situation, in which this partial integration 
of  the  agricultural  market  has  been  projected  as  it were  into 
a vacuum,  where the individual institutions hovered in a strange 
sort of weightless condition, until such time as the force of gravity 
loomed up  on the  horizon,  threatening  to  precipitate  them  into 
the void. 
I  believe  we  should  here  formulate  a  further  conclusion  to 
be  addressed  to  the  planned .  Summit  Conference.  The  Com-
munity of the Six-as the year  1969 with its  various strains has 
quite clearly  shown-----is  by no means  so perfect,  so  fine,  sa har-
moniously organised as General de Gaulle in his day, for example, 
would have had it  appear, giving  that as  the  decisive  reason for 
reacting  sceptically  towards  other  candidates'  applications  for 
entry.  After  the  internal  contortions,  difficulties  and upheavals 
that we have experienced in the Community, the Members of this 
Community should enter into  the  membership  negotiations  with 
the  four  candidates-which  it  is  to  be  hoped  will  soon  take 
place-with more modesty and should declare from the outset as 
the  most  important  common  aim  a  joint  effort  with  the  four 
candidates,  even  during  the  transitional  period,  to  make  topic 
No.  1 their prime consideration:  the harmonisation of economic, 
cyclical and tax policy. 
Then  there  will  be  the  possibility  not  only  of  the  present 
member  states  and the  four  candidates  moving  closer  together, 
but also  of the same possibilities  arising,  with a similar member-
ship,  in WEU. 
I do not wish to pursue this subject further today, important 
and interesting  though it no  doubt  is.  I  should  merely  like  to 
point out what a multitude of urgent tasks for the future lie before 
us in Western Europe. 
Let me close with a deliberate political comment.  Over the 
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bly of the Council of Europe, we  have concerned ourselves here, 
in  this  Chamber,  with  the  much  discussed  European  Security 
Conference.  I  myself  am far  from  being  opposed  to  such  an 
event.  On the contrary, I  welcome  this move towards an initial 
exchange of views, which will no doubt be serious and frank, but 
will,  to begin with, I am firmly  convinced, reveal nothing but the 
continuing divergence of attitudes.  What I  cannot understand is 
why  this planned event is  labelled a "Security Conference".  For 
there  will  be  no  security  in  Western  Europe,  and  still  less  in 
Eastern Europe,  as  long  as  the Brezhnev  doctrine  exists  and  as 
long  as  Communism  continues  to  claim  to  be  the  only  road  to 
happiness. 
Any amount of intelligence and any amount of goodwill could 
not  change  anything  in  the  short  term,  given  the  present  state 
of tension. 
On our side, in the free  countries of Europe, a maximum of 
political  intelligence  certainly  exists,  but  unfortunately,  in  the 
sixties, it has not found expression in  progressive action, but has 
largely  exhausted  itself  in  conservative  excuses.  What goodwill 
there  has  been  has  shown  itself  primarily  in  our  unfortunately 
still  powerless  parliamentary assemblies  and  not where  concrete 
decisions should have been taken. 
For  the  future,  however,  goodwill,  even  if  we  mobilise  it 
anew  and as  an  urgent  priority,  will  not alone  be  sufficient  for 
a reinforcement of parliamentary rights and supervisory authority, 
but  we  shall  have  to  concern  ourselves  much  more  intensively 
with  scientific  forecasting,  which  until  now-if I  am  not  mis-
taken-has been  rather  neglected  in  the  European  institutions. 
For goodwill  can only  lead us  to the paths we  wish  to tread; it 
can  only  reveal  to  us  the  functions  which  must be  brought  to-
gether for the unification of Europe; but it can give us  no indica-
tion of how  future machinery actually can  function.  We  should 
therefore draw much more than we have in the past on science. 
All that will naturally take some time.  For those of us who 
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put it this  way-must wait  patiently if reluctantly  and not lose 
our nerve; and we must preserve the toughness we have mustered 
in the dark and gloomy days we  shared between 1963 and 1969. 
For all my sceptical attitude to the present, I am an optimist 
with regard to future  prospects  and I  shall remain one-indeed, 
I  must.  There would be plenty of time for pessimism if we  had 
still not achieved a federated Europe by the year 2000.  But we 
have not yet reached that point and so  let me  offer you  another 
paradox: the idealists of today, who are not prepared to  sacrifice 
their great vision of the future and are often scoffed at by the all 
too  down-to-earth  "realists"  of  today  because  of  their  allegedly 
utopian  at:titude,  will,  I  am  firmly  convinced,  be  the  realists  of 
tomorrow and the builders of Europe.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (F).- I call Mr. Cifarelli. 
Mr.  Cifarelli  ([).  - Mr.  Chairman,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
this  Joint Meeting of the Consultative  A'Ssembly  of the  Council 
of Europe and the European Parliament was called on to discuss 
monetary policy, which indicates that certain dramatic changes in 
the  currency  situation  of  European countries  which  have  taken 
place recently have not taken us  by surprise, inasmuch as,  owing 
particularly  to  the  Commission  of  the  Communities,  practical 
discussions  has started and practical measures had been planned 
to cope with pressing monetary problems. 
Nonetheless  today's  meeting  takes  place  against  a  dramatic 
background,  created  by  the  measure  for  the  revaluation  of  the 
mark  and  particularly  by  the  tension  that  has  arisen  between 
the Commission of the Communities and the Government of the 
Federal Republic  of Germany even during  this  admittedly  tran-
sitional  phase  in  which  that Federal Government  is  simply  dis-
posing  of  everyday  administrative  matters  pending  the  appoint-
ment of the new government. 
I have no hesitation in describing what has just taken place as 
the moment of truth.  Without any destructive pessimism or blind 
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cipated by those who, not only with an ideal before them-deter-
mination to construct a united Europe-but also with a persistent 
foresight  as  to  measures  to  be taken,  have  always  stressed  the 
need for  a European monetary policy closely  related to  a Euro-
pean capital  policy,  to  a  European economic  programme  (both 
short and long-term)  and to  a general economic policy. 
I would remind you here of the important conclusions of the 
Action  Committee  for  the  United  States  of  Europe  under  the 
chairmanship of Jean Monnet in which so great a part of the Trif-
fin  Report was incorporated.  I have already mentioned the Com-
mission's activities: I should like to stress what was said yes,terday 
by Mr.  Rey when he reminded us how the Barre Plan had been 
adopted.  That plan, in spite of  some criticisms in the Hougardy 
Report, is  valuable in my  view  particularly because  of  the close 
adherence to reality of the measures proposed therein, which are 
not attempting to do too much but strive to  do what is  absolutely 
essential. 
Yesterday afternoon Mr.  Chapman in  a  remarkable  speech 
said  substantially  that  although  the  monetary  upheavals  in  two 
of  the  great  states  of  the  Community,  France  and the  Federal 
Republic of  Germany, were most important, what had happened 
to the franc and the mark, with the devaluation of the former and 
the revaluation of the latter,  had removed two  serious  unknown 
factors  constituted  by  the  absurdity  of  a  difference  between  the 
actual and the theoretical values  of  both currencies.  Refusal to 
devalue the franc was  costing a  tremendous  amount and was  in 
contradiction to the true state of  affairs.  Refusal to revalue the 
mark was  equally unrealistic. 
The return  to  reality  was  undoubtedly  a  positive  step.  It 
must be considered dispassionately,  and from  that point of  view 
I  am in agreement with Mr.  Chapman's remarks  and with those 
made  by  Mr.  Hougardy  in  his  report,  and  by  other  members 
of  this  Assembly  who  have  pointed  out how  measures  for  the 
recovery  of  the  pound  sterling  by  means  of  the  curtailment  of 
public  expenditure  and  encouragement  for  the  British  export 
drive  were  creating  a  more  favourable  monetary  situation  for 
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What we  in this Assembly must however regard as  negative 
is  the way in which the measures for the franc  and for the mark 
were adopted, not merely without consulting the Communities but 
even,  I  might  say,  in  contradiction  to  them;  this  contradiction, 
particularly in the case of the mark, has not yet been solved and 
gives  us  all  grounds  for  concern  regarding  relations  between 
individual  states  and the  Community  organisations.  This  is  an 
extremely  important  point,  which  must  be  stressed,  since  the 
true way to European integration lies through respe,ct for  institu-
tions,  use  of the Community machinery,  patient toil to  adapt to 
reality the existing agreements, the institutions that are already in 
operation and policies that have already been planned. 
I consider that the measures adopted both by France and by 
Germany reflect a great and dangerous illusion. 
I  have read  a  catchword referring to  French policy:  "With 
the disappearance  of  de  Gaulle,  a  pretext has  been lost."  This 
is  as  much  as  to  say  that  certain  refusals  at  the  highest  level 
provided a  convenient alibi;  now that the situation has changed, 
not only  must different  directives  be  given  but we  must  review 
the European objectives that are actually being pursued. 
This  is  true  not  only  for  France but for  my  own  country, 
Italy,  and for  the  other countries  of the European Community. 
I  wish  to  stress  how  important it  is  from  this  point of  view  to 
realise  that  either  negative  or  positive  situations  may  induce 
illusions. 
When a currency is  in difficulties,  as  has happened with the 
French franc,  one may delude ·oneself into thinking that dangers 
can be overcome and harm avoided by merely national measures. 
Similarly,  in  a  situation  like  that  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany, where undoubtedly there is  an economic  boom and a 
strong currency  (some  people might  think too  strong),  one  may 
delude  oneself  into  thinking  that  the  problems  can  be  solved 
solely on a national level. 
If today we  can enter  something  on the  credit side  in  this 
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-as we  were  told  yesterday-has finally  adopted  the  provision 
necessary  to  open negotiations  with Britain and the  other  three 
countries  that have  applied for  membership.  This  undoubtedly 
is  a positive fact.  We hope-we shall do all we  can to persuade 
public opinion  in  this  direction~that as  soon  as  possible,  with 
the  summit  meeting  at  The  Hague,  the  political  bases  for  our 
Community  action  will  be  adequately  reconsidered,  both  as 
regards reactivation of Community policy and in terms of the ex-
pansion of the Communities. 
We have just heard an interesting speech by Mr.  Bertoli, of 
the European Parliament.  While I do not wish to enter into any 
argument,  I  must say  that I  disagree  with many of  his  remarks; 
I  shall  be  able  to  discuss  these  with  him  at  some  other  time 
elsewhere.  However,  there is  one  positive  factor in his  speech: 
he related the vicissitudes  of  the European currencies to those of 
the dollar,  and drew the conclusion that it was  necessary for  the 
European  currencies  to  be  restabilised  also  in  relation  to  their 
international function  in  view  of  the  growing  importance  of  the 
economies of the individual European countries and of the Com-
munity as a whole. 
If this is  possible, we must resort to a European currency, or 
at  least  to  a  European  currency  reserve  fund,  adopting  any 
measures that on a supranational plane will strengthen the possi-
bilities  of -restoring  the  balance without falling  back  on national 
solutions, which are proving increasingly inadequate and which we 
as  federalists  and  Europeans  must  undoubtedly  regard  as  quite 
inapplicable in practice. 
We  must  admit  that in  the  Rome  Treaties  a  common  eco-
nomic policy was  scarcely  touched upon;  we  must  admit  that a 
common monetary policy was practically outside the provisions of 
the Rome Treaties; that much progress has been made towards a 
common  agricultural  policy,  although,  as  we  know,  with  great 
difficulty.  In respect to  this  too,  however,  it is  necessary  to go 
ahead  on  fresh  bases.  Precisely  in  this  field  of  agricultural 
policies,  now  that from  a  simple  customs  union  and facilitation 
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aiming at common control of a whole sector, we come in contact 
with-I might say almost we  come up against-the hard facts  of 
monetary matters. 
But this does not surprise the federalists.  We had no inten-
tion  in  the  Rome  Treaties  of  bringing  about  a  mere  customs 
union;  we  did  not  desire  the  curious  and  absurd  situation  of 
member  states  being  interconnected  in  respect  of  some  policies 
and going their own national ways  in other matters.  We wished 
to  open  the  way  for  European  integration.  I  think  reassevtion 
of the Treaty and respect for  its  institutions,  and reassertion,  as 
has been stressed here (since it is the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council  of  Europe  and  the  European  Parliament  that  are  dis-
cussing these problems), of the absolute need to extend the Com-
munity  means  behav-ing  with  that guarded  optimism,  or,  if you 
like, with that non-suicidal pessimism, that is  incumbent on politi-
cians confronted with the present situation. 
With this  in mind,  while  I  express  my support for  the con-
clusions of the Hougardy Report, I hope that the Commission and 
the  Ministers  who  meet  at  The  Hague  in  November  will  bear 
in mind all the close-knit argument regarding the inter-relationship 
of these problems that our colleague Mr. Hougardy has taken as 
a  basis  for his  conclusions. 
Perhaps we  cannot do  everything and must beware of max-
imalism,  but certainly we  shall have to make some moves in the 
monetary field,  because on this field decisive battles for European 
integration will be fought.  (Applause.) 
The Chairman (F). - I call Mr. Rey, President of the Com-
mission of the European Communities. 
Mr. Rey, President of the Commission of the European Com-
munities  (F).  - Mr.  Chairman,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen,  the 
debate on European monetary problems,  decided on by our two 
Assemblies  last  spring,  has  turned  out  to  be  highly  topical  in 
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Things  have  been  happening  these  days,  on  which  I  will 
comment in  a moment,  which  show  how  very  unsatisfactory the 
present monetary position has become in the free world in general 
and in  the  Community,  or let  us  say  rather in the  continent  of 
Europe in particular. 
I  will not keep  you long,  Mr.  Chairman,  as  I  want to  con-
centrate on the  European scene.  In the space  of  two  years  we 
have had a series of crises: in October 1967, a crisis of the pound 
sterling  which  led  to  its  devaluation;  in  spring  1968,  a  dollar 
crisis  which  led  to  the  introduction  of  new  monetary measures; 
in November 1968, we were within 24 hours of a serious French 
monetary crisis; since May 1969 the German mark has been too 
healthy,  which has  caused a crisis there; in the last two months, 
we  have had the devaluation of the French franc at the beginning 
of August, and the floating of the Deutsche Mark at the beginning 
of this week. 
I  really do not think such a  state of affairs can be regarded 
as  satifactory. 
Naturally, it is  not my intention to .criticise the major mone-
tary authorities in Washington or to deny the great progress made 
in  the  free  world  since  the  last  war,  and  I  hasten  to  add  that, 
insofar  as  monetary  crises  arise  out  of  a  lack  of  harmony  be-
tween  the  monetary  position  and the  general  economic  position 
of  a  country  or region,  it is  obviously  not the monetary  system 
that is  to blame.  But what is  very noticeable is  the growing and 
in my  view  increasingly inadmissible part played in the variation 
of  rates  of  exchange  by purely  erratic movements  of  increasing 
amounts  of  unstable  capital which,  let us  admit,  are speculative 
in  character. 
Some  of  these  movements,  of  course,  can  be  justified  on 
economic grounds,  others less  and less  so,  and I  think it would 
be wise to face up to this and to ask ourselves whether the existing 
systems should not be improved or changed. 
To mention only the last two movements which have affected 
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French  Government  felt  obliged,  or thought it was  obliged,  to 
change the French exchange rate at the beginning of the month, 
was  not  due  simply  to  the  general  economic  situation;  it was 
due  to  the  speculation.  The person who  said  so  was  no  other 
than  Mr.  Pompidou,  President  of  the  French  Republic,  in  a 
public statement he made scarcely ten days ago. 
So far as the Federal Republic is  concerned, it is  quite clear 
that if the revaluation of  the mark has  been a  matter of  public 
discussion for  some months, and if the Government of the Fede-
ral Republic felt obliged less than six days ago to take the mone-
tary  decisions  you  all  know  about,  it  was  not  because  of  the 
general economic situation, but because speculative pressure had 
become  so  great  that  the  German  Government  felt  it  could  no 
longer resist it. 
This  state  of  affairs,  Ladies  and  Gentlement,  is  intolerable. 
Exchange  rates  should  be  fixed  either  by  the  central  banks  or 
by  the  governments.  It is  quite  inadmissible  for  them  to  be 
influenced in such a  dramatic way simply by speculative or irre-
sponsible  movements  of  capital.  When-as  happens  almost 
every  year-we hear that a  pleasure boat has  capsized because 
the passengers had all moved to one side,  and that some people 
have unfortunately been drowned, we  do not take it as  a matter 
of  course;  we  say  that  the  boat  was  badly  built  or had  been 
overloaded,  and  we  prosecute  the  captain  or  the  boat-builder, 
but we do not just accept that sort of situation. 
I think that is the position we have reached in the free world. 
It is becoming essential to start thinking more actively and dynam-
ically about ways  of remedying this  state of  affairs.  That is  the 
first thing I want to say. 
My  second  remark  is  about  the  consequences  for  Europe. 
For what is  barely  acceptable  in  the  free  world  becomes  quite 
intolerable in Europe. 
With  great  difficulty,  as  you  know,  we  are  in  process  of 
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One of  the  most important of  these  is  the common  agricultural 
policy, based on a common price system.  How can we  possibly 
reconcile perpetual monetary instability with making an integrated 
agricultural policy like ours work? 
I  am very  glad that my friend  and colleague Mr.  Mansholt 
is  here.  You know  that  these  policies  are mainly  the  fruits  of 
his  inspiration  and  workmanship.  Tey  have  been  followed  by 
the  successive  commissions,  the  Hallstein  Commission  and  then 
by  the  Commission of  Fourteen.  They have  been  approved by 
the European Parliament,  adopted unanimously by  our six  gov-
ernments,  and  put  into  operation.  And yet  we  find  ourselves 
in  a  position  of  monetary  instability  in  Europe  which  is  in 
process of compromising seriously the normal functioning of these 
policies. 
We  shall  have  an  opportunity  to  discuss  this  on  Monday 
at  the  meeting  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  for  which  we  have 
asked.  We  shall  also  have  an opportunity,  I  imagine,  of  doing 
so during this week in the European Parliament.  But the prob-
lem exists, and it is therefore absolutely essential to find a remedy 
for this state of affairs, and that quickly. 
The Commission believes that the remedy is  to be sought in 
two  directions:  first,  by  strengthening  economic  solidarity  and 
monetary  co-operation within  our six  countries.  As  you  know, 
we  have  adopted  a  plan  which  bears  the  name  of  our  Vice-
President,  Mr.  Barre.  This  plan,  adopted  on  12  February,  at 
first  ran into considerable opposition and many difficulties.  But 
as  time went  on,  people realised we  were  right,  and on 17  July 
the Council of  Ministers  of  our Community adopted the plan in 
principle.  Studies which will lead to  its final  implementation are 
now in progress.  I  have every reason to believe that before the 
end of the year the Barre Plan will be in operation.  It will, I  am 
sure,  make  a  very  useful  contribution  towards  improving  the 
monetary machinery inside the Community. 
The second direction in which a remedy can be sought is  in 
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We  are fully  aware that such  an  enlargement,  on which  all 
the  members  of  this  Assembly  have  set  their  hearts,  is  fraught 
with  difficult  technical  and  political problems.  In Brussels  this 
week,  we  issued  a  supplementary  opinion  to  that  of  1967,  in 
which  we  repeated  that  the  time  had  come  to  pursue  these 
negotiations, and gave certain indications as  to how and on what 
lines  they should be opened. 
Neither do we  underestimate the immense difficulties  that lie 
in our way.  But I  am quite  sure that if we succeed in  the near 
future  in  overcoming  these  difficulties  and  reaching  an  agree-
ment, we  shall have increased European stability,  we  shall  have 
broadened its foundations,  and we  shall also have contributed, at 
least  in  our  own  continent,  towards  finding  a  remedy  for  the 
monetary instability I have just been condemning. 
That and that alone is  what I  wanted to say in this  debate. 
As  a member of the Hallstein Commission, I  have taken part in 
these debates practically every year,  and I  know it is  traditional 
at this Joint Meeting not to adopt any motions. 
But something must come out of  this  debate.  My personal 
feeling is this: if the debates on the excellent reports by Mr. Hou-
gardy,  Mr.  Petersen  and  Mr.  Federspiel,  and  the  exchange  of 
views  which has taken place here during the last two  days,  have 
convinced us all that the instability of monetary systems in Europe 
is  no longer tolerable, and that we  must take rapid and energetic 
steps  to  remedy  it,  this  debate  will  have  been  of  some  value. 
(Applause.) 
The Chairman  (F). -We shall now hear speeches from  the 
Rapporteurs. 
I call Mr. Hougardy. 
Mr. Hougardy (F).- Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
I first wish to thank the speakers for the comments and observa-
tions they have been kind enough to make on my report.  As for 
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and Mr.  Federspiel  and  I  am  glad  to  note  that although-as I 
pointed out yesterday-there had unfortunately been no  contact 
between  the  Consultative  Assembly  and  the  European  Parlia-
ment-our conclusions  are  practically  identical;  that  is  a  point 
which needed stressing. 
In winding up this  debate, I think it is  fair to say that prac-
tically all  the speakers have  been in  agreement with the  conclu-
sions  which  we  ourselves  reached.  We  are  all  agreed  that  a 
political  solution  is  needed;  yet  the  answer  I  receive  is  that  a 
political solution is  impossible for the time being.  This I under-
stand; but the question then is:  what is  to be done? 
In the  remarkable  summary which he  has  just given  in his 
usual highly precise way,  Mr. Rey has quoted a number of dates 
to  emphasise  the  mass  of  obstacles  and  major  problems  with 
which  Europe  has  been  faced.  He  has  emphasised  that  the 
Barre Plan is  to be implemented by the end of the year; that will 
be  a  first  step  forward.  Nevertheless-and  I  have  just  found 
amongst my notes one of the observations on Mr. Barre's plan-
I  should  like  to  draw your  attention  to  the  fact  that the  Com-
mission  attached  to  that  Memorandum  a  draft  decision  of  the 
Council  of  Ministers  recommending  that  member  states  should 
take  no  major  decisions  on  economic  policy  until  the  relevant 
problems had been  discussed  in  depth by  the  three  appropriate 
bodies-the Monetary  Committee,  the  Economic  Policy  Com-
mittee and the Budgetary Policy Committee. 
How  right  that  Memorandum  was!  Unfortunately,  it  is 
qualified  by  the  words:  "unless  prevented  by  force  of  cir-
cumstance". 
That is the crux of the problem.  Too often, in fact,  the claim 
that circumstances prevent such consultations is used as a pretext, 
and  that  is  why  we  today  are  faced  with  the  situation  you  all 
know about. 
Some  speakers have  said  that my  conclusions went  too  far. 
I  would point  out that in  section  1  of  my  report,  I  state  quite 
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"We are  all  becoming more and more clearly  aware of 
the need to achieve this aim,  and there is  a growing tendency 
to  see  a  solution  to  the  world's  monetary  problems  in  the 
setting  of  a  'European  monetary  area'  or  a  'European 
reserve  currency'.  But  such  schemes  can  certainly  not  be 
carried  through  immediately.  To  begin  with,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  establish  intermediate  objectives  and  work 
towards  minimum  conditions." 
Further on, in section 14, I add: 
"But  before  these  further  minimum  measures  become 
necessary, the first set of minimum measures must have been 
implemented-politically." 
The word "politically" is  underlined. 
In section  18, I continue as follows: 
"No  doubt  the  policy  of  purely  economic  integration 
creates and intensifies the need for a common policy.  But it 
comes  close  to  the  nerve  centres  of  national  politics,  and 
every decision which the member states can no longer avoid 
takes  them  farther  along  this  path.  For  the  need  of  a 
common policy is not the same thing as  the policy itself, any 
more  than  the  aggravation  of  an  illness  implies  its  cure. 
Until there is  a minimum of agreement on the general policy 
aims  of the Community's member states ...  " 
-and I  am  in  agreement  with  a  number  of  speakers  here-
".. . any success achieved in economic integration will inevi-
tably go  hand in hand with  an exacerbation of the political 
crisis  through which  Western Europe is  passing,  though the 
aim  of  political  unity  will  not  automatically  be  brought 
closer." 
The proposals put forward by Mr.  Glinne and Mr. Boersma 
interested me  greatly.  I  hope that Mr.  Glinne's  will  bear fruit. 
I would remind him, however, by way of reply, of the final para-
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"Clearly,  a  procedure  whereby  only  losses  were  borne 
jointly  would  be  politically  unacceptable.  Community  ar-
rangements  cannot  relate  to  expenditure  alone.  Proposals 
of  this  kind  appeal  only  to  those  whom  they  enable  to 
exercise  equal  influence  on  measures  to  stimulate  and  to 
curb  expansion  and  also  to  affect  a  partner's  policy  on 
public expenditure.  As  things  are  at present, this would be 
feasible  only  with  compulsory  co-ordination  of  economic 
policies." 
Once  again,  however,  Mr.  Glinne,  I  think  your  proposal 
deserves to be pursued. 
I  congratulate  Mr.  Chapman  on  his  optimism.  Perhaps 
it should be pointed out that it was  this  same famous  optimism 
which  enabled  Great Britain to  stand up to the  enemy  for  four 
years.  It might be as  well for this to be stressed at a time when 
certain Eastern European states are celebrating the 25th anniver-
sary of the liberation of their country. 
What struck  me  as  most  significant  in  Mr.  Chapman's  re-
marks  was  the fact  that Great Britain's trade balance will  show 
a surplus of about 1,000 million dollars by the end of  1969 and 
that the process  of restructuring British industry  is  going  ahead. 
I  think  that  this  effort  and  the  expected  surplus  in  the 
British balance-of-payments  will  be extremely  important factors 
in the future  development of  the  monetary problems now facing 
Europe. 
Mr. Dequae, I should like to thank you for the opinions you 
expressed.  You  have  spoken  with  the  authority  of  a  former 
finance  minister.  I  think  that  the  standpoint  you  took  clearly 
demonstrates all the dangers inherent in this  situation. 
There  is  one  point,  Mr.  Dequae,  on  which  I  cannot fully 
share  your  opinion,  and it  is  the  amount  of  Eurodollars  which 
you  quoted.  I  think  the  actual  figure  is  much higher;  but this 
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Mr. Vredeling mentioned an article in the Guardian which, I 
must  confess,  had  completely  escaped  my  notice.  The  figures 
he  quotes  are  extremely  interesting  and  would  be  a  suitable 
subject  for  discussion  by  our  own  Parliament's  Political  Com-
mittee  and  Economic  Committee,  since  they  cast  a  particularly 
interesting light on the monetary situation in Europe and under-
line  the effect  which  trade can have  on economic  developments 
in our six countries. 
I  am sorry to have to say to Mr. Ohlin that I  am unable to 
agree with  his  proposals. 
Of course, Mr. Ohlin, with the system that you recommend, 
that is  to say  a flexibility  margin of about 2 per cent, it may be 
possible to insure more easily against exchange risks. 
All  the  same,  I  should  like  to  draw  the  attention  of  this 
Assembly to  the fact that insurance cover for exchange risks will 
have its effect on cost prices. 
You know  as  well  as  I  do  how much insurance rates  have 
increased in recent times, precisely because of the difficulties,  and 
even dangers, inherent in such insurance. 
And if exchange rates affect cost prices,  to  nobody's advan-
tage,  the  result will  be lower profits,  at a  time  when  productive 
investment  is  still  difficult  to  achieve  in some  countries  because 
of constantly dwindling profits. 
And so  I  would  ask Mr.  Ohlin-and I  think  he will  agree 
with me because he himself has. admitted, in his  own words, that 
he has no immediate solution to offer-I would ask what is  to be 
done to prevent large differences in exchange rates from becoming 
the norm over excessively long periods. 
Lastly,  I  would  like  to  thank  Mr.  Couste  for  the  positive 
contribution he has made to this discussion. 
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Mr.  Oele's opinion that everything possible must be done to put 
an end to the distorted monetary situation in Europe before it is 
too late. 
The Chairman (F).-I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Petersen. 
Mr. Petersen.- There are no texts to be voted on at the end 
of  the debate,  but it seems  to  me that the conclusion  drawn by 
Mr.  Rey at the end of his speech may serve as  an official resolu-
tion.  All members of the two Assemblies will agree that monetary 
instability in Europe is  intolerable  and that remedies have to be 
found urgently. 
Mr. Rey mentioned the importance of speculation in connec-
tion  with  the  latest  two  events  in  European monetary  develop-
ments,  in  August  and  this  week.  There  are  two  reasons  for 
monetary disturbance.  One is a difference in unit costs of produc-
tion and the other is  speculation.  In the short term,  speculation 
is  the more dangerous.  But I believe that it is  easier to counter-
act speculation.  The co-operating central banks know  the  tech-
nique.  If there  was  also  the  political  will  that  problem  could 
be handled. 
It is  impossible for a Rapporteur to touch upon all the points 
raised  in  the  debate,  but I  want  to  say  something  on  a  matter 
stressed  by  Mr.  Hougardy  in  his  reply-the  theory  of  more 
flexible  exchange rates and especially what is  now known as  the 
"crawling pegs".  I  believe that, sensibly handled, this  technique 
may  solve  the  problem of  uneven  development  in  unit  costs  _of 
production.  It is  easier to  solve  the  problems that way  than to 
have  a  restrictive  wage  policy  and  other  restrictive  economic 
measures in individual countries.  The system of "crawling pegs" 
would have to be combined with wider margins  of fluctuation in 
the  daily  movement  of  the  exchange  rates.  If we  had  a  well-
organised  forward  market,  exporters  and  importers  might  have 
a safe basis for their calculations.  More attention should be paid 
to  "crawling  pegs",  because  we  might  have  a  means  of  getting 
away  from  the  devaluations  or  revaluations  which  now  disturb 
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As  to  preventing  foreign  exchange  crises,  may  I  be 
allowed  to  mention  what  might be  called  the  Norwegian  type 
of  foreign  exchange  policy.  Except  for  the  past  two  years, 
Norway  has  had  a  substantial  deficit  on  foreign  exchange 
balance  in  the  post-war  period,  but  we  have  not  had  any 
crises.  The  reason  is  that  we  have  been  able  and  willing  to 
borrow long-term  not only  to  cover  all  the  deficits  but also  to 
increase  our monetary  reserves.  If countries  which  cannot  ex-
port enough to cover  their  imports were  more willing  to  export 
securities, which can always be produced, there would be a better 
balance in  the foreign  exchange  markets.  Of  course,  that will 
be at a price.  One must pay an attractive rate of interest to the 
lenders, but for about twenty years in Norway we have found that 
the price is well worth it. 
The Chairman (F). - I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Federspiel. 
Mr. Federspiel. - I shall not prolong this summing up, which 
President Jean Rey  did  so  admirably  and  which  my  two  col-
leagues rounded up on a number of economic questions. 
This  debate  has  brought  out  one  thing  without  any  teal 
controversy  ·except  on minor  technical  points-the necessity  of 
combining political action with whatever technical manipulations 
one can do with the currencies which are creating more and more 
trouble.  I  see some hope in that because it may dr-ive  our gov-
ernments  to  consider  political  action  also  in  other  cases~  being 
forced  by this  need to look seriously at the monetary problems. 
The Chairman (F).  I call Mr. Kirk, Chairman of the Political 
Affairs Committee. 
Mr. Kirk.- I  want first of all on behalf of the members of 
the Consultative Assembly  to thank our colleagues  of  the Euro-
pean Parliament for  joining us  in  what I  think has  been  a  very 
fruitful  two-day  discussion,  and  on behalf  of  all  of us  to  thank 
the three Rapporteurs for the work they have done in this field. 
I  must  admit  that  when  the  subject  was  first  suggested,  I  had 
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these  two  days.  It seemed to  me that the  discussion  was  likely 
to  become  something  like  the  medieval  discussions  about  the 
procession of the Holy Ghost,  getting more  and more arcane as 
the two  days  went  on,  but as  Mr.  Rey,  whom  we  are delighted 
to see with his colleagues, said, the events of the last two months 
have given the debate an actuality which in the spring it did not 
appear  that it  would  possess.  In consequence,  we  have  had  a 
very  solid manifestation  on the part of  the  Commission  and on 
the part of  the  members  of the  two  Assemblies  of  the need for 
some  solution  to  the  constant  instability  of monetary problems, 
not only in Europe but outside Europe as  well. 
As Mr.  Rey pointed out, for  instance,  one of the keystones 
of the Community's policy-the common agricultural policy-has 
been  very  severely  threatened.  This  creates  problems  not  only 
for them and their Commission but, if I may speak not as  Chair-
man of  the Political Committee but as  a British delegate, for us. 
Until now we have been informed that that policy was  as immut-
able as  the Ten Commandments carved on tablets of stone which 
could  not  be  touched,  but  now  two  leadings  Members  of  the 
Community  have  found  no  difficulty  in  touching  it very  hard. 
I  assure Mr. Rey that Britain will  be hoping for a quick solution 
of the problem, like him and Dr.  Mansholt, because it will  com-
plicate  our  approaches  in  the  common  negotiations  unless  we 
know where we stand in the matter. 
The trouble with all these arguments such as we have had in 
these  two  days  is  that  they  are  a  great  demonstration  of  the 
unsatisfactory nature of  the .  present state  of  affairs,  and  around 
the  arguments  revolve  the  experts  who  always  remind  me  of 
Mr.  Belloc's  doctors  who  murmured  as  they  took  their  fees, 
"There is  no cure for  this  disease",  who  never  come  up with  a 
solution  other  than  did  Mr.  Rey in his  announcement  that the 
present solution is  intolerable and we  must do  something  about 
it.  He says  the Six  must do  something.  That is  perfectly true. 
But the Six  alone  cannot settle  the  problem  even  among  them-
selves.  The two  major reserve currencies are not represented in 
the Six.  They cannot even solve the problem with the  applicant 
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of  the  dollar is  fundamental to  all  this.  It is  a  problem  which 
affects us  in Europe more than any other par.t  of the world; and 
yet it cannot be solved by Europe alone. 
The  answer  is  a  new  kind  of  Bretton  Woods  Conference. 
We have been moving towards it for a long time.  There was the 
development at Rio 18  months ago.  The development of special 
drawing rights  is  all  a patching up of  the  present situation,  and 
yet  surely  it would  be right  to  say  that  twenty-five  years  after 
Bretton Woods  we  cannot exist entirely on a  system  laid  down 
in circumstances  that were totally different from  those  of  today. 
Those were the days when Europe was  an economic disaster area 
and the United States was a wealthy partner.  I would not say that 
America is  now a disaster area, but Europe has economic riches 
and it is  now time  to  look again  at the problems  of the  system 
set up at Bretton Woods to see what we can put right and whether 
or not we  might  start afresh.  To discuss  things  like  "crawling 
pegs"  and "floating  marks"  in  isolation means  that we  are  kid-
ding  ourselves  that we  can patch up  the  pr·esent  system.  I  do 
not believe we can. 
I  am  no  monetary  expert.  I  have  listened  with  admiration 
to  speeches  made by people cutting their way  through the laby-
rinth we  are in at present.  It has been a very useful debate but 
may I  conclude with one word for  consideration.  I  think it has 
been to some  extent fortuitous  in  that is  followed the events  of 
the last  two  months.  I  would  suggest,  with  great  respect,  that 
before  our  next  annual meeting  it might  be  a  good  idea  if  the 
Bureaux of  the  two  Assemblies  could  have  a  look  at  the  form 
which  this  annual  meeting  takes  to  see  whether,  after  sixteen 
years,  we  might not be able to  find  better ways  of  carrying  out 
our  affairs.  Originally  the  meeting  was  designed  to  inform  the 
British and other non-Community countries of the workings of the 
Coal  and  Steel  Community  and  the  Parliamentary  Assembly. 
There  is  now  a  sort  of  ritual  which  we  went  through  with 
Mr. Hougardy's report, that is,  that we  receive a report from the 
European  Parliament  at  the  beginning  of  the  proceedings  and 
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Instead,  we  have,  over  the  last  few  years,  been  selecting 
particular themes,  mainly in  advance, in the hope  that they will 
be  reasonably  topical  when  we  come  together.  I  feel  that  we 
should  look  at  this  again,  not  necessarily  because  it  is  wrong 
but because to choose a theme of this  technicality as  early as  we 
do  in  the hope  that it  will  turn out,  as  it  did  this  week,  to  be 
topical,  could lead  to very grave  difficulties.  It is  possible  that 
we could make this procedure slightly better than it is now. 
It only remains for me on behalf of the Political Committee 
and, I hope, the Assembly, to thank everyone who has contributed 
to  the  debates,  particulady  the  President  and  members  of  the 
European Commission for  coming here and giving  such an edge 
to  our discussions,  and to hope that in future  years  we  may be 
able  to  achieve  topicality  without  necessarily  being  as  technical 
as we have been over the last two days. 
2.  Closure of the Joint Meeting 
The Chairman (F).- In connection with what Mr. Kirk has 
just said, I have to inform you that a short working meeting was 
held  yesterday  as  <the  result  of  negotiations  between  the  groups 
of the two Assemblies, and President Scelba and myself proposed 
that the form  and time  of the Joint Meetings should be changed 
--though of course the matter must be referred to the organs  of 
the two Assemblies.  We could also review, of course, the way in 
which Joint Meetings are prepared and the choice of subjects. 
The fact is  that when the meeting which has taken place here 
yesterday and today was first suggested, there was a good deal of 
sceptical  comment  in  both  our  Assemblies.  Whether  as  the 
result of  a  decision by the German Government or as  the result 
of  speculation-! am  inclined  to  think  it was  speculation-our 
work has acquired an interest and a topicality which it might well 
have lacked. 
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general European negotiations which have been talked about for 
so long but which have not yet managed to get off the ground. 
I  think  there can be no  doubt  about  the  value  for  both of 
our  Assemblies  of  a  Joint  Meeting  held  once  ,every  year,  and 
you  may  rely  on  those  responsible  for  the  organisation  of  this 
Assembly's work to devise  ways  of  improving a  sixteen-year-old 
institution  which  has  sometimes  been  manifestly  useful  and 
sometimes been viewed with a  certain scepticism,  as  I  have just 
mentioned, but which in any event will be preserved. 
I  therefore hope to see  you again  at the 17th Joint Meeting 
of members of  the European Parliament and of the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
In closing  this  16th  Joint  Meeting,  I  should  like  again  to 
express  my  special thanks  to  the Rapporteurs  and the members 
of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  who  have 
rendered such outstanding service in the organisation and holding 
of these debates. 
The 16th Joint Meeting is at an end. 
The Sitting is  closed. 
The Sitting was closed at 12.15 p.m. 